A re-examination and reinterpretation of the records of the presocratics and earlier from an ATR (Argumentative Theory of Reason) perspective : the development of reasoning in Greece in the form of “devising and evaluating arguments intended to persuade” by Armfield, Greg
 
WINING AND DINING* 
 
A Re-examination and Reinterpretation  
of the Records of the Presocratics  
and Earlier from an ATR  




The development of reasoning in Greece in the form of “devising and 















Submitted for the degree of Masters of Arts in Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 





Aristotle was the founder of logic. He said that there was nothing like it earlier. Interpretations of 
the records of the presocratics from a classical theory of reasoning (CTR) perspective give the 
‘traditional account’ of the development of ‘Greek rationalism’. That is, an account of the Greeks 
becoming better at discovering the world through a process of forward inference: ratiocination. 
The recent argumentative theory of reason (ATR) of Sperber and Mercier provides an alternative 
perspective through which to interpret, or reinterpret these same records. According to the theory, 
the main function of reasoning is the devising and evaluating of arguments intended to persuade. 
This suggests a process of backward inference in order to support ideas that have arisen intuitively 
or in some other way. In applying this new perspective to the records, the result is that the Greeks 
did develop as reasoners, but more in the ATR sense until Plato. That is, the Greeks, over time, 
became better at devising and evaluating arguments, which were then used to support their ideas 
and speculations. Together these ideas and their supporting arguments became the theories the 
Greeks are known for. In other words, the Greeks developed first as rational persuaders with a 
variety of physical ideas and speculations about the world.  
 
At some point in the development, the Greeks recognised what it is to reason and its utility in the 
context of the law courts and the political assembly. Over a period of time, they came to 
understand, formalise and teach and learn the ways and methods of reasoning in the ATR sense. 
Once this was understood, there is evidence that it was then consciously and deliberately applied 
in attempts to discover the world through the process of forward inference. This all occurred well 
before Aristotle. To conclude, there was not nothing at all before Aristotle. He systematised what 
had already been formalised in coming up with logic. But formalised methods of reasoning, both 
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1.0  THE INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Preamble 
 
The question of how we reason is being answered by psychology. The question of why we reason, 
its function or purpose, is also being addressed. Do we reason to conclusions or do we reason from 
conclusions? The first could be considered forward inference, while the second could be 
considered backwards inference, but it is not as simple as this. If we reason from conclusions, we 
know where we want to end up, the conclusion; all we need to do is decide where to start—our 
opening premise. If we reason to conclusions, we need to start with our opening premise, assumed 
or proven to be true, with no clear idea of where we want to end up. But, through the process of 
ratiocination, we will end up with a conclusion of one sort or another. If we are working towards a 
conclusion of which we have some inkling, then we are back with reasoning from conclusions. 
 
If considering the development of reasoning, we need to consider both forward and backward 
inferencing, reasoning to and from conclusions. Reason has generally been considered in classical 
theories of reasoning as forward inference, and historical accounts of its development are from this 
perspective: starting with true propositions (what Aristotle calls the immediate or first premise), or 
ones that can be demonstrated to be true, adding more true propositions in accordance with 
principles of validity, resulting in true conclusions,.  
 
One recent alternative approach resulting from the argumentative theory of reason argues that 
backward inferencing from intuitively arising ideas (conclusions) is perhaps more natural. Ideas 
arise, we take them to be true, and we then seek to persuade others to believe us (to accept them). 
This is where the use of reason and argument is needed. We do the bulk of our reasoning after the 
fact, either confabulating arguments to support our ideas and persuade others to accept them, or 
evaluating the arguments they are using in trying to persuade us. As a result, there is 
improvement in the devising and evaluating of reasons or arguments intended to persuade.  
 
Two of Aristotle’s claims are the starting point for this thesis: (1) that he invented logic, and (2) that 
there was nothing at all like it (logic) earlier. The account below, therefore, starts with Aristotle’s 
ideas about logic and argument. Although his works can be used as support for classical theories 
of reasoning, forward inferencing, this is not unequivocal. As will be seen below, he was aware of 
the problem that the argumentative theory of reasoning addresses, of how (or even whether it is 
possible) to prove the immediate (first) premise to be true. He seems to have concluded that some 
ideas just arise and are taken to be true. In other words, there is some alignment between Aristotle 
and the argumentative theory of reasoning.  
 
If Aristotle is considered a crucial point in the development of Greek reasoning, any account of 
what preceded him should seek to explain when, how and why. This has already been done, as 
any history of Greek philosophy text will attest. However, these accounts have interpreted the 
ancient texts and records from a classical theories of reasoning perspective: the Greeks developed 
as forward inferencers, basically from Thales onward. Aristotle and his logic can therefore be 
considered the culmination of this development. He systematised what had been undergoing 
formalisation for some time.  
 
If we understand the argumentative theory of reasoning and then apply it to the same texts and 
records mentioned above, will the result be the same? Or, will it become apparent that the 
development was not of the Greeks as invariably forward inferencers but as initially and naturally 
backward inferencers? Or, somewhere in between? It may not be possible to answer this question 
2 | P a g e  
conclusively, but it seems it will be worth the effort. It could mean that our perception of the 
Greeks as natural philosophers (scientists) may need to be changed or modified to include the 
Greeks as masters of persuasion. The story starts with Aristotle. 
 
 
1.2  The development of logic 
 
William and Martha Kneale’s Development of Logic (1962) is one of the most regularly cited histories 
of logic. The first paragraph gives as good a definition as any of the topic and of the significance of 
its ‘founder’, Aristotle. 
 
Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inference; and it is certain that men made 
inferences and criticised the inferences of others long before the time of Aristotle. This is not 
enough in itself to justify us in saying that there must have been a beginning of logic before 
the time of Aristotle; for men may perform various activities correctly (e.g. talk English) 
without formulating the rules for those activities explicitly. But it is clear from what we find 
in Plato and Aristotle and other sources that Greek philosophers had begun to discuss the 
principles of valid inference before Aristotle wrote those works which came to be known as 
the Organon (Kneale and Kneale, 1962, p.1). 
 
In the six works of the Organon1 Aristotle develops a full set of rules and principles for logic. For 
him, logic is an art and not a science.2 However, it is an art that can be used to discover and 
understand the various sciences, and an art that went on to become the tool (or instrument = 
organon) of Western thought. Before considering his logic, it might be an idea to consider his 
explanation for how these sorts of things arise and develop in general. 
 
 
1.3  Aristotle’s explanation of discoveries and development 
 
Whether the developmental model in his Sophistical Refutations originated with him or with 
someone else is not mentioned. Since it is a model for discoveries, innovations, and variations in 
general, this should be taken to include the development of logic itself (logos) and the process of 
reasoning (logos). 
 
For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous labours that have been handed down 
from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the 
original discoveries generally make an advance that is small at first though much more 
useful than the development which later springs out of them. For it may be that in 
everything, as the saying is, ‘the first start is the main part’; and for this reason it is the most 
difficult; for in proportion as it is most potent in its influence, so it is smallest in its compass 
and therefore most difficult to see—but when this is once discovered, it is easier to add and 
develop the remainder (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 183b15). 
 
                                                     
1 Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations 
2 Science = episteme = knowledge. Art = tekhne = doing. Knowing versus doing. 
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“In the case of all discoveries …” Aristotle is clear that this is a general model, applicable to all 
discoveries and developments. An original innovation or realisation is taken up and handed on, 
leading to the full flowering of some art or science. That there always must be a starting 
innovation, variation, or realisation accords with Aristotle’s ideas of knowledge and original 
causes; in fact, Aristotle is quite clear as to what constitutes knowledge and understanding:  
 
In every line of inquiry into something that has principles or causes or elements, we achieve 
knowledge—that is, scientific knowledge—by knowing them; for we think we know a thing 
when we know its primary causes and primary principles, all the way to its elements 
(Aristotle, Physics 184a10). 
 
And again, with further explanation of the nature of causes . . . 
  
We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to 
knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know 
the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, 
that the fact could not be other than it is (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 70b9). 
 
Now . . . we should consider how many and what sorts of causes there are. For our inquiry 
aims at knowledge; and we think we know something only when we find the reason why it 
is so, i.e. when we find its primary cause (Aristotle, Physics 194b16). 
 
“. . . advanced bit by bit . . .” There is an original cause, ‘the first start is the main part’, which, 
while most difficult to see, once discovered can be added to in order to develop a full account of 
the development. Aristotle’s developmental model should be able to account for his discoveries, 
the development of logic, the rules of reasoning, the principles of valid inference, in the context of 
earlier discoveries and developments.  
 
Aristotle illustrates his model of development with the example of the art of rhetoric: ‘the 
counterpart of dialectic’ (Rhetoric 1354a1) and which, for Aristotle, is a ‘technical study’ “concerned 
with modes of persuasion” (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1355a4).  
 
This [sort of development] is in fact what has happened in regard to rhetorical speeches and 
to practically all the other arts, for those who discovered the beginnings of them advanced 
them in all only a little way, whereas the celebrities of today are the heirs (so to speak) of a 
long succession of men who have advanced them bit by bit, and so have developed them to 
their present form, Tisias coming next after the first founders, then Thrasymachus after 
Tisias, and Theodorus next to him, while several people have made their several 
contributions to it; and therefore it is not to be wondered at that the art has attained 
considerable dimensions (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 183b25). 
 
Rhetoric, before the sophists took it up around the middle of the fifth century, consisted of ways or 
methods of psychological persuasion, a form in which it continues to this day; for example, in 
marketing and advertising. The original cause or origin of rhetoric (or persuasion = peitho, the 
original term) is so early in history it cannot be identified. There is reference to oratory or rhetoric 
in Akkadian writings before 2000 BC. Corax and Tisias of Syracuse are considered the Greek 
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founders, but they may be mythical or even the same person. Whatever the case, rhetoric was well 
established by 399 BC in Athens. Aristotle’s choice of it as a contrast and what he says about it was 
not random; the teachers of rhetoric, the sophists, were his competitors. 
 
 
1.4  There was nothing at all before logic 
 
After convincingly presenting and illustrating his developmental model, Aristotle mentions the 
one exception, logic. Strangely and uniquely, before he did what he did, nothing existed at all. 
 
Of the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been 
thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all3 (Aristotle, Sophistical 
Refutations 183b34). 
 
Moreover, on the subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas 
on the subject of deduction we had absolutely nothing else of an earlier date to mention, but 
were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 
184a8). 
 
Can this be true? That with respect to logic, ‘nothing at all’ existed before his time and what he did 
originated with him, as the result of his ‘experimental researches’. The Kneales’ response is 
reasonable:  
 
Since logic is not simply valid argument but the reflection upon principles of validity, it will 
arise naturally only when there is already a considerable body of inferential or 
argumentative material to hand (Kneale and Kneale, 1962, p.1). 
 
Aristotle’s claim is quite clear: with respect to logic, there was no original realisation or innovation 
earlier than his, no bit by bit development, no heirs, no examples; there was nothing that was 
added and developed. In other words, Aristotle is claiming to be the primary cause, the founder, 
the originator, if we take his words literally. In doing what he did, Aristotle could not have been 
systematising nothing. There must have been something prior to serve as a basis. What was it?  
 
 
1.5  Aristotle’s syllogism 
 
Aristotle’s logic is expressed primarily in the syllogism (sullogismos = deduction, inference). In the 
Organon he develops a number of principles and rules. He also introduces a number of terms that 
have stood the test of time. The topic is introduced in his Prior Analytics in his usual way: 
 
The subject is demonstration . . . and demonstrative understanding. We must next define a 
premise, a term, and a syllogism, and the nature of a perfect and of an imperfect syllogism . . 
. (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24a10). 
                                                     
3 NOTE: All underlinings are mine. The intention is to emphasise points that I believe are important in the development 
of the account. 
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First up are definitions of universal, particular and indefinite premises: 
 
A premise then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. This is either 
universal or particular or indefinite. By universal I mean the statement that something 
belongs to all or none of something else; by particular that it belongs to some or not to some 
or not to all; by indefinite that it does or does not belong, without any mark to show whether 
it is universal or particular . . . (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24a16). 
 
A further two types of premises are the demonstrative and the dialectic: 
 
The demonstrative premise differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premise is 
the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his 
premise, but lays it down), whereas the dialectical premise depends on the adversary’s 
choice between two contradictories (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24a21). 
 
With premises understood, syllogisms (inferences, deductions) can be constructed. This is not to 
say that we are not capable of constructing syllogisms naturally; only that if we decide to construct 
syllogisms (most often modus ponens and modus tollens, i.e. syllogisms) consciously and deliberately 
for some reason, this is how it is done: 
 
A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is 
stated follows of necessity from their being so. I mean by the last phrase that they produce 
the consequence, and by this, that no further term is required from without in order to make 
the consequence necessary (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24b19). 
 
These syllogisms can be perfect or imperfect: 
 
I call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make 
plain what necessarily follows; a syllogism is imperfect, if it needs either one or more 
propositions, which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down, but have 
not been expressly stated as premises (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24b23). 
 
With a basic understanding of the rules of inference, syllogisms can be constructed and employed 
in different ways. The process, however, remains the same: 
 
But [whether a premise is demonstrative or dialectic] will make no difference to the 
production of a syllogism in either case; for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue 
syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to something else 
(Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24a25). 
 
This can all be summarised with a clear definition of the syllogism/deduction: 
 
A deduction, then, is an argument in which, if p and q are assumed, then something else r, 
different from p and q, follows necessarily through p and q (Aristotle, Topics 100a25).  
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1.6  Aristotle’s demonstration 
 
The definitions and explanations in the Prior Analytics set the scene for Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics, where he continues to expand the concept of argument and explain its functions, 
specifically in the form of demonstration. 
 
. . . subsequently we must speak of demonstration. Syllogism should be discussed before 
demonstration because syllogism is the general: the demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but 
not every syllogism is a demonstration (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 25b26). 
 
Aristotle’s demonstration (as opposed to persuasion) is central to his theory of teaching and 
learning: demonstration (apodiexis) is a type of deduction (syllogism) that he argues guarantees 
truth or knowledge. 
 
All teaching and all intellectual learning result from previous knowledge. . . . Both deductive 
and inductive arguments proceed in this way; for both produce their teaching through what 
we are already aware of, the former getting their premises as from men who grasp them, and 
the latter proving the universal through the particular's being clear. (And rhetorical 
arguments too persuade in the same way; for they do so either through examples, which is 
induction, or through enthymemes, which is deduction.) (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 71a1) 
 
Deductive and inductive arguments can be used to produce knowledge. Rhetorical arguments 
proceed in the same manner, but unfortunately only produce opinion. Can knowledge be 
attainable through deductive and inductive arguments? We would need to know what is meant by 
‘knowledge’ first, before being able to decide. As stated above, for Aristotle, scientific knowledge4 
of something means knowing the causes of it, or the reason for it being what it is. 
 
This knowledge is attained through the particular type of syllogism called a ‘demonstration’. 
 
We shall say later whether there is also some other way of knowing; but we certainly say that 
we know through demonstration. By ‘demonstration’ I mean a deduction expressing 
knowledge; by ‘expressing knowledge’ I mean that having the deduction constitutes having 
knowledge (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 71b17). 
 
But, what is a demonstration? 
 
If then knowing is the sort of thing we assume it is, demonstrative knowledge must also be 
derived from things that are true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and 
explanatory of the conclusion; for this will also ensure that the principles are proper to what 
is being proved. For these conditions are not necessary for a deduction, but they are 
necessary for a demonstration, since without them a deduction will not produce knowledge 
(Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 71b20). 
 
                                                     
4 This is actually a redundancy: episteme (Gk) = scientia (L) = knowledge 
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More precisely, a demonstration is a syllogism with the added requirement that the premises are 
true.  
 
[A deduction] is a demonstration whenever the deduction proceeds from true and primary 
premises or our knowledge of the premises is originally derived from primary and true 
premises, a dialectical deduction is the one that proceeds from common beliefs (Aristotle, 
Topics 100a27).  
 
And, if the premises are true, the result should also be true. In other words, demonstration 
guarantees truth.  
 
Since what is known without qualification cannot be otherwise, what is known by 
demonstrative knowledge will be necessary. Demonstrative knowledge is what we have by 
having a demonstration; hence a demonstration is a deduction from things that are necessary 
(Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 73a21). 
 
One final but crucial point is that above and beyond the valid inference and the true premises, a 
demonstration needs to provide an explanation—causes, reasons.  
 
A demonstration is a deduction that reveals the explanation. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 
85b22). 
 
Not all syllogisms provide explanations. For example, the following syllogism (Aristotle, Posterior 
Analytics 78b23ff) does not explain why walls do not breathe.  
 
(1) Everything that breathes is an animal 
(2) No wall is an animal.            
(3) Therefore, no wall breathes. 
 
If the syllogism can be transformed so that the middle term can explain the connection between the 
two terms it connects, then it does explain: walls do not breathe because they do not have lungs. 
 
(1) Everything that breathes has lungs. 
(2) No wall has lungs.                 
(3) Therefore, no wall breathes.  
 
 
1.7  Demonstration guarantees knowledge 
 
When the demonstration is explanatory, it provides causes or reasons, and truth is the necessary 
consequence. Unfortunately, this largely depends on the truth of the first premise. In theory, if it 
cannot be ‘proved’ to be true, the demonstration falls. In practice, as Aristotle points out in several 
places, some first premises have to be accepted on faith.  
 
We contend that not all knowledge is demonstrative: knowledge of the immediate [first] 
premises is indemonstrable. Indeed, the necessity here is apparent; for if it is necessary to 
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know the prior things, that is, those things from which the demonstration is derived, and if 
eventually the regress comes to a standstill, it is necessary that these immediate premises be 
indemonstrable (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 72b21). 
 
The reality is that while all demonstration is meant to guarantee truth (knowledge), not all truth is 
the result of demonstration. There are other ways by which we may be able to discover truth, for 
example, pre-existing knowledge. But if a demonstration (a deduction expressing knowledge) is 
used, “having the deduction constitutes having knowledge” (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 71b19).  
 
The relationship between induction and deduction is that we can learn from induction but only 
deduction guarantees truth. Those universals we have reached through induction need to be 
deductively proved, and they need to be proved by the use of that type of demonstration that is 
explanatory. With the foundation out of the way, Aristotle moves on to his next topic, the sciences.    
 
In theory, according to Aristotle, the sciences should be derived deductively because this supplied 
explanations (causes, demonstration): “A demonstration is a deduction that reveals the 
explanation” (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 85b22). In practice, he went about it empirically. 
However, what can be discovered empirically can be proved deductively, after the fact. This 
would take some effort, but it is the basis of the scientific method.  
 
The purpose of our discussion is to discover a line of inquiry that will allow us to reason 
deductively from common beliefs on any problem proposed to us, and to give an account 
ourselves without saying anything contradictory (Aristotle, Topics 100a18). 
 
Although Aristotle’s ideas are introduced above, he is not the focus of this thesis. His ideas have 
been introduced to give a context and a rough understanding of reason and logic in his terms. The 
goal of this thesis is to account for what came before. Specifically, on the basis of their surviving 
records, what we can conclude about the presocratics and the development of reasoning at the 
time. The cut-off date is 420 BC, just after public performance of Aristophanes’ Clouds (423 BC). 
This is not arbitrary. The lampooning of Socrates the ‘sophist’ in the play indicates that an 
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2.0  THE QUESTIONS 
 
 
2.1  The first question 
 
Aristotle presents an interesting and persuasive account of his contribution to the development of 
logic. But, is it true? There have been a range of opinions over the centuries, but no complete 
agreement. It is accepted that “Aristotle was the first thinker to devise a logical system” 
(Honderich, 1993, “Aristotle”). But this is not to say that Aristotle both formalised and 
systematised reasoning (logic), as he claims, on the basis of nothing. 
 
He drew upon the emphasis on universal definition found in Socrates, the use of reductio ad 
absurdum in Zeno of Elea, claims about propositional structure and negation in Parmenides 
and Plato, and the body of argumentative techniques found in legal reasoning and 
geometrical proof. Yet the theory presented in Aristotle’s five treatises known as the Organon 
. . . and in the Rhetoric—goes far beyond any of these (Honderich, 1993, “Aristotle”). 
 
This is a sentiment to which Aristotle himself agrees elsewhere: “All teaching and all intellectual 
learning come about from already existing knowledge” (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 71a1). One 
early example of argument is Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen (~420 BC), an epideictic oratory, where 
he comments on what he is doing, indicating some meta-level reflection and conceptions:  “Having 
now finished the first section, I shall advance to the beginning of the next section, and I shall set 
out the causes through which Helen's journey to Troy was likely to come about” (Gorgias, 
Encomium of Helen, 5). 
 
A number of well-structured and persuasive modus ponens arguments followed by a summary 
indicates that rhetoric had developed to include both psychological and rational forms of 
persuasion—persuasion in the form of valid inference. 
 
By this discourse I have removed infamy from a woman; I have continued in the mode I 
established at the beginning. I tried to put an end to the injustice of blame and ignorance of 
opinion; I wanted to write the discourse, Helen's encomium and my plaything (Gorgias, 
Encomium of Helen, 21). 
 
Aristotle’s claim that there was nothing at all is questionable, especially as the sophists had been 
teaching exactly this sort of thing—formalised ways of reasoning/argument—for at least a century 
before him, not to mention that Socrates, Plato, and the later natural philosophers, if not exactly 
teaching, were applying reasoning to their investigations and to their attempts to persuade others 
to accept their ideas. 
 
Aristotle has two responses. The first is that the sophists weren’t teaching the art of logic as he saw 
it—demonstration and dialectic. The second is that they weren’t actually teaching at all. 
 
10 | P a g e  
For the training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the practice 
of Gorgias. For he used to hand out rhetorical speeches to be learned by heart, and they 
handed out speeches in the form of question and answer, which each supposed would cover 
most of the argument on either side. And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was 
rapid but unsystematic. 
For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but 
its products, as though anyone professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to 
obviate any pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of shoe-making or the 
sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present him with several 
kinds of shoes of all sorts—for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an 
art to him (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 183b36). 
 
The response to the first response is that the students may have been copying and mimicking, 
which is a form of learning, but someone had to write the essays and put together the ‘contentious 
arguments’ in the first place. Presumably the teachers knew and were applying the art. They were 
doing the same thing in the same way each time, which indicates, if not a formal method, at least a 
‘way’ of going about it. And it was widespread by 420 BC.  
 
The second response may be valid. It may be, as Aristotle suggests, better to teach the art than just 
provide the product, but this would depend on the need. Does the student of the professors of 
contentious arguments want to learn how to construct arguments or to just succeed in the law 
courts and the assembly? 
 
Was there already a “body of inferential or argumentative material to hand” before Aristotle? Had 
the principles of validity been recognised? Were those Greeks before Aristotle reflecting upon 
them? The Kneales mention a few earlier examples, the records of the presocratics provide more, 
and Aristotle himself gives a number. It would seem that if not logic, at least reason and the 
general principles of reasoning, were known and, more importantly, were being reflected on and 
applied before Aristotle. Contrary to the Kneales’ belief that there is no justification for “saying 
that there must have been a beginning of logic before the time of Aristotle”, there appears to be 
evidence that there is. 
 
 
2.2  The second question 
 
Does demonstration guarantee knowledge? Not all knowledge is the result of demonstration, as 
Aristotle observes: all demonstrations result in knowledge but not all knowledge is the result of 
demonstration. Aristotle comments on those who view demonstration and knowledge differently.  
 
The other party agree [believe] that knowledge results only from demonstration, but they 
claim that it is possible to demonstrate everything, since they take circular and reciprocal 
demonstration to be possible (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 72b15). 
 
If a demonstration is produced, does it guarantee knowledge or just make it more likely? If it is 
possible to reason to the truth, the demonstration should be the original forward inferencing (from 
the immediate (first) premise to the conclusion) doing double duty as the proof as well. The truth 
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could arise in some other way, and if so the demonstration would conceivably be devised later, 
following Aristotle’s rules. This seems to be what Aristotle is referring to below: ‘knowledge of the 
immediate premises is indemonstrable’. Our senses don’t deceive us but we have no way of 
proving what they are telling us if we can’t find a first premise upon which to base our argument. 
 
We reply that not all knowledge is demonstrative, and in fact knowledge of the immediate 
premises is indemonstrable. Indeed, it is evident that this must be so; for if we must know 
the prior things (i.e. those from which the demonstration is derived), and if eventually the 
regress stops, these immediate premises must be indemonstrable. Besides this, we also say 
that there is not only knowledge but also some origin of knowledge, which gives us 
knowledge of the definitions (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 72b19). 
 
What was obviously a consideration for Aristotle was that there is a point beyond which it doesn’t 
seem possible to reason deductively. This is when and where intuitive reason “grasps the first 
principles” and provides us with our first (immediate) premises.    
 
If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things 
invariable or even variable are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, 
and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i.e. practical wisdom, 
scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining alternative is that it is intuitive 
reason that grasps the first principles (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics VI.6.1141a7). 
 
Demonstrative proofs are needed to support conclusions and to persuade others. What is not clear 
is whether these are the result of forward or backward inference (from the conclusion to the 
immediate (first) premise). That is, are the conclusions to be reached through a process of 
ratiocination (what has been termed ‘Greek rationalism’) or do conclusions arise in some other 
way with the proof (demonstration) constructed later, when and if needed? There appears to be a 
point beyond or before demonstration that, as Aristotle states, is intuitive inference and intuitive 
understanding. 
 
It should be obvious that the answers to the questions are going to be yes and maybe. Yes: there 
was something before Aristotle, and maybe: perhaps demonstration can guarantee knowledge in 
special cases, but there are other non-demonstrative ways of discovering it. Much of what we 
understand about the presocratics and Greek philosophy as a whole, the ‘traditional account’, has 
been developing in the West since the early 1800s.5 Recently, in the last two decades, however, 
there have been developments outside philosophy that could impact upon the traditional account, 
but this has not been tested. Therefore, the answer to the second question should remain ‘maybe’ 
until further investigation is carried out.  
 
  
                                                     
5 “The recovery of Aristotle” refers to an earlier similar development, spanning about one hundred years, from mid-12th 
century, when a significant number of early Greek texts were translated into Arabic. 
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3.0  THE APPROACH 
 
 
With logic being the rules of reasoning, the principles of validity, an understanding of reasoning 
should logically have existed prior to Aristotle. That is, we should be able to find examples of 
reasoning, recognition of what it is to reason, recognition of the benefits of good versus poor 
reasoning, development of better ways to reason, formalisation of these ways, and finally 
systematisation of these ways (logic). The question is not simply “was there reasoning before 
Aristotle?” but “was there any recognition, understanding, formalisation and transmission of 
reasoning before Aristotle?” 
 
Since the early 1800s scholars have been providing accounts of Greek rationalism. This alone 
should be sufficient to answer the question of whether there was anything earlier. These scholars 
generally agree that this ‘something earlier’ was the development of a particular type of reasoning. 
What follows is a list of those texts, old and new, that are repeatedly cited in the literature—in 
chronological order. (Interestingly, there are several texts over 100 years in the University of 
Canterbury library.) 
 
1837  Hegel, G. W. F. (2006). Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6. Translated. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
1846  Grote, G. (1907) A History of Greece, from the Time of Solon … London: George Routledge 
1873  Neitzsche, F. (1996) Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. Washington D.C.: Gateway 
Editions 
1886  Zeller, E. (1931) Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. London: K Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. 
1901  Gomperz, T. (1901) Greek Thinkers: A history of ancient philosophy. London: J Murray 
1908  Burnet, J. (1908) Early Greek Philosophy. Second edition. London: A and C Black 
1928  Robin, L. (1928) Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit. Translated. New 
York: A. A. Knopf 
1932  Cornford, F. M. (2014) Before and After Socrates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1939-45  Jaeger, W. W. (1939) Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. Translated. Oxford: Blackwell. 
1951  Dodds, E. R. (1951) The Greeks and The Irrational. Berkeley: University of California Press 
1953  Snell, B. (1953) The Discovery of Mind: The Greek origins of European thought. Translated. 
Oxford: Blackwell 
1958  Popper, K. R. (1958) “Back to the Presocratics: The presidential address.” Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society. Vol. 59. Pp. 1-24. 
1962-81   Guthrie, W.K.C. (1962) A History of Greek Philosophy. 6 volumes. Cambridge University 
Press. 
1970  Lloyd, G.E.R. (1970) Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle. London: Chatto & Windus 
1972  Hussy, E. (1972) The Presocratics. London: Duckworth. 
1974  Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E. and Schofield, M. (1983) The Presocratic Philosophers: A critical 
history with a selection of texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1975  Frankel, H.F. (1975) Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
1975  Heidegger, M. (1975) Early Greek Thinking. Trans. New York: Harper & Row. 
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1978  Szabo, A. (1978) The Beginnings of Greek Mathematics. Dordrecht: D Reidel 
1979  Lloyd, G. E. R. (1979) Magic Reason and Experience: Studies in the origin and development of 
Greek science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1987  Barnes, J. (1987) Early Greek Philosophy. New York: Penguin 
1989  Barnes, J. (2001) The Presocratic Philosophers. London: Routledge 
1989  Irwin, T. H. (1989) Classical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1994  McKirahan, R. (1994) Philosophy before Socrates: An introduction with texts and commentary. 
Indianapolis: Hackett 
1995  Vlastos, G. and Graham, D. (1995) Studies in Greek philosophy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press  
1999  Long, A. A. (1999) The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
These scholars and more have added to the ‘traditional account’ of the development of Greek 
rationalism. They have done this using those records of the presocratics that have survived. Those 
in the Diels-Kranz index, (The Fragments of the Presocratics), first published in 1903 with later 
editions until 1952, those that have been discovered later, such as those found in an ancient 
rubbish dump in the Graeco-Egyptian town of Oxyrhynchus, those of Plato, Xenophon and 
Aristotle, and others. These have all been translated into English and numerous other languages.  
 
The traditional account has been constructed on an understanding of reasoning that can be called 
the ‘classical theory of reasoning’ (CTR). This is the general idea that it is possible to use reasoning 
to discover and understand the world. That it is possible to apply the process of reasoning to move 
from truths about the world to newer truths on the basis of deduction alone. From the CTR 
perspective, reasoning and the function of reasoning were considered basically equivalent. 
 
Mercier and Sperber, who are leading the recently arisen alternative approach, believe that 
philosophy and psychology are currently dominated by a classical, or ‘Cartesian’ view of 
reasoning. This view can be found with some classical Greek philosophers, but it is most famously 
found in Descartes: the idea that the role of reasoning is to critically examine our beliefs so as to 
discard wrong-headed ones and thus create more reliable beliefs—knowledge. This knowledge is 
in turn supposed to help us make better decisions (Mercier, sites.google.com/site/ 
hugomercier/projects, accessed 17/5/2017) . From this perspective the traditional account 
portrays the Greeks as becoming increasingly better at this type of reasoning and therefore coming 
up with better ideas and theories.  
 
As to the structure of what follows: After briefly commenting on the traditional account, I 
introduce several recent theories that are relevant to the thesis questions. The first is the theory of 
cultural evolution, which can be used to account for cultural change in behaviour and artifacts, 
which, in our case, means the process of reasoning and its products, the ideas and theories of the 
presocratics. Aristotle’s earlier explanation of discoveries and development is expanded in the 
modern version. 
 
Another recent theory is the argumentative theory of reasoning of Sperber and Mercier 
(2011, 2017), the main idea being their hypothesis that “the function of reasoning is 
argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade” (2011, p.58). 
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While this doesn’t necessarily contradict the classical theory of reasoning, it does give a 
significantly different perspective through which to interpret or reinterpret the records. 
 
Theories of consciousness, introspection, self-consciousness, and cognition also contribute. At 
some stage, the Greeks became aware of what it was to reason and began teaching and passing it 
on. 
 
The new theories suggest a new approach to reinterpreting the records in order to answer our 
questions. This approach will be applied to the same records used by the traditional scholars but 
result is new understandings. The end point, and the answer to one thesis question, remains the 
same—there was not “nothing at all” before Aristotle. However, a different account of how it arose 
emerges and brings into question whether it is possible to reason to the truth and whether this is 
what the presocratics were doing.  
 
The conclusion is that the Greeks became better reasoners, but in the ATR sense initially. They 
came up with new ideas intuitively as well as new ways to devise and evaluate reasons and 
arguments intended to persuade. This was through the process of backward inferencing and the 
other components of the argumentative theory of reasoning. At some point they became aware of 
what they were doing and recognised its utility. This led to the formalisation of reason in order to 
teach and apply it. However, since CTR and ATR refer to the function of reasoning, it is probably 
more accurate to suggest that they formalised the act or process of reasoning.  
 
At some time in the past, the idea arose with the Greek thinkers that reason could be applied in its 
CTR sense—ratiocination. At least, they thought this was possible—inferencing forwards to 
conclusions about the world. This aspect doesn’t seem to be directly stated by Aristotle, but it is an 
idea that has come to be accepted: the world can be discovered through forward inference; others 
can be persuaded through backward inference. If it is not possible to deduce truth, then all that is 
left is persuasion. This is a somewhat different conclusion from that of the traditional scholars.    
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4.0  THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT 
 
 
It is not necessary to dwell too long on the traditional account of Greek rationalism. The story is 
known to most with an interest in this area. The main point to be made is that the traditional 
account has resulted from applying the CTR perspective to the records. This is understandable; 
until a few years ago there were no alternative theories or perspectives around. The traditional 
account portrays the Greek developments in the following lights: 
  
Why do we reason? The goal of reasoning, so the story goes, is that of coming to new 
conclusion not through mere observation or through the testimony of others, but by drawing 
these new conclusions from information already available to us (Sperber and Mercier, 2017, 
p.52). 
 
. . . the assumption that the main function of human reasoning is to improve on individual 
cognition (Mercier, 2016, p.689). 
 
The traditional account can be summarised: Cultural changes in Greece were the result of the 
Greeks becoming better at applying this type of reason to questions about the world, and as they 
became better at it, they came up with better answers. The records of the presocratics track this 
development, from the simple explanations of the Milesians, to the deductive argument of 
Parmenides, to the complicated theories of the later natural philosophers, to Socrates and Plato. 
The teaching of the art of persuasion by the sophists is part of the account but a part that is often 
glossed over. They did not come up with any interesting or important theories and so were not 
considered ‘real’ reasoners (and later, not ‘real’ philosophers).   
 
The idea is that the early Greek thinkers had some sort of special talent that set them apart from 
their neighbours and from those who came before. Although often explicitly denied by various 
writers, this view seems to creep through implicitly in comments about how philosophy and 
science arose. The following quotes are from only one source, but similar quotes can be found in 
much that has been written about the early Greek thinkers. I have chosen to use Barnes because he 
holds particularly strong opinions and states the case particularly clearly. 
  
The presocratics invented the very idea of science and philosophy. They hit upon that special 
way of looking at the world which is the scientific or rational way (Barnes, 2001, p.xviii). 
 
Certainly, Thales was not the first man to think about cosmogony; but what little we know of 
his predecessors does not contain much that is rational or philosophical in spirit (Barnes, 
2001, p.12). 
 
The presocratic philosophers have one common characteristic of supreme importance: they 
were rational. … that assertion does not imply that the Greeks, as a race, were peculiarly 
devoted to reason or peculiarly devoid of superstition. … The presocratic philosophers were 
not typical of their fellows: they rose above the vulgar (Barnes, 1979, p.4). 
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The records upon which the traditional account has been based are all we have, basically, unless 
another rubbish dump of papyrus is discovered. They have been worked on for some time (the 
originals and in translation) and scholarship has been filling the gaps and the inconsistencies in the 
Greek versions. The records as they stand today can be considered fairly accurate. They are the 
basis of the traditional account and will be the basis of the reinterpretation.  
 
In the traditional account, ‘Parmenides marks a watershed in presocratic philosophy” (numerous 
writers) and in Western thought. For Cornford (1912) he is the ‘father of logic’. For Guthrie, 
“Presocratic philosophy is divided into two halves by the name of Parmenides. His exceptional 
powers of reasoning brought speculation about the origin and constitution of the universe to a 
halt, and caused it to make a fresh start on different lines” (Guthrie, 1965, p 1). And McKirahan, 
“Parmenides’ philosophy marks a turning point in the history of thought. Neither his style of 
argument nor his astonishing conclusions could be overlooked even by those who strongly 
disagreed with him” (McKirahan 1994, p 157).  
 
Any alternative account is going to need to address these perceptions, along with many others (e.g. 
“Philosophy begins with Thales”—Aristotle, B. Russell; “Thales is said to have been the first to 
introduce the study of nature to the Greeks”—Simplicius; “Xenophanes was the founder of 
scepticism and epistemology”, etc.). They will not become suddenly unimportant or uninteresting; 
they will remain important and interesting, but for different reasons.  
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5.0  THE RECENT THEORIES 
 
 
5.1  Cultural change and cultural evolution 
 
“Extinction is the rule. Survival is the exception.” Carl Sagan. The Varieties of Scientific 
Experience (2006) 
 
Darwin’s theory of evolution has all species of organisms arising and developing through the 
natural selection of small, inherited variations. It is these that increase the individual's ability to 
compete, survive, and reproduce. The term ‘natural selection’ refers to the differential survival and 
reproduction of individuals due to differences in phenotype.  
 
Within all populations of organisms there is variation and it occurs partly because random 
mutations arise in the genome of an individual organism and because offspring can inherit such 
mutations. Genomes interact with environments to cause individual variations in traits. Those 
individuals with certain variants of a trait that increase survival and reproduction chances above 
those of other individuals with other, less successful, variants, survive and hence the population 
evolves. 
 
Darwin’s ‘descent with modification’ simply referred to passing traits from parent to offspring. It 
has expanded to refer to inherited characteristics passed on by way of genetic replication and is 
now accepted as covering any descent with modification, including cultural changes. "Universal" 
Darwinism replaces the concept of "organism" with any recognisable pattern, phenomenon, or 
system. The first requirement is that the pattern can "survive" (maintain, be retained) long enough 
or "reproduce" (replicate, be copied) sufficiently frequently so as not to disappear immediately 
(Hodgson, 2005, p.899).  
 
A number of areas are being re-evaluated through the perspective of Darwin’s theory: 
evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology—anthropology, biology, ethics, ecology, 
economics, and so on and so forth. Cultural evolution and cultural change are sometimes 
considered equivalent but in fact the former is the mechanism or process that leads to the latter.6 
And while it is a fairly simple matter to list cultural changes, it is not as simple to give an account 
of how and why they arise. The basic tenet is that cultural change is evolutionary in nature. 
Change in the area we are interested in will be manifested as changes in behaviour, reasoning, and 
the outcomes of that behaviour: artifacts: anything created by humans which gives information 
about the culture of its creator and users (ideas, beliefs, opinions, etc.). 
 
Although Darwin did not specifically refer to cultural evolution, the following passage from his 
Descent of Man illustrates it well: 
 
Now, if some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others, invented a new snare or 
weapon, or other means of attack or defence, the plainest self-interest, without the assistance 
                                                     
6 There could also be drift or isolation. 
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of much reasoning power, would prompt the other members to imitate him; and all would 
thus profit. The habitual practice of each new art must likewise in some slight degree 
strengthen the intellect. If the new invention were an important one, the tribe would increase 
in number, spread, and supplant other tribes. In a tribe thus rendered more numerous there 
would always be a rather greater chance of the birth of other superior and inventive 
members. . . . Even if they left no children, the tribe would still include their blood-relations; 
and it has been ascertained by agriculturists . . . that by preserving and breeding from the 
family of an animal, which when slaughtered was found to be valuable, the desired character 
has been obtained (Darwin 1877, 154) (Descent of Man, Day 32 of 151). 
 
In this example, a new behaviour arises, is selected, and is transmitted. The outcome is superior 
fitness of some sort, most easily demonstrated by the results of using the snare or weapon: more 
food or greater security. The example illustrates the three phases of cultural evolution: 
 
1. Variation: This is the appearance or arising of alternatives. It may be new behaviours that 
arise, and these will result in new and different artifacts. How the new behaviours arise is 
not important, but the genetic model of mixing and matching could be an analogy. People 
reach conclusions both firsthand, through experience, and secondhand, learning from 
others, and these can be distortions, and hence new alternatives. At times, a certain 
behaviour can produce a range of outcomes, artifacts. At other times, different behaviours 
may need to arise to produce different outcomes. In the case of the Greeks, we are 
considering the behaviour of reasoning and the artifacts that result: the ideas and theories 
that they are known for. In the example above, the variation was the invention of the new 
snare or weapon. 
 
2. Selection: This is the phase where the alternatives are tested and either selected in or 
selected out. Although ultimately behaviours and artifacts should be selected on the basis 
of survival value, this is not always obvious nor the result of conscious and deliberate 
consideration. Many modern behaviours and artifacts seem to offer little apparent benefit 
other than looking or sounding cool, hip, or the like. ‘Selecting in’ refers to choosing the 
best from among the alternatives. ‘Selecting out’ refers to removing those alternatives that 
provide fewer benefits, with what remaining persisting. In the example above, the new 
snare or weapon was selected because it provided more food or offence and defence than 
their existing tools or behaviours.  
 
3. Transmission: Without transmission nothing arising and selected would persist long 
enough to be considered a change. With cultural evolution, this transmission can be both 
vertical, from parents to offspring, and oblique, between peers not necessarily related. The 
modes of transmission for both behaviours and artifacts can be imitation or teaching and 
learning. In the example above, only imitation is mentioned, but ‘showing’ should also be 
included: showing how to make the snares and weapons, and showing how to best use 
them. This becomes part of the tribal knowledge. 
 
Cultural change and cultural evolution can be used to explain the Greek ‘discovery’ of reason and 
the resultant artifacts: the Greek theories of nature. The traditional account is more of an historical 
account of the development of reasoning, logic, and ultimately philosophy and science. However, 
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any reasonably accurate account of the Greek changes should resemble cultural change/cultural 
evolution even if Darwinian theory is not deliberately applied. The question becomes, cultural 
change/cultural evolution of what? Reasoning, but what sort of reasoning?  
 
 
5.2  The argumentative theory of reasoning 
 
The ability to reason has been selected for because it has given us a survival advantage. 
 
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better 
decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic 
distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be 
rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to 
devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is 
adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their 
vulnerability to misinformation (Sperber and Mercier, 2011, p.58). 
 
The purpose of human conscious thought is participation in social and cultural 
groups, and logical reasoning depends on conscious thought (Baumeister, 2011). 
 
This recent ‘argumentative theory of reasoning’ (ATR) is an alternative to the classical theory of 
reasoning (CTR): 
 
As stated above, the hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative—to 
devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade.  
 
According to the theory, people reason not primarily to improve knowledge and make better 
decisions but to come up with and evaluate reasons in order to persuade others or be persuaded 
by others. This is different from the idea that reasoning enables us to come up with more accurate 
representations of the world. 
 
 
5.2.a  The classical theory of reasoning (CTR) 
 
According to a long philosophical tradition, reasoning is what enables the human mind to go 
beyond mere perception, habit, and instinct (Sperber and Mercier, 2011, p. 58). 
 
There is an important difference between inference and reasoning: reasoning is more than just 
inference. Inferencing, as I am using the term, is carried out unconsciously not as mental acts that 
we decide to perform but as processes that take place inside our brains, at a “sub-personal” level 
(in the sense of Dennett 1969). We may be aware of the outcomes of the inferences but not the 
process itself. “All inferences carried out by inferential mechanisms are in this sense intuitive. They 
generate intuitive beliefs; that is, beliefs held without awareness of reasons7 to hold them” (Sperber 
                                                     
7 A reason: a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event. By the use of reason, we “produce reasons in order 
to justify our thoughts and actions to others and to produce arguments to convince others to think and act as we 
suggest (Sperber and Mercier, 2017, p.7) 
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and Mercier, 2011, p.58). Reasoning, in their view, is not “an alternative to intuitive inference; 
reasoning is a use of intuitive inferences about reasons” (Sperber and Mercier, 2017, p.133). 
 
That inferences are intuitive may contradict the idea that we form beliefs because we have 
reflected on reasons to accept them—not that they have arisen intuitively. According to Sperber, 
such beliefs, “held with awareness of one’s reasons to hold them, are better described not as 
intuitive but as reflective beliefs” (Sperber, 1997, p.67). 
 
Far from denying that we may arrive at a belief through reflecting on our reasons to accept it, 
we see this as reasoning proper . . . What characterises reasoning proper is indeed the 
awareness not just of a conclusion but of an argument that justifies accepting that conclusion 
(Sperber and Mercier, 2011, p.58). 
 
Classical theories of reasoning assume the function of reasoning is to arrive at more accurate 
representations of the world. There is a reasonable assumption that the ability to reason has 
survival value in that it brings about an improvement in the quality of individual beliefs and 
decisions. The ability to reason is supposed to lead to our beliefs about the world becoming more 
accurate and reliable and decisions based on them more likely to bring about our goals. Reasoning, 
in this view, is a tool for coming up with more useful and effective decisions. It is expected that 
humans who are better able to reason in this way will be better able to survive. 
 
There are two problems with this view. The first is that we are often very bad at evaluating 
evidence and making rational choices, as Wason tests have shown over a number of years. As 
Sperber and Mercier state: “Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and 
make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic 
distortions and poor decisions” (Sperber and Mercier, 2011, p.57). 
 
The second problem is confirmation or myside8 bias, which is our tendency to accept evidence and 
arguments that support our beliefs and reject evidence and arguments that do not. This results in 
errors in judgement, which, when translated into behaviour, does not always bring about the 
expected or the best results. Reflecting on the outcomes of actions should also lead to better 
reasoning, but this is not always the case.  
 
Is there survival value in a system that seems to come up with inaccurate representations of the 
world as a result of ‘faulty’ reasoning and confirmation bias? Surely reasoning has persisted 
because it has some value, perhaps a rough and ready understanding of the world is the best we 
can hope for. Either we are wrong in considering CTR-type reasoning faulty in some way, or we 
need to discover if there are any other important functions; functions that have evolved because 
they do do something well. 
 
 
                                                     
8 A term introduced by Sperber and Mercier. “Reasoning does not blindly confirm any belief it bears on. Instead, 
reasoning systematically works to find reasons for our ideas and against ideas we oppose. It always takes our side. As 
a result, it is preferable to speak of a myside bias rather than of a confirmation bias” (Sperber and Mercier, 2017, 
p.218). 
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5.2.b  The argumentative theory of reasoning 
 
The basis of evolutionary psychology is the idea that psychological traits that have survival value 
persist. That is, they are not selected against. Following from this is the idea that those human 
traits that have greater survival value are the ones that have the greater chances of persisting. The 
question, therefore, is what is the main function of reasoning and what value does it have? We 
may need to be clear about what reasoning is before considering its function. The same applies to 
the trait of confirmation (myside) bias, sometimes considered to be a flaw: What is its function? It 
turns out both have important functions that have significant value.  
 
Sperber and Mercier argue that the function of reasoning is to produce and evaluate arguments 
about the world.  
 
Intuitive reasoning (or, system 1 reasoning) is carried out at a sub-personal level. People may 
be aware of having reached a certain conclusion—be aware, that is, of the output of an 
inferential process – but we claim that they are never aware of the process itself (Sperber and 
Mercier, 2011, p.58).9 
 
Once intuitive beliefs arise, we usually find we have reasons for them that we can rattle off if 
asked. But, it seems we frequently confabulate these reasons on the spot,10 and they are often not 
the actual reasons (which we don’t have access to) but the reasons we consider most apt, as if we 
had actually worked through a process of forward inference-type reasoning in the first place. This 
seems to apply to reasons as causes, in Aristotle’s sense, and reasons as justifications (for actions). 
The interesting point about intuitive inference is that we consider it to be accurate. We have an 
epistemic confidence; we trust our ability to interpret the world and so we don’t feel the need to 
reflect on these beliefs or evaluate them in order to decide whether to accept or reject them.  
 
In fact, what we do is look for evidence and reasons that support our ideas (motivated reasoning). 
This is the function of myside bias, to increase our epistemic confidence and reinforce our intuitive 
beliefs. We accept our ideas as accurate and act accordingly. We do, at times, attempt to persuade 
others to accept them as well, as an important component of ATR-type reasoning is 
communication “in social and cultural groups”. 
 
“In evolutionary terms, the exchange of arguments improves communication by allowing 
messages to be transmitted even in the absence of sufficient trust” (Mercier, 2016, p.690). Some 
mechanisms of epistemic vigilance “focus on the source of information and help answer the 
question: Whom to believe? Other mechanisms focus on content and help answer the question: 
What to believe?” (Sperber and Mercier, 2017, p.191). Myside bias and the confabulation of reasons 
provides us with the content of this argumentative communication.  
 
Argumentation would be evolutionarily stable because it makes those who engage in it 
better off on average: those who produce arguments are more likely to get their messages 
across than if they relied only on trust and those who receive arguments can accept beneficial 
                                                     
9 In Sperber and Mercier (2017) they offer ATR as an alternative to dual processing (system 1 and 2) reasoning. 
10 So-called ‘moral dumbfounding’ is an interesting example of this. (Haidt, 2012, p.45-47) 
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messages they might otherwise have rejected. As a result, argumentation allows good ideas 
and sound beliefs to spread (Mercier, 2016, p.690). 
 
Collaboration provides mutual benefits in many areas: finding food, constructing shelter, 
defence, etc. The ability to collaborate with other members of the group leads to aligned 
beliefs and aligned actions. In persuading others, however, it benefits us to allocate only the 
minimum resources necessary. On the other hand, others need to ensure they are not 
persuaded cheaply. This leads to an interesting asymmetry. 
 
Sperber and Mercier point out the significant difference between the production of reasons of our 
own and the evaluation of the reasons of others. On the one hand, we produce reasons and 
arguments to persuade others in an interactive, or deliberative setting. There is little point in 
producing arguments for others without first being challenged, or expecting to be challenged, or in 
producing counter-arguments to our own beliefs. It is a waste of resources, and in neither case 
would the result be others changing their minds. For this reason, producing arguments will have a 
strong myside bias; we are only focused on expending effort on producing arguments that support 
our ideas or that attack those of others (that differ from our own). In academic contexts, challenges, 
objections and counter-arguments are anticipated and arguments are constructed accordingly—
students are directed to anticipate and address possible questions of their readers. 
 
But, in producing these arguments, it appears that reasoners are lazy. They expend minimum 
effort in order to achieve their goal. They consider their possible audience and only produce 
arguments strong enough to persuade. This means not “attempting to anticipate what counter-
arguments might be raised against their arguments”. It is easier to match the arguments to the 
response of the audience, through the back and forth of the interaction, to see which “arguments 
are effective and which arguments are countered and then to reply to the specific counter-
arguments raised”. Reasons and arguments will be confabulated on the spot, and changed on the 
spot, as long as persuasion is the intention.  
 
While reasoners, according to the theory are biased and lazy when producing arguments, the same 
cannot be said for the other half of the equation—those evaluating the arguments. “By contrast, 
when they evaluate others’ arguments—particularly arguments that challenge their views—they 
are demanding but objective” (Mercier, 2016, p.689). Early humans who automatically accepted or 
rejected all arguments would have long disappeared from the population. What is needed is 
epistemic vigilance. People will only accept arguments for the ideas they are supporting when 
they are of good enough quality. There is no value in being persuaded by poor arguments. There is 
also no value in not being persuaded by strong arguments that support ideas and beliefs contrary 
to those already held. A degree of rigour, and therefore expenditure of resources, is needed to 
evaluate the source and content of arguments intended to persuade.  
 
The overall interaction is iterative. Reasons and arguments at the start of an interaction could be 
simple statements and the like. Depending on the response, these can be strengthened, becoming 
explanations, explanations plus evidence, weaker forms of argument (for example, argument from 
probability), and eventually sound deductive arguments. This would be quite an expenditure of 
cognitive resources. On the other side, as the reasons and arguments become stronger, the 
evaluating of the reasons and arguments would need to become more rigorous and critical, 
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eventually leading to examining the arguments themselves for validity and soundness, applying 
the elenchus (refutation) and coming up with counter-arguments.    
 
Xenophanes was the first to mention this aspect, that through the process of production and 
evaluation of ideas, better ones are discovered: 
 
By no means did the gods reveal all things to mortals from the beginning, 
But in time, by searching [inquiring], they discover better (Stobaeus, Selections 1.8.2 = DK 
21B18). 
 
“The argumentative theory thus predicts a fundamental asymmetry in reasoning: that reasoners 
are biased and lazy when they produce arguments, but objective and demanding when they 
evaluate others’ arguments” (Mercier, 2016, p.691) A further point is that deliberation is best done 
in heterogeneous groups. The least successful reasoning, in the ATR sense, is that done by the lone 
reasoner. A mixed group that is free to express and support their own ideas and evaluate and 
counter those of others is most successful (Sperber and Mercier, 2011, 2017; Mercier, 2016). 
 
The main points of the argumentative theory of reasoning can be found on Hugo Mercier’s 
website, and although an ‘unpublished source’, it does nicely summarise the discussion above: 
 
Listeners and speakers use arguments to improve the reliability of communication:  
 reasons are given in order to persuade others to accept a given conclusion 
 listeners can decide whether to accept the conclusion by evaluating the reasons  
 finding and evaluating reasons needs the use of reason  
 doing this well improves communication 
 the better the argument, the more likely the conclusion is to be true, but not guaranteed 
 the better the argument, the more likely the conclusion is to be accepted 
 a speaker who manages to convince a listener and a listener who acquire potentially 
valuable information are both better off. (Mercier, https://sites.google.com/site/ 
hugomercier/theargumentativetheoryofreasoning, accessed 12/2/17) 
 
The crux of the difference between the CTR and ATR perspectives is stated above: “a true 
conclusion is more likely to be supported by good arguments”. A good argument cannot 
guarantee a true conclusion, but it makes it more likely. This would suggest truth needs to be 
apprehended in some other way if we want it guaranteed. This is an interesting difference from 
Aristotle who believed that a demonstration that accords with his criteria does guarantee truth.   
 
From the CTR perspective, we reach conclusions through forward inference. From the ATR 
perspective, we construct reasons for intuitive ideas through backward inference—similar to 
abduction. We could either be discovering the world through the application of reasoning, 
particularly forward inference and deduction. Or, we could be persuading others by the 
application of reasoning to accept ideas that have arisen in other ways. The records of the 
presocratics have been interpreted from the CTR perspective. If the ATR perspective is closer to 
what is actually happening, it might be time to reinterpret the records. Before doing this, however, 
one last set of theories are needed. At some stage in the development, the Greeks became aware of 
what it is to reason. How do we become aware of non-conscious cognitive processes?  
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5.3  Conscious cognition theories 
 
Many Greek thinkers before Aristotle formalised and taught methods of reasoning (the sophists, 
Socrates, Plato, etc.), which wouldn’t have been possible without being aware, or conscious, of 
what it is to reason. Consciousness includes being awake, being aware of what is going on around 
us or of what we are doing or of ourselves. When we are conscious we are aware of being aware. 
We are conscious of being conscious (Ornstein, 1991, p.225). 
 
There are many things we perceive without being conscious of them. If we go to the effort of 
processing these things in the brain, why do we not need to be conscious of them? The fact is that 
brains existed and worked well long before humans and before self-awareness. Being aware of our 
perceptions in many cases is the exception. “A better question might be: Why are we aware of 
what we are aware of? What special purpose is served by allowing a stimulus to enter 
consciousness?” (Ornstein, 1991, p.234).  
 
We function without conscious thought most of the time because it is the more efficient strategy. It 
leaves us free to perceive what is going on in the world. If we are aware of our conscious 
processes, then there must be a reason for it. “This is just as Evolution intended. She wouldn’t 
waste her resources giving us access to our internal workings if it didn’t lead to increased 
reproductive success” (Ornstein, 1991, p.230). These conscious processes “occur one at a time, take 
effort, and are inefficient. They are [however] more flexible than unconscious processes” (Ornstein, 
1991, p.230). 
 
It turns out that what we become conscious of are those things that require immediate action or a 
decision between alternatives. In other words: 
 
Consciousness is involved when deliberate, rather than automatic, control or intervention is 
needed. … Very few of our decisions get shunted up to consciousness, only those that need a 
top-level decision about alternatives (Ornstein, 1991, p.227). 
 
Alternatives includes alternative behaviours and alternative ideas and reasons. Being aware of 
ideas differing from our own is an example of an alternative. Not choosing is not an option if the 
alternatives are certain ideas or behaviours that have practical consequences. If it is possible to opt 
out of choosing, how do we know this is the best choice? Even not choosing is choosing.  
 
Just as there is value in persuading others to accept our ideas, there is value in evaluating their 
ideas and behaviours and choosing the ‘best’. In the case of ideas this will be on the basis of trust 
(the source) and/or reasons (the content), either those given freely or after being asked for. In 
answer to the question, why did you choose X and not not-X, a person will give their reasons, and 
in hearing these reasons, another person is able to understand, to a degree, how the reasoning is 
being carried out (a theory of mind).  
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For example, A is attempting to persuade B that ‘X is the case’. 
 
A.  X is the case. The idea believed to be true. 
B. Why? Asking for reasons. 
A. Because Y. Giving a reason. 
B. Therefore, X because Y. Reformulating the reason. 
A. Yes. 
B. Or, if Y then X. Reformulating into inference. 
A. Yes, if Y then X, and as Y is in  
 fact the case, therefore X is the case. Continuing to a modus ponens argument. 
B. Thanks. That makes sense. B is persuaded that X is the case. 
 
Since most of our thinkings about the world “take place unconsciously, automatically, and work 
by rules evolved over millennia”, we thus live our lives without knowing how we are doing it and 
what is happening to us (Ornstein, 1991, p.227), until we do. And when we do, the next question is 
how to use this knowing.  
 
The trick in managing the mind is to bring the automatic reactions into consciousness 
(Ornstein, 1991, p.227). 
 
Introspection is one way of doing this. When we introspect we examine or observe our conscious 
thoughts and feelings, our mental and emotional processes. We become aware of our cognition. As 
Plato asks in Theaetetus, ". . . why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, 
and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are?" (Plato, Theaetetus, 155). 
 
The act of inference is often neither conscious nor deliberate, and it operates not only in conceptual 
thinking but also in perception and in motor control (Sperber and Mercier 2011 p. 57). Reasoning, 
“as commonly understood, refers to a very special form of inference at the conceptual level, where 
not only is a new mental representation (or conclusion) consciously produced, but the previously 
held representation (or premises) that warrant it are also consciously entertained” (Sperber and 
Mercier 2011 p. 57). 
 
Reasoning is conscious, and consciousness is involved when deliberate, rather than automatic, 
control or intervention is needed, which is the case with reasoning. Once we reason consciously 
and deliberately, in the sense of coming up with reasons, we have a way to communicate and 
possibly cooperate with others. What we communicate and attempt to persuade others to accept is 
our model of the world: “Our normal waking consciousness builds us a model of the world, based 
on sense and body information, expectations, fantasy and crazy hopes, and other cognitive 
processes” (Ornstein, 1991, p.228). That is, what is going on and how to deal with it.  
 
It has frequently been implied, and sometimes even pointed out, that the individual strives 
toward consistency within himself. His opinions and attitudes, for example, tend to exist in 
clusters that are internally consistent (Festinger, 1957, p.1). 
 
However, this consistency is not always the case. Alternatives bring about a change in 
consciousness that can be partly explained by cognitive dissonance: “In psychology, cognitive 
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dissonance is the mental stress or discomfort experienced by an individual who holds two or more 
contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values at the same time; performs an action that is contradictory to 
their beliefs, ideas, or values; or is confronted by new information that conflicts with existing 
beliefs, ideas or values” (Festinger, 1957, p.978). 
 
People feel a tension when they are aware of an inconsistency either between two attitudes 
or between an attitude and a behaviour. This tension produces some type of change to 
reduce the state of dissonance (Festinger, 1962, p.93). 
 
Various strategies are used to resolve cognitive dissonance: we may keep the inconsistency in 
place by minimisation or avoidance, rationalisation, acceptance, or we may attempt to end it by 
changing the beliefs or actions, or by integration. Because cognitive dissonance is experienced as 
emotional discomfort, there is a natural urge to remove or resolve it. The argument is that this is 
done consciously, as opposed to automatically, in one or more of the following ways: 
 
1. Change behaviour or cognition 
2. Justify behaviour or cognition by changing the conflicting cognition 
3. Justify behaviour or cognition by adding new cognitions 
4. Ignore or deny any information that conflicts with existing beliefs (Festinger, 1957). 
 
The result is ideas we are willing to accept. Through the process of myside bias we come up with 
reasons for our intuitive ideas or for the results of our resolving of cognitive dissonance that give 
us epistemic confidence and that can be used to persuade others. After all this effort, it turns out 
that we don’t need to be right. If the actual aim is to persuade others to accept our conclusions, our 
version of the world, whether it is accurate or not isn’t the point. In the end, we seem to choose the 
version that best suits us, that we believe most benefits us. And we feel that it will continue to be 
best for us if we can persuade others to accept it as well. The evidence is that whether we are 
actually right or wrong, we go about persuading others in the same way, by confabulating and 
presenting those reasons we believe are most likely to get them to change their mind. If, during 
this, we come to change our mind, we start again. 
 
The reasons we give for our intuitive beliefs are confabulated on the spot. And, if they are not 
accepted, stronger ones are re-confabulated, on the spot. Confabulation is used not only in reason-
giving, but also in memory.    
 
Memory, like the rest of our mind, did not arise to provide us with an objective and 
comprehensive database composed of the contents of the world. Rather, our general concern 
is adapting our behaviour.  … The brain changes with experience, and thence we adapt and 
adjust. There are no real memories as we know them. We reinterpret the hard points in 
memory over and over in our life, assembling our past anew throughout our lives, 
throughout changes in experience. … to believe we have a complete memory of events is an 
illusion, as our view of out consistency is an illusion. The mind evolved to keep us adapting, 
not to know ourselves, so even events we are sure that we remember perfectly are just a re-
semblance, the mind’s I deciding on the fly. Memories are a dream (Ornstein, 1991, p.191).  
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Reasons are like memories. They are memories of what we think we did when we were 
inferencing forwards when we came up with a particular idea in the first place. Or, memories of 
how we think the world works when we are inferencing backwards and searching for reasons for 
belief or justification. And, just as “memories are a dream”, reasons are dreams also. We may 
clearly remember working through a process of forward valid deductive inference, from a true 
starting premise, adding other true premises, to a true conclusion that is something new we 
believe we have discovered through reason about the world, and it may all be a dream, 
confabulated on the spot for the purpose of persuasion.  
 
This section has covered a range of ideas and theories with respect to consciousness. The relevance 
to the thesis is that the Greeks went through a change between Homer and Hesiod (say) and 
Socrates when they became conscious of reasoning, recognised its utility, reflected on what it is to 
reason, and formalised and taught it. The theories above give an idea of how this proceeded. The 
records should give us an idea of when. 
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6.0  THE REINTERPRETATION AND EXPECTATIONS 
 
 
The theories above can explain the changes expected in reasoning in Greece before Aristotle (in 
fact, before the lampooning of Socrates). With the focus on the behaviour of reasoning and the 
artifacts, the ideas and theories produced, it should be possible to describe what the Greeks were 
doing in ATR terms. (Philosophy has elements of ATR and CTR-type reasoning and it is difficult to 
say where one stops and the other begins. However, the reinterpretation will come to suggest that 
CTR-type philosophical reasoning was a development from more general ATR-type reasoning.) 
 
The three phases of cultural evolution are obvious. Considering the ideas, there will be variation in 
those ideas that are available for selection, and transmission of those that survive. Considering the 
behaviour, there will be variation in ways of reasoning, selection, and transmission of those that 
survive imitation or teaching and learning. 
 
 
6.1  Variation 
 
Ideas arise in the mind, one way or another, and most are thought to be accurate. We are 
sometimes deceived by mirage or illusion, but we sometimes are aware of this. That is, we are 
accurate in perceiving something as an illusion but not of what the actual something is. If the 
intention is to persuade others to accept these ideas, they must be expressed. This can be done 
verbally or in writing. If ideas can be expressed freely, it is reasonable to expect a greater number 
of ideas and a greater range of variation. As to ideas arising, it may be safe to assume that there is 
little variation between people and groups of people; what differs is the expressing of them. If it is 
not safe to express new, different, strange or unorthodox ideas safely, they will not be expressed.  
 
 
Figure 1. More ideas overall should mean a greater variation 
 
What should also add to number and therefore variation is exposure to different ideas, of other 
peoples and other cultures. A significant number of Greeks in certain places and at certain times 
did have a relative freedom to express unorthodox ideas with the only restrictions seeming to be 
on ideas defamatory of the gods, which were considered not heretical but polluting. Greeks also 
were in contact with a range of different cultures even within Greece, with the independent and 
isolated poleis developing in ‘geographic isolation’. Greeks were also in contact with non-Greek 
cultures. They had colonies from the east of the Black Sea, south in Egypt, to the east coast of 
Spain, and they traded with their neighbours. At various times they were invaded, conquered and 
ruled by their neighbours. 
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Figure 2. Greek colonies around the time of the Milesians/Xenophanes11 
 
Consequently, there was no lack of variation in the ideas and no significant barriers to expressing 
their ideas for selection. There was also variation in the behaviour of reasoning. There is a 
significant difference between simply stating ideas, explaining them, and developing them into 
sound deductions, or demonstrations. Since all of these types of reasoning are natural, the 
variation was in the recognition of different types of reasoning under the pressure to come up with 
stronger types of reasons.  
 
 
6.2  Selection 
Ideas expressed are available for selection, either for or against. This is the phase of cultural 
evolution best explained by the ATR. A person expressing an idea would tailor the accompanying 
reasons to the expected audience. If these were not persuasive enough, then stronger reasons 
would be devised. At each step in devising and using stronger reasons the audience would also 
need to be more critical and objective. Ideas would be evaluated by consideration of source and 
content. The ideas to survive selection were those that others freely chose (for some reason or 
other) or were persuaded to accept.  
 
The following diagram illustrates how this process proceeds in an iterative way. The overall goal 
of a person expressing an idea is to persuade others to accept it. This doesn’t always happen, and if 
counter-arguments are strong enough, there is the possibility of the person expressing the idea 
changing their mind and accepting one based on a counter-argument. The overall goal for the 
targets of persuasion is not to be persuaded too cheaply. They need to maintain an epistemic 
vigilance and only accept those ideas that are accompanied by sufficient reasons (or, sufficiently 
strong reasons). 
  
                                                     
11 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Greece_and_it%27s_colonies_in_550_BC.jpg 
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Figure 3. Persuading others to accept an idea 
 
Where this persuasion is carried out, the deliberative setting, is also important. The ATR suggests 
that the best reasoning is carried out by heterogeneous groups. This was the situation in Greece. 
The freedom to express ideas openly and publicly meant that this was done in several settings: the 
symposia, public reading or reciting of texts, public displays by itinerant thinkers and poets, and 
in private discussion groups. All of these are well illustrated in Plato and Xenophon. Another 
consideration was that the Greeks were somewhat competitive. In a culture based on winning 
victories, as portrayed in Homer and the myths, this carried over to the deliberative setting.  
 
On the whole, it seems that there was in Miletus a relative freedom of thought (including 
speculative thought) and expression in the 6th century (even though it was invaded by Cyrus I 
around 550 BC), and this was not the norm in the surrounding cultures. There was also wealth and 
leisure that meant time for speculative thought. Literacy was fairly widespread. There was the 
beginnings of the practice of reaching decisions through public debate conducted according to 
rational principles. And, there was a willingness to consider foreign ideas that resulted from 
contact with several other cultures, some of which invaded at times (McK, 1994, p.21-22). 
 
There was also the idea of equality to consider. It was perceived as including the right to express 
and evaluate ideas. And competitiveness—a social pressure to come up with, express, and have 
ideas accepted. Competitiveness was mentioned by Zeno when he met Socrates in Athens in 
around 450 BC, and Xenophanes refers to it below: 
 
In that competitive spirit, then, I wrote the book when I was a young man. . . . So in this 
respect you missed the point, Socrates; you think it was written not out of a young man’s 
competitiveness, but out of a mature man’s vainglory (Plato, Parmenides, 128 d7) 
 
The amount of effort put into confabulating reasons will be based on the expected reception and 
evaluation of the idea. The ‘tougher’ the expected audience, the greater the effort put into devising 
31 | P a g e  
persuasive reasons, and some of the final arguments recorded for the presocratics must have been 
the culmination of many years of reflection and refinement. The competitive Greek culture played 
into this; winning by whatever means necessary appears in Homer (considered ‘craftiness’) and 
later in Plato and Xenophon. A person expressing an idea focused on acceptance while on the 
other side of the equation the audience focused on evaluation, not being ‘tricked’.   
 
… to avoid being victims of misinformation, receivers must therefore exercise some degree 
of what may be called epistemic vigilance. The task of epistemic vigilance is to evaluate 
communicator and the content of their messages in order to filter communicated 
information. (Sperber and Mercier, 2011, p.60) 
 
To the Greeks, being tricked into accepting ideas was equivalent to losing, to being outthought. 
One side was fighting to persuade and the other side was fighting to evaluate accurately. This 
comes through in the records of the time in three settings in particular that have a particularly 
Greek flavour: public readings and recitations, testing of visiting thinkers, and symposia. All are 
referred to in Plato and Xenophon, who paint clear pictures of the competitive side of these 
interactions.   
 
The first is the public reading of texts by the author, or sometimes texts recited from memory. One 
case, which will be referred to again below, was Zeno reading his book of arguments in Athens. 
 
Antiphon said that [Parmenides and Zeno] were staying with Pythodorus, outside the city 
wall in the Potter’s Quarter, and that Socrates had come there, along with a number of 
others, because they were eager to hear Zeno read his book, which he and Parmenides had 
just brought to Athens for the first time. Socrates was then quite young (Plato, Parmenides, 
127 c1-4). 
 
Second is the testing of those itinerant thinkers and teachers, either after they had read or recited, 
or later at someone’s home—often the home of someone hosting the visitor. From the descriptions 
Plato gives, this testing or clarifying was an important part of the culture, or at the least, of the 
‘philosophical’ sub-culture that was developing; people wanted to be sure they had the story right. 
In the following quote, Socrates approaches and tests Zeno immediately after he finished his 
reading—during ‘question time’:  
 
Then Socrates, after he had heard it, asked Zeno to read the first hypothesis of the first 
argument again; and when he read it, Socrates said, Zeno, what do you mean by this; if 
things are many, they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible, because 
unlike things can’t be like or like thing unlike? That’s what you say, isn’t it? (Parmenides, 
127 d5-e4). 
 
The third were the symposia, drinking parties, which followed a fairly set process and only started 
to consider expressing and evaluating ideas after the formalities were over. There may have been 
drinking involved, but the discussions could be serious and often memorable, as the following 
passage illustrates.  
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Apollodorus, I’ve been looking for you! You know there once was a gathering at Agathon’s 
when Socrates, Alcibiades, and their friends had dinner together; I wanted to ask you about 
the speeches they made on Love. What were they? I heard a version from a man who had it 
from Phoenix, Philip’s son, but it was badly garbled, and he said you were the one to ask. 
So please, will you tell me all about it? After all, Socrates is your friend—who has a better 
right than you to report his conversation? (Symposium, 172 b1-8). 
 
The records give the impression that some of the arguments were the result of many years’ work, 
trying out arguments, responding to and reflecting on feedback and counter-arguments, and 
devising stronger arguments. This also applies to the behaviour of reasoning. The new ways of 
reasoning, in terms of new ways of devising arguments, that arose and persisted brought about an 
interesting collection of new ideas and theories. What is expected in a development of ATR-type 
reasoning is the appearance of stronger, more persuasive reasons rather than more accurate ideas.  
 
The following diagram illustrates the ‘ramping up’ of reasons and arguments in the face of 
rejection. Due to selective laziness, the person expressing the idea and attempting to persuade will 
not go to all the effort of devising the strongest reasons and argument first if not needed. This will 
only happen if the idea is rejected and if the person is fairly insistent, with his or her mind set on 
persuasion. This ramping up could be in a single interaction or over time with a variety of 
audiences, and this is again one of the important aspects of the Greek situation. Some of the 
recorded ideas and arguments must have been the result of many years of reflection and 
refinement. A modern equivalent can be found in academic journals.   
 
This ramping up can only be done by someone with a toolbox of different types and strengths of 
reasons and arguments. The records show that the Greek toolbox developed in the century or 
more before Aristotle.   
 
 
Figure 4. The ongoing tension: epistemic confidence and the desire to persuade versus epistemic vigilance 
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6.3  Transmission 
 
The ideas that survive selection are those that others are persuaded to accept. (This is not the only 
way ideas are selected. Some are copied or imitated without any active need for persuasion at all. 
All that is necessary is exposure. That is, someone expresses a new idea and it is taken up by 
others. There will be reasons for this, based on fitness and survival, but this is a different topic.) 
Once accepted, the ideas are transmitted vertically and obliquely. In Greece, the records suggest 
this was something that was a common occurrence and that led to the development of their 
understanding of the world. Travellers would be welcomed into a polis and accommodated and 
entertained, perhaps only by a certain circle, in the expectation of being brought up to date with 
the latest ideas.  
 
The actual ideas that were being transmitted may have been old news and superseded by newer 
ones, but they were passed on all the same because there is also value in transmitting obsolete, 
wrong ideas—they become part of the tribal memory. We wouldn’t know anything about Thales 
and his water, for example, otherwise.  
 
Since the behaviour of reasoning was of benefit—it caused a person to become more persuasive; to 
get more of his or her ideas into the group—it was transmitted at first by imitation. However, once 
it was recognised for what it was and its utility, some effort was put into discovering how it 
worked, and then this was actively taught and learnt, much like Darwin’s example above. The 
records are testament to the transmission of the ideas. Plato’s dialogues are also good illustrations 
of how this transmission occurred.  
 
Overall, the context in Greece meant that ATR-type reasoning arose, developed, and was passed 
on. This quotation from Mercier applies to the situation in Greece with respect to the second phase: 
 
. . . the argumentative theory of reasoning suggests that the main function of reasoning is to 
exchange arguments with others (Mercier, 2016, p.689). 
 
The theories of conscious cognition above give an idea of how the Greeks became aware of what 
they were doing. The records give a demonstration.      
 
 
6.4  The reasons 
 
Reasons—organised answers to the question “Why does (did, should) X do Y?”—vary 
between formulas and cause-effect accounts in one dimension and between popular and 
specialised statements on the other. Conventions, explanatory stories, codified 
justifications, and technical accounts all qualify as reasons (Tilley, 2004, p.445).  
 
The diagram below from Sperber and Mercier (2017) gives an idea of the uses of reasons as well as 
the types. 
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Figure 5. The uses of reasons (Sperber and Mercier, 2017, p.129) 
 
In answer to how and why questions reasons will be provided in the form of explanations and 
arguments. Explanations can be used to explain why and to explain how. Arguments can be used 
to argue that. One idea that persists through the records of the presocratics is that of the arché. If, 
for example, the idea is that the arché is water, a number of questions would follow: 
 
Why is it water? An explanation or an argument that it is water. 
Why should I believe it is water? An argument justifying the belief. 
How did water come to be the arché? An explanation of how it came to be water. 
How do things come to be of or from water? An explanation of how things come to be of or 
from water. 
Why do things come to be of or from water? An explanation of why things come to be of or 
from water. (Eternal motion or something like it.) 
 
The simplest strategy is to consider reasons to be answers to how and why questions. Their form 
will vary, and this is what we are interested in. 
 
 
6.5  The arché 
 
One consistent question until the sophists and Socrates was of the essential nature of the world—
the arché, initially referring to the ‘beginning’, ‘origin’, or ‘source of action’ and later, after 
Anaximander, including ‘first principle’ or ‘element’.  
 
Let us take as associates in our task our predecessors who considered the things that are 
and philosophised about the truth, for it is clear that they too speak of certain principles 
and causes . . . (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3 983a26). 
 
The ideas changed over time, beginning with Chaos in the mythological accounts, to water, aer, 
and so on. What didn’t change was the concept of an arché. 
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Of those who first pursued philosophy, the majority believed that the only principles of all 
things are principles in the form of matter.  
For that of which all existing things are composed and that from which they originally 
come to be and that into which they finally perish—the substance persisting but changing 
in its attributes—this they state is the element and principle of the things that are. . . . For 
there must be one or more natures from which the rest come to be, while it is preserved 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983b6 = DK 11A12). 
 
This basic thing needed to be material as the idea of the insubstantial did not arise before the 
atomists posited ‘the void’. It also needed to address the points in the quote above. Any ideas on 
the arché expressed would presumably need to be accompanied by reasons; otherwise, why 
would anyone accept them? Since ideas about the arché is the consistent factor, we can focus on 
the variables, which are the types of reasons used to support them. This is where we expect to 
find the changes, in how the reasons were constructed and in what the results were, the ideas 
plus reasons: the theories. 
 
 
6.6  The expectations 
 
Of the two basic types of reasons, explanations are most useful in accounting for the natural world 
and arguments in accounting for actions. Questions about the arché could be answered by 
explanations and/or arguments. Questions about other things, including actions, likewise. The 
context would determine whether to explain why something is the case or to argue that something 
is the case. Above and beyond explanations, however, is the question of why someone should 
accept or believe. Since ‘believe’ is a verb12 (or, ‘choose’ to believe), we would probably expect an 
argument. These appear in the records long before the presocratics, but it was the presocratics who 
put them to use in a new way. 
 




Someone notices it is wet outside and asks the question, “Why is it wet?” 
 
The answer could be “Because it is raining.” This can be considered a ‘why explanation’. 
 
The response could be, “How does raining lead to it being wet?” 
 
In this case, the answer would be a cause and effect explanation and considered a ‘how 
explanation’. 
 
The next question may be, “Why should I believe you?” 
 
                                                     
12 Verb = a word used to describe an action, state, or occurrence.  
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Now an argument is needed. “You should (choose to) believe (verb = action) me because 
…” 
 
Both types of reasons are found in the records. The development of interest is their increasing 
persuasive powers. By starting with ideas of the arché, this development becomes apparent. At 
each iteration, more persuasive reasons seem to be needed in order to put previous ideas to rest. 
Since a sound argument makes truth more likely (from the ATR perspective; from the CTR 
perspective, a sound argument makes truth certain), once this step was reached what was left for 
the presocratics?  
 
 
6.7  Summary 
 
The intention of this slightly long section is to explain clearly what we can expect to observe in re-
examining and reinterpreting the records. Circumstances in Greece match those described by 
Sperber and Mercier as conducive to ATR reasoning. This statement applies to all cultures, not just 
Greece, but it is Greece, however, that we are interested in. The other theories above describe the 
developments and changes that can be expected. Overall, we should be able to track Greek 
reasoning in terms of Greek development of better reasons supporting their speculations, and 
better, more critical evaluation of the same. There are many records from before the presocratics 
and this is the best place to start, when reasoning was being carried out naturally.  
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7.0  THE MYTHOLOGISTS AND MIXED-THEOLOGIANS 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
The earliest of the Greek records, including Homer and Hesiod, as well as those of what Aristotle 
called the ‘mixed-theologians’, Alcman of Sparta in the 7th C and Pherecydes of Syros in the 6th C 
are the starting points. The Iliad and Odyssey were the basis of Greek education and were 
memorised, copied, and expressed in various ways.  
 
Homer and Hesiod and the like provide good examples of reasoning, explaining how and why 
and using arguments to justify actions. Homer and Hesiod were accepted on the basis of trust in 
the source. It was assumed that Homer’s stories came from the gods and from those who were 
present. Hesiod refers to being guided by the Muses. It is also made clear by the writers of the 
myths that their accounts ‘come from the gods’. In terms of types of reasons, there are the 
following: 
1. Homer’s Trojan War and the Return of Odysseus—explanations of how and why and 
arguments for actions  
2. Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and Days—explanations of how and why and arguments 
for actions 
3. The Hymn to Hermes—argument from probability 
 
Since the thread we are following is the arché, with the earlier meaning of ‘beginning’, ‘origin’, or 
‘source of action’,13 the place to start is Hesiod’s Theogony. Early examples of Greek reason before 
“philosophy began with Thales on 28 May 585 BC”14 are easily found in the myths supporting 
ideas on cosmogony, how the world (cosmos) came to be; cosmology, the nature of the cosmos; 
theogony, how the gods came to be; theology, what, how and why the gods do what they do; and 
models or guides to behaviour. Creation myths are universal: from chaos, the earth diver, 
emergence, ex nihilo (out of nothing), and the world parent. Greek creation myths follow the chaos 
model, as most clearly explained by Hesiod. 
 
 
7.2  The arché—Hesiod’s Theogony 
  
The basic premises for Hesiod’s arché are (1) everything in the world is one god or another, and (2) 
gods beget gods. That is, whatever comes into being is a new god, the result of intercourse 
between ‘earlier’ or ‘older’ gods.15  
 
Verily first of all did Chaos come into being, and then broad-bosomed Gaia [earth], a 
firm seat of all things for ever, and misty Tartaros in a recess of broad-wayed earth, 
and Eros, who is fairest among immortal gods, looser of limbs, and subdues in their 
                                                     
13 Meaning later expanded, by Anaximander, to include ‘first principle’ or ‘element’. 
14 The date can be confirmed: an eclipse of the sun ‘predicted’ by Thales.  
15 Theoretically, gods cannot be earlier or older—they just are. This thought is found in Xenophanes, late 6th century. 
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breast the mind and thoughtful counsel of all gods and all men. Out of Chaos, Erebos 
and black Night came into being . . . (Hesiod, Theogony, 116). 
 
 
Figure 6. One suggested family tree from Hesiod16  
 
Even in the myths, there is variation, selection and transmission. Hesiod provides a mythological 
account synthesised from a number of local accounts of how the world came to be. In making the 
story more coherent and by removing many of the contradictions and inconsistencies in Homer’s 
account, he makes the account more persuasive. In his Theogony, how gods begat gods and 
consequently brought into being what they personified reads as a genealogy. Hesiod’s reasons are 
analogical: growth in nature is observed as animals mating and begetting offspring. Why not 
expand the idea to include everything? 
 
Greek ideas changed over time from accounts of older or more primitive aspects of the world, as 
they saw them, to younger or more developed or complex ones—but all revolving around the 
personification of gods. The older gods form the bases and the newer gods add the adornments 
(kosmos). As new aspects of the world and the human condition were noticed and named, new 
gods were added or repurposed—for example persuasion and Peitho. Presumably the Greeks 
decided that if there were older and newer gods, then logically there had to be an earliest, most 
primitive one; for the Greeks this was Chaos. 
 
Hesiod explains how the world came to be, and he explains why. That is, why certain gods chose 
to mate with certain other gods. It is analogical and based on human ideas and emotions, but it 
could be summarised as the mating choices resulting from considerations of what would provide 
the greatest benefits. Hesiod’s account must have been accepted for a number of reasons: trust in 
the source, authority, coherence and clarity, persuasive analogy. And perhaps, the fact that there 
were no viable alternatives. 
 
 
7.3  Arguments justifying actions in Homer 
 
Odysseus’ argument for Achilles re-joining the war and Achilles’ counter-argument: why he is 
rejecting the plea and not re-joining are found in the Iliad. These arguments are of the same form as 
later ‘sophistic’ arguments, the difference is that there is no indication that the author was 
                                                     
16 http://www.maicar.com/GML/MythsCreation.html 
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consciously and deliberately devising them. He was recording the type of reasoning used to 
persuade at the time that came naturally. 
 
In Book IX of the Iliad there are three speeches involving Achilles. All involve reasons and 
arguments of different types, some for the first time.  
 
There is an example of a well arranged speech by Odysseus at 9.225-306, in which can be found the 
various parts that the sophists were later to teach. He starts with a prooemium, seeking the good 
will of Achilles by thanking him for his hospitality. He next states his proposition (228-31), that the 
Greek ships will be destroyed unless Achilles returns to defend them. There is then a brief 
narration of how the situation developed (232-46), and then a specific demand that Achilles return 
(247-48). As proof, Odysseus cites four reasons why Achilles should return to the war (249-306). 
(Kennedy, 1994, p.14) 
 
(Reason 1) An appeal to character: 
 
Achilles will come to regret not helping when he could.  
 
(Reason 2) An appeal to authority: 
 
Achilles’ father advised him to do certain things when he initially set out for Troy.  
 
(Reason 3) An appeal to reward: 
 
A list of gifts Agamemnon is willing to make if Achilles returns.  
 
(Reason 4) An appeal to emotion: 
 
And the “last argument, functioning as an epilogue, is emotional; Hector is said to be 




Achilles responds with a counter-argument of his own. He will not re-join the war for a 
number of reasons, which present as inferences: “If I were to re-join the war, then …” These 
can be restated as ‘because’ reasons: “I will not re-join the war because …” 
 
The arguments in Book IX can easily be formalised into deductive arguments, but this is not 
necessary. They function perfectly well as they stand. 
 
 
7.4  Arguments justifying actions in Hesiod’s Work and Days 
 
The gods were the world, but the gods also acted in and on the world, and an understanding of 
what they did and how and why they did it allowed for some sort of predictive ability. Hesiod 
provides this information in his Works and Days, a farmer’s almanac, with farming and moral 
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advice, that he wrote for his brother. The poem provides information on god-world and god-
human interactions.  
 
Gods reward or punish depending on whether they are pleased or displeased, so it obviously best 
to act in ways that please the gods. The problem is, of course, knowing what pleases the gods. 
Hesiod lists what pleases and displeases the gods and their likely responses. The starting premise 
could be, ‘gods reward those who please them and punish those who displease them’. 
 
Giving straight judgements to foreigners pleases the gods: 
 
Those who give straight judgements to foreigners 
and citizens and do not step at all aside from justice 
have a flourishing city and the people prosper in it. 
There is Peace, the nurse of children, throughout the land, and wide-seeing Zeus  
Never ordains harsh war for them (Hesiod, Works and Days, 225). 
 
Having thoughts of evil violence and cruel deeds displeases the gods: 
 
But for those who have thoughts of evil violence and cruel deeds, 
Wide-seeing Zeus son of Kronos has ordained justice. 
Often indeed the entire city of an evil man suffers, 
When he sins and plans wicked deeds.  




7.5  How to farm 
 
The farming instructions are the distillation of wisdom acquired over time and through trial and 
error. There are a number of inferences in the form of rules or injunctions, often supported by 
empirical evidence as reasons. Many of these are in the form of enthymemes, a syllogism with a 
missing premise, usually expressed as ‘A because B’. They take the form of ‘If A then B because C’.  
 
For example, ‘Once the rains arrive, plant your corn because this will lead to a good crop’. The 
inference that has become known through trial and error or experience is ‘If the rains have arrived, 




“Why should I plant my corn when the rains arrive?” 
 
“Because it will result in a good crop.” (Explanation why) 
 
“OK, but how does planting my corn when the rains arrive result in a good crop?”  
 
“Explanation how.” 
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The reasons are incorporated in the inference and nothing more should be needed on order to 
persuade the brother to accept the injunction. The same applies to the following examples: 
 
Do not put your work off till to-morrow and the day after; for a sluggish worker does not fill 
his barn, nor one who puts off his work … 
 
When the piercing power and sultry heat of the sun abate, and almighty Zeus sends the 
autumn rains [in October] … when it showers its leaves to the ground and stops sprouting, 
the wood you cut with your axe is least liable to worm. 
 
Let a slave follow a little behind with a mattock and make trouble for the birds by hiding the 
seed … (Hesiod, Works and Days, 383-465) 
 
For each injunction, the reason given appears to anticipate expected the ‘Why should I do what 
you suggest?’ question. Knowing his intended audience and in accord with the principles of 
motivated reasoning and selective laziness, he has devised his arguments accordingly. He also has 
authority and trust on his side as well. 
 
 
7.6  Argument from probability in the Hymn to Hermes 
 
In a later record, the ‘Homeric’ Hymn to Hermes,17 can be found other arguments.  It seems that 
one-day-old Hermes is being accused by Apollo of steaking Apollo’s cattle. To this accusation, 
Hermes responds that “he knows nothing about the cattle and employs what is apparently the 
earliest specific example of argument from probability (eikos) in Greek: Is he, a baby, ‘like’ (eoika) a 
cattle thief? That is, is it “probable” that he could have stolen cattle?” (Kennedy, 1994, p.14). And 
later, before Zeus as judge, Apollo has evidence of the cows’ tracks and a farmer who witnessed 
the deed (who Hermes had attempted to bribe), “but Apollo does not develop any arguments from 
his evidence” (Kennedy, 1994, p.14). 
 
 
7.7  New type of explanation of the mixed-theologians 
 
One response to purely mythological ideas were mixed-theological theories. However, evidence in 
the records is sparse so they may not have been mainstream. The variation was that instead of 
gods begetting gods, some changes were posited as the result of gods acting directly on the world 
in some way. This was a sort of god-physical world interaction and a new type of explanation, not 
a rejection of the gods, and so may not have been considered unorthodox or irreligious. Aristotle 
only mentions this change in passing: 
 
. . . since the ‘mixed’ theologians, those who do not say everything in mythical form, such as 
Pherecydes and certain of the others, and also the Magi . . . (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1091b8). 
 
                                                     
17 Probably 6th C 
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7.8  Semi-physical explanations 
 
The idea of philosophy beginning with Thales is due to him coming up with non-mythological, 
physical answers to questions about the world. The intermediate step were the mixed-theologians 
whose reasons were explanations of interactions between gods and the physical world. Plato had 
more to say about it later, but the first example in the records is from Alcman of Sparta, around 620 
BC, and although it provided its own explanatory reasons, there was nothing to justify them.  
 
For when matter began to be arranged there came into being a kind of way [porus or Porus], 
as it were a beginning [or origin, arché]. So, Alcman says that the matter of all things was 
disturbed and unmade; then someone came into being who was arranging everything, then a 
way came into being … when Thetis had come into being there became beginning and end of 
all things, and the totality of things has a similar nature to that of the bronze material, Thetis 
to that of the craftsman, and the way and the limit to that of the beginning and the end . . . 
(Alcman Fr. 3 (Page), col. ii, 7-20 (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, p.47)) 
 
In this passage, and another where Thetis stirs the ocean to create new stuff, is the new idea that 
things come to be not through reproduction but through production, a direct interaction between 
the gods and the physical world. (Another indication of this change, according to Kirk, Raven and 
Schofield, is in translating whether to capitalise the names in the passage. Is the reference to the 
god Porus, god of the way or means of passage, or to porus, the passage itself?) 
 
Alcman of Sparta was known as a lyric poet and his cosmogonical side was unknown before the 
fragment above was first published in 1957.18 That his theory has not been previously mentioned 
suggests he had little influence in this area. He may have only been recording some current ideas 
he found interesting that had arisen in Sparta (not known for this sort of thing) or that had arrived 
in Sparta from elsewhere. That main point is that an alternative account had arisen. 
 
The Pherecydes (of Syros) mentioned by Aristotle had stories of a similar ilk, of gods fashioning 
the world out of material. Since Pherecydes’ dates match those of Anaximander—mid-6th C, there 
may have been some sharing of ideas, perhaps of things arising from the arché that did not rely on 
the gods completely. While Pherecydes was focusing on complete accounts of the world, 
Anaximander and the Milesians were focusing on the arché and the mechanism of creation. Or at 
least, that is how they have been portrayed. The main point is that new ideas were starting to arise 
as alternatives to tradition, and consequently new reasons were going to need to be devised to 
persuade others to at least consider them. That is, not automatically reject them. 
 
  
                                                     
18 The papyrus fragment was found in a rubbish dump in Oxyrhynchus in Egypt around 1855. 
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8.0  THE MILESIANS 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
The main point of the argumentative theory of reasoning is that reasoning is an important 
component of communication and cooperation. This applies to the Milesians, three early Greek 
thinkers from the Ionian polis of Miletus. 
 
The Milesians were speculating on the nature of the world, which was not new, nor was reason-
giving and evaluating. What Thales did that was new was to proffer non-mythological answers in 
the form of physical explanations. He is often referred to as the founder of philosophy on the basis, 
but this seems somewhat unfair to those who came before him.  
 
Thales is said to have been the first to introduce the study of nature to the Greeks: although 
many others came before him, as Theophrastus thinks, yet he so far excelled them as to 
eclipse all his predecessors. But he is said to have left nothing behind in writing except the 
so-called Nautical Astronomy (Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics 23.29-33). 
 
Thales was a man of practical wisdom, one of the so-called Seven Sages of early Greek 
history, and he was regarded by posterity not only as an original contributor to science and 
philosophy, but also as an astute statesman (Barnes, 2001, p.9). 
 
That is, his ideas were about the physical world as it was observed; it was still divine, but not 
personified. For this new type of answer he needed different types of reasons—no more gods 
begetting gods. Although Thales’ reasons for his ideas are almost non-existent in the records, those 
of his followers show significant developments. Myside bias, selective laziness and the demands of 
the audiences can account for these. 
 
 
8.2  Thales of Miletus (c.624-c.546) 
 
Thales was a well-known sage; he was involved in politics, astronomy, geometry and business 
speculation, among other things. That he did not give reasons supporting the ideas he is known for 
is unlikely. More likely is that they were not remembered or recorded. That he was able to give 
reasons is shown by a number of aphorisms ascribed to him: 
 
Of existing things, god is the oldest—for he is ungenerated. 
 
The world is the most beautiful—for it is god’s making. 
 
Space is the greatest—for it includes everything. 
 
Mind is the swiftest—for it runs through everything. 
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Necessity is the strongest—for it controls everything. 
 
Time is the wisest—for it discovers everything.  
 
… The motto ‘Know Thyself’ is his, though Antisthenes in his Successions says that it was 




8.2.a  Thales’ arché—All is water 
 
However, they do not all agree about how many or what kinds of such principles there are, 
but Thales, the founder of this kind of philosophy, stated it to be water (Aristotle, 
Metaphysics 1.3 983b18 = DK 11A12). 
 
It is not clear whether Thales considered things were of or from water. It is also not recorded why 
he thought “water is the arché”. Since it is natural to ask for reasons, and since there were none 
recorded, Aristotle proposed a few of his own: 
   
He may have gotten this idea from seeing  
a. that the nourishment of all things is moist, and  
b. that even the hot itself comes to be from this and lives on this (the principle of all things 
is that from which they come to be)—getting this idea from this consideration and also  
c. because the seeds of all things have a moist nature; and  
d. water is the principle of the nature of moist things (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3 983b6–27 = 
DK 11A12). 
 
Thales may have used reasons of this sort. Aristotle’s proposed reasons are important in that he 
started a trend that has continued. Modern writers continue to confabulate reasons on behalf of 
early Greek thinkers, based on what they should have been thinking, often in the form of clear 
deductions that couldn’t realistically have been in use before Parmenides and the Eleatics.  
 
Thales is not recorded as refuting earlier ideas about what is, even the mythological accounts. 
There is no record of him considering how things come to be from what is, nor the mechanism of 
change. Of course, these would be questions asked by his audience, and so he must have given 
some reasons for his ideas. 
 
 
8.2.b  The earth rests on water 
 
This is why he declared that the earth rests on water. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3 983b21 = DK 
11A12). 
 
Some say [the earth] rests on water. This is the oldest account that we have inherited, and 
they say that Thales of Miletus said this. It rests because it floats like wood or some other 
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such thing (for nothing is by nature such as to rest on air, but on water). He says this just as 
though the same argument did not apply to the water supporting the earth as to the earth 
itself! (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.13 294a28 = DK 11A14). 
 
That the earth rests on water is also ascribed to Thales. In the form above, Aristotle seems to be 
implying the following: All is of or from water because the earth rests on water. This doesn’t 
seem particularly persuasive. Perhaps there is something missing, or perhaps Thales never meant 
the second part to stand as the reason for the first part.  
 
This can be restated simply (and crudely): the earth rests on water because it floats on water like 
wood floats on water. Since the mythological accounts have the earth surrounded by water, this is 
not a completely new idea. Aristotle suggests that something is amiss with Thales’ reasoning. If the 
earth rests on water, then what does the water rest on? This is a question that his successors spent 
some time and effort answering. 
 
 
8.2.c  The soul produces motion 
 
From what is related about him, it seems that Thales too held that the soul is something 
productive of motion, if indeed he said that the lodestone has soul, because it moves iron 
(Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2 405a19–21 = DK 11A22). 
 
Aristotle and Hippias say that [Thales] gave inanimate things too a share in soul (psuche), 
taking his evidence from the magnetic stone and from amber (Diogenes Laertius, I.24 = 
11A1). 
 
Another set of arguments from Thales concerns souls and gods, which suggests he did not reject 
the gods and customary accounts. Things were still divine; it was the form of the divine that he 
decided was water. Various writers have transformed these fragments into formal arguments, but 
this is not really necessary: the intention comes through fairly clearly. 
 
These two fragments are examples of analogical explanation, defined as “a comparison between 
one thing and another, typically for the purpose of explanation or clarification”.   
 
An analogical argument is an explicit representation of a form of analogical reasoning that 
cites accepted similarities between two systems to support the conclusion that some further 
similarity exists (Bartha, 2016). 
 
This was the case with the mythological explanations, gods begetting gods, and it will be the case 
with the natural philosophers before and after Parmenides. As a form of reasoning it is valid, but 
not always reliable. 
 
(1) The soul, the animating principle, causes movement. 
(2) Magnets and amber (when rubbed) cause movement. 
(3) Therefore magnets and amber have souls. 
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This fallacy, affirmation of the consequent, will appear again and again. (If A then B, B therefore 
A.) Since the intent is persuasion, the fact that the argument is invalid will not matter if it gets 
others to accept it.  
 
Another consideration is that inferences of the sort, A  B, are sometimes imagined to be A ≡ B. 
That is, if it is wet outside, it is raining is the same as if it is raining outside, it is wet. The everyday 
world is sometimes perceived as slightly different from what the use of logic would have us 
believe. If it is wet outside, then it is raining, and if it is raining outside, then it is wet.  
 
This being the case, the affirmation of the consequent above becomes not a fallacy but a true (or at 
least, believable) statement about the world. It seems to have taken some time for the Greeks to 
recognise this.  
 
 
8.2.d  All things are full of gods 
 
Some say the soul is mixed in with the whole universe, and perhaps this is why Thales 
supposed that all things are full of gods (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.5 411a7–8 = DK 11A22). 
 
This can be restated simply as, ‘All things are full of gods because the soul is mixed in with the 
whole universe’. 
 
Thales’ sageworthiness should have meant he was at least listened to, if not believed. As important 
as his audience accepting his ideas on the basis of trust is what they thought after time to reflect. 
At this early stage his audience would be aware of two similar but different accounts of the world; 
the mythological and the physical (and perhaps their own). This would have caused them to 
process, evaluate and reach some sort of decision. With Thales, there was the choice of 
mythological versus physical. It seems the mythological held sway. As time wore on, there would 
have been a choice between the different physical accounts as well. Cognitive dissonance and the 
excluded middle would ensure this. 
 
 
8.2.e  Other Thalean ideas 
 
They say that Thales was the first to prove that a circle is bisected by its diameter (Proclus, 
Commentary on Euclid 157.10-11). 
 
Thales is also known for some geometrical theorems. The records refer to him ‘proving’ or 
‘demonstrating’ them (translations differ). This probably means something like ‘pointing out’ or 
practically explaining the principles. This would suggest something different from the later 
concept of a geometric proof—the writing of reasoned, logical explanations that use definitions, 
axioms, postulates, and previously proved theorems, arriving at a conclusion about a geometric 
statement. It would be closer to this definition of prove: to demonstrate the truth or existence of 
(something) by evidence or argument. With Thales, this could have been nothing more than 
cutting out a circle and folding it in half. In the same way he could have ‘proved’ the other 
geometrical theorems he is known for: the right triangle, which he applied to calculating the 
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heights of pyramids, and similar triangles, which he applied to calculating the distance of ships 
from the shore. The point is that this sort of ‘proving’ is a type of reason-giving, and could have 
been good practice for his other speculations (McKirahan, 1994, p.26). 
 
 
8.3  Anaximander of Miletus (c.610-c.546) 
 
Anaximander is sometimes described as the pupil of Thales. This is probably not accurate. More 
likely, they were members of a group or circle that discussed, among other things, the nature of the 
world. Thales may not have needed reasons to persuade while Anaximander did. Whichever was 
the case, there is a clear development in ATR-type reasoning with Anaximander.  
 
Apollodorus of Athens . . .  says in his Chronicles that [Anaximander] was sixty-three in the 
second year of the fifty-eighth Olympiad [547/6 BC] and that he died shortly after (Diogenes 
Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II 2). 
 
 
8.3.a  The arché is apeiron 
 
Anaximander was the first to introduce the term ‘arché’ to refer specifically to principle and element 
of what is. This was the meaning that persisted. 
 
Of those who declared that the arché is one, moving and apeiron, Anaximander . . . said that 
the apeiron was the arché and element of things that are, and he was the first to introduce this 
name for the arché [that is, he was the first to call the archē apeiron] (Simplicius, Commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics 24.13–21 = DK 12A9 + 12B1). 
 
Anaximander does not supply reasons for his apeiron, and while later writers have, they seem 
anachronistic. However, Anaximander may not have needed them. The idea that the arché is 
apeiron, once it had arisen, would only have needed reasons to support it if challenged. It may have 
been accepted on the basis of trust.   
 
 
8.3.b  The arché cannot be water or any of the four elements 
 
He says that the arché is neither water nor any of the other things called elements, but some 
nature which is apeiron, out of which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them 
(Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.6.1–2 = DK 12A11). 
 
The fragment above may be in response to Thales’ water. Simplicius implies that Anaximander 
had reasons for not choosing one of the four elements as his arché but it is not stated:  
 
It is clear that he observed the changes of the four elements into one another and resolved 
not to make any one of them the underlying stuff but rather something else apart from them 
(Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 24.21-25 = DK 12A9).  
 
48 | P a g e  
If reasons were missing from presocratic fragments, later writers posited their own, which doesn’t 
really help us. Aristotle proffers a well-developed counter argument against the apeiron being one 
of the four elements:   
 
The infinite [apeiron] body cannot be one and simple . . . if it is conceived, as some say, as that 
which is aside from the elements, and from which they generate the elements. . . . For some 
make the infinite this [i.e., something aside from the elements], rather than air or water, to 
keep the others from being destroyed by the one of them that is infinite. For they contain 
oppositions with regard to one another, for example, air is cold, water wet, fire hot. If any 
one of them were infinite, the rest would already have been destroyed. But as it is, they 
declare that the thing from which all come into being is different (Aristotle, Physics 3.3 
204b22-29 = DK 12A16). 
 
The apeiron could be seen as Anaximander’s response to the question, if everything is of or 




8.3.c  Things come to be by separation 
 
He accounts for coming into being not by alteration of the element but by the separating off 
of the opposites by an eternal motion (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 24.21-25 = 
DK 12A9). 
 
In addition he said that motion is eternal, in which it occurs that the heavens come to be 
(Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.6.1–2 = DK 12A11). 
 
The changes from the original apeiron are the result of a separating off of opposites by an 
eternal motion which produces hot and cold. These act on one another and in turn generate the 
world. The form of the hot is fire, the origin of the sun, the moon and the stars. The form of the 
cold is a dark mist, which can be transformed into air and earth. These changes happen not by 
chance but according to necessity. This can be compared to Hesiod’s Theogony. It is a non-
mythological explanation of how the world came to be.  
 
 
8.3.d  The apeiron is divine 
 
However, as we move away from the arché, we start to find reasons and arguments in 
Anaximander, some quite persuasive. In the following fragment is a clear reason: 
  
This [the infinite, apeiron] does not have an arché, but this seems to be the arché of the rest, and 
to contain all things and steer all things, as all declare who do not fashion other causes aside 
from the infinite [the apeiron] … and this is the divine. For it is deathless and indestructible, 
as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers say (Aristotle, Physics 3.4 203b10–15 = 
DK 12A15). 
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The claim is that the apeiron is divine. In response to the “Why?” question, it is easy enough to 
inference backwards to the argument: 
 
(1) Whatever is deathless and indestructible is divine. (These being the characteristics of 
‘divine’.) 
(2) The apeiron is deathless and indestructible. 
(3) Therefore, the apeiron is divine. 
 
There are things missing from this argument; for example, how do we know that the apeiron is 
deathless and indestructible? But, if these arguments were constructed with an expected audience 
in mind, this may have been all that was considered necessary. The response, if any, would 
dictate the next step. 
 
 
8.3.e  The earth stays at rest—principle of sufficient reason 
 
The argument from probability was pointed out in the Hymn to Hermes. A second sort of 
argument, based on the principle of sufficient reason, appears with Anaximander and can be 
added to the toolbox. 
 
For Anaximander, the earth is not floating on water but at rest in space. As McKirahan states: 
“Unusual is the sophisticated argument on which he bases [or, with which he supports (GA)] this 
belief” (McKirahan, 1994, p.40).  
 
Some, like Anaximander . . . declare that the earth stays at rest because of equality. For it is 
no more fitting for what is situated at the centre and is equally far from the extremes to move 
up rather than down or sideways. And it is impossible for it to move in opposite directions 
at the same time. Therefore, it stays at rest of necessity (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.13 295b11–
16 = DK 12A26). 
 
The earth is aloft and is not supported by anything. It stays at rest because its distance from 
all things is equal (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.6.3–4 = DK 12A11). 
 
This must be the response to Thales’ idea of the earth floating on water: It is observed that the 
earth stays at rest. Why is this? According to Anaximander, it is because it is equal distance from 
all things and therefore there is no reason (“no more fitting”) for it to move in one direction over 
another. It stays at rest of (logical) necessity.  
 
One way of expressing the argument is the modus tollens form, which arrives at a conclusion by 
negation. This is going to become a regular occurrence in the records and will become the basis of 
Zeno and Melissus’ arguments, or counter-arguments.  
 
(1) If there is sufficient reason for something to move, then it moves. 
(2) The earth doesn’t move.                                                   
(3) Therefore, there is not sufficient reason for it to move. 
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The other way of expressing the argument is modus ponens.  
 
“The earth stays are rest because of equality.” Or, “It stays at rest because its distance from all 
things is equal.”  
 
In other words, “if equality  stays at rest”. There is an equality; therefore, stays at rest. 
Admittedly, the equality is only in terms of distance; but, it’s a start. 
 
(1) If something is of equal distance from all things, then it will stay at rest. 
(2) The earth is of equal distance from all things. 
(3) Therefore, the earth stays at rest.  
 
In answer to the question, why does the earth stay at rest? Anaximander has inferenced backwards 
to an interesting and persuasive argument. The process may have been something like: why 
doesn’t the earth move? Because it has no reason to move. Why doesn’t it have reason to move? 
Because if it moved it would have to move somewhere, and if it moved somewhere it would have 
to be because the reason to more to the ‘somewhere’ was greater that alternative reasons to move 
somewhere else. Why is that? Because all somewheres are of equal distance away. These may not 
be exactly the thoughts that ran through Anaximander’s mind, but it may be something like it.   
 
What is more important, however, is that the argument he gives is the “first known application of 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason” (McKirahan, 1994, p.40), which, according to Leibniz, is that “no 
fact can be real or existent … unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not 
otherwise” (Leibniz, sec. 32). Anaximander implies that there is no reason for the earth to be 
moving in one direction as opposed to any other. Anaximander’s (deductive) argument would 
have been difficult to refute at the time as it was using ideas that were commonly accepted. It is a 
significant development.   
 
 
8.3.f  Other explanations 
 
Anaximander speculated on a number of other topics, giving fairly convincing analogical 
explanations to support them. I will present two without comment; it is obvious what he is doing. I 
have underlined the words or phrases that indicate reasons. 
 
He also declares that in the beginning humans were born from animals of a different kind, 
since other animals quickly manage on their own . . . (Pseudo-Plutarch, Opinions 2 = DK 
12A10). 
 
Winds occur when the finest vapours of dark mist are separated off and collect together and 
then are set in motion. Rain results from the vapour arising from the earth under the influence 
of the sun. Lightning occurs whenever wind escapes and splits the clouds apart (Hippolytus, 
Refutation of All Heresies 1.6.5–7 = DK 12A11). 
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8.4  Anaximenes of Miletus (c.585-525) 
 
Anaximenes proposed aer as the arché. Replacing Anaximander’s apeiron with something like mist. 
He proposed a mechanism for change that was more developed than Anaximander’s vague 
separation. And, probably in response to a more discerning or demanding audience, he developed 
arguments for speculations in other areas, scoring a couple of firsts in a couple of areas—one being 




8.4.a  The arché is one and unlimited but not indeterminate 
 
Anaximenes . . . like Anaximander, declares that the under-lying nature is one and 
unlimited [apeiron] . . . (Theophrastus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 24.26–25.1 = DK 13A5). 
 
Anaximenes . . . declared that the principle is unlimited [apeiron] aer, from which come to be 
things that are coming to be, things that have come to be, and things that will be, and gods 
and divine things (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.7.1–8 = 13A7). 
 
Anaximenes’ arché is one and unlimited (apeiron = unlimited), as Anaximander held. There are no 
reasons given although a number have been proposed by later writers that are quite persuasive.    
 
 
8.4.b  The arché is aer 
 
. . . the under-lying nature is one and unlimited [apeiron] but not indeterminate, as 
Anaximander held, but definite, saying that it is aer (air) (Theophrastus, quoted by 
Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 24.26–25.1 = DK 13A5). 
 
. . . the principle is unlimited [apeiron] aer . . . The rest come to be out of the products of this 
(Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.7.1–8 = 13A7) 
 
Anaximenes the Milesian asserted that aer is the principle of the things which exist; for 
everything comes into being from air and is resolved again into it (Pseudo-Plutarch, Opinions 
876AB = DK 13B2). 
 
Anaximenes says that aer, something closer to mist than air, is the principle from which come to be 
the things that are. There are no specific reasons given for the choice of aer. However, it could be 
that his explanation of what it is that causes substances to be different and his proposed 
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8.4.c  Substances differ in rarity and density 
 
The form of aer is the following: when it is most even, it is invisible, but it is revealed by the 
cold and the hot and the wet, and by its motion. It is always moving, for all the things that 
undergo change would not change if it were not moving. For when it becomes condensed or 
finer, it appears different. For when it is dissolved into a finer condition it becomes fire, and 
on the other hand air being condensed becomes winds (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 
1.7.1–8 = 13A7). 
 
It differs in rarity and density according to the substances <it becomes>. Becoming finer, it 
comes to be fire; being condensed, it comes to be wind, then cloud; and when still further 
condensed, it becomes water, then earth, then stones, and the rest come to be from these 
(Theophrastus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 24.26–25.1 = DK 
13A5). 
 
This is a complete explanation for how things come to be and how they change. It is not only 
because they vary in density but also because they are caused to vary in density. When aer is most 
even it is invisible. In a less dense state it presents as fire. In denser states it presents as wind, then 
cloud, water, earth, and stones. The differences that relate to air, water, clouds, and the like can be 
easily observed in the world—the three states of water. 
 
 
8.4.d  Condensation and rarefaction cause change 
 
It is eternal motion that causes changes from one state to another. In the following fragments, his 
explanation is made clear. 
 
He too makes motion eternal and says that change also comes to be through it 
(Theophrastus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 24.26–25.1 = DK 
13A5). 
 
Anaximenes stated that clouds occur when the air is further thickened. When it is 
condensed still more, rain is squeezed out. Hail occurs when the falling water freezes, and 
snow when some wind is caught up in the moisture (Aëtius 3.4.1 = DK 13A17). 
 
Cloud comes from air through felting, and water comes to be when this happens to a 
greater degree. When condensed still more it becomes earth, and when it reaches the 
absolutely densest stage it becomes stones. Thus the most important factors in coming into 
being are opposites—hot and cold (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.7.1–8 = 13A7). 
 
This mechanism explains the different densities and hence the different things in the world. This 
explanation is very persuasive as it accounts for what can be readily observed in the world and it 
uses evidence from the world. In fact, it provides good reasons for accepting the idea that all is aer. 
Basically, if aer is squeezed it becomes denser and if somehow not-squeezed it becomes finer. It is 
the eternal motion that is the cause of this squeezing and unsqueezing.  
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8.4.e  Hot and the cold are caused by condensation and rarefaction 
 
Another consequence of the squeezing and unsqueezing is the hot and the cold, which 
Anaximenes sets about proving empirically: 
 
. . . let us leave neither the cold nor the hot in the category of substance, but <hold them to 
be> common attributes of matter, which come as the results of its changes. . . . As a result he 
claimed that it is not said unreasonably that a person releases both hot and cold from his 
mouth. For the breath becomes cold when compressed and condensed by the lips, and 
when the mouth is relaxed, the escaping breath becomes warm because of rareness 
(Plutarch, The Principle of Cold 7 947F = 13B1). 
 
Anaximenes states that hot and cold are the result of change, not substances in themselves. More 
importantly, he has a demonstration to support his statement: air passing the lips causing two 
states—when condensed, cold, and when rarefied, hot. This is something that everyone can 
experience, and hence a more persuasive argument than just referring to perceptions. 
 
McKirahan refers to the fragment above as “the first piece of reasoning preserved from Greek 
philosophy” (1994, p. 51). However, the evidence from the earlier texts and fragments suggests 
there was not a time when the Greeks were not reasoning. From a CTR perspective, it is 
imaginable that this fragment could be interpreted as the earliest example of ‘Greek rationalism’. A 
better interpretation may be that it is the best example yet of the use of observable/experienced 
phenomena as physical evidence supporting a particular idea.  
 
 
8.4.f  Aer is a god 
 
Anaximenes determined that air is a god and that it comes to be and is without measure, 
infinite, and always in motion (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.10.26 = DK 13A10). 
 
Anaximenes’ reasons for the idea that aer is divine are similar to those of Anaximander (and, 
indirectly, Thales also), by referring to his/her/its qualities. 
 
(1) If something comes to be and is without measure, infinite, and always in motion, then it 
is a god (divine). 
(2) Aer comes to be and is without measure, infinite, and always in motion. 
(3) Therefore, aer is a god (divine). 
 
He adds a couple more qualities, but the reason is basically the same. The idea that the arché is 
divine suggests that Milesian ideas at the time were not too different from existing mythological 
ideas. “All is gods” became “All is divine” or “All is god”. This should have allayed suspicion that 
the natural philosophers were engaged in unorthodox or heretical activities. So, while the 
argument above is not particularly noteworthy, perhaps it indicates an inclination to persuade 
others that there was no threat with these new ideas. What will need to be followed up is of course 
the idea of gods “coming to be”. Do they? This will be addressed by the next presocratic on the 
scene.  
54 | P a g e  
8.4.g  The earth is flat and floats on air 
 
For Thales, the earth rested on water; for Anaximander, it was suspended space as there was no 
reason for it to go one way or another. Anaximenes has another idea, it was flat and suspended 
over a column of air. 
 
Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritus say that its flatness is the cause of its staying at 
rest. For it does not cut the air below but covers it like a lid, as bodies with flatness 
apparently do; they are difficult for winds to move because of their resistance. They say that 
the earth does this same thing with respect to the air beneath because of its flatness. And 
the air, lacking sufficient room to move aside, stays at rest in a mass because of the air 
beneath (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.13 294b13–20 = DK 13A20). 
 
This explanation uses analogy in a specific way. The explanation is first presented, followed by the 
evidence, making for a more persuasive argument. Lids floating on boiling pots would have been 
common, and connecting one representation with another can be quite persuasive. In fact, the 
image that that is caused to arise in the mind is persuasive enough without need for further 
reasons. It is wrong and therefore a next step would be better explanation, better evidence, or a 
different type of argument. 
 
 
8.4.h  Earthquakes and the earth being drenched and drying 
 
Anaximenes declares that when the earth is being drenched and dried out it bursts, and 
earthquakes result from these hills breaking off and collapsing. This is why earthquakes 
occur in droughts and also in heavy rains. For in the droughts, as was said, the earth is 
broken while being dried out, and when it becomes excessively wet from the waters, it falls 
apart (Aristotle, Meteorology 2.7 365b6–12 = DK 13A21). 
 
Anaximenes’ explanation refers to observables as supporting evidence. This use of easily observed 
physical phenomena as evidence, including that earthquakes occur in droughts and also in heavy 
rains, which was apparently what was actually happening in various parts of Greece at the time, is 
a significant development. One problem with referring to and basing ideas and arguments on 
observables is that they can be perceived differently by different people.  
 
 
8.4.i  Anaximenes’ use of analogy 
 
Of final interest is Anaximenes’ use of analogy in order to cause to arise in the mind clearer mental 
representations of what it is he is attempting to persuade others to accept. For example: 
 
… the stars are implanted like nails in the ‘ice-like’; but some say they are fiery leaves like 
paintings (Aetius II, 14, 3-4). 
 
Anaximenes says the sun is flat like a leaf (Aetius II, 22,1). 
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Heavenly bodies do not move under the earth … but round it, just like a felt cap turns round 
our head … (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies I, 7, 6). 
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9.0  XENOPHANES OF COLOPHON (c.570-c.475) 
 
In some ways, Xenophanes is the hero of the story. He consolidated what the Milesians were 
doing, raised questions of knowledge, refuted existing ideas, put forward his own ideas, and he 
did all this in a way that brought about some significant developments in reasoning. With 
Xenophanes, the implicit became explicit.  
 
According to Kirk, Raven and Schofield, Xenophanes “was a poet and a sage, a singer of his own 
songs rather than those of others: he was certainly not, as some have mistakenly assumed . . . a 
Homeric rhapsode. In the longest of his extant elegies (B1, an interesting poem with no immediate 
philosophical relevance) he has authority enough to outline the rules of behaviour for the 
symposium that is to follow; he seems therefore to have been honourably received in aristocratic 
households” (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983, p.164). 
 
[Xenophanes] wrote in verse, both elegiac and iambic, against Hesiod and Homer, censuring 
them for their remarks about the gods. He also recited his own poems. He is said to have 
disagreed with Thales and with Pythagoras, and to have attacked Epimenides. He lived to an 
advanced age, as he himself says: 
Already there are sixty-seven years 
tossing my speculation throughout the land of Greece, 
and from my birth there were twenty-five in addition to these, if indeed I know how to 
speak truly about these matters (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 9.18-19 = 
DK 21B8). 
 
The natural domain of arguments is actions, explaining and justifying them. It appears that 
Xenophanes is consciously and deliberately devising them and that he applies his ‘way’ to other 
areas of interest. I will introduce some preliminary ideas before discussing his arché. 
 
 
9.1  We should express thoughts that are noble 
 
Xenophanes’ fragments are the first to provide clear reasons that could be considered his own (that 
is, not put into his mouth by later writers) for ideas or claims. This is especially true of the 
fragment referred to by Kirk, Raven and Schofield above, which, while usually dismissed by 
serious philosophers,19 actually gives a great deal of information relevant to our purposes. I 
present the fragment first and then comment: 
 
For now, behold, the floor is clean, and so too the hands of all, and the cups. One (attendant) 
places woven garlands round our heads, another proffers sweet-scented myrrh in a saucer. 
The mixing-bowl stands there full of good cheer, and another wine is ready in the jar, a wine 
that promises never to betray us, honeyed, smelling of flowers. In our midst the frankincense 
gives forth its sacred perfume; and there is cold water, sweet and pure. Golden loaves lie to 
hand, and the lordly table is laden with cheese and with honey. The altar in the centre is 
                                                     
19 “an interesting poem with no immediate philosophical relevance” (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983, p.164)  
57 | P a g e  
decked with flowers all over, and song and revelry fill the mansion. 
It is proper for men who are enjoying themselves first of all to praise God with decent 
stories and pure words. But when they have poured a libation and prayed for the power to 
do what is just—for thus to pray is our foremost need—it is no outrage to drink as much as 
will enable you to reach home without a guide, unless you are very old. But the man whom 
one must praise is he who after drinking expresses thoughts that are noble, as well as his 
memory (and his endeavour) concerning virtue allows, not treating of the battles of the 
Titans or of the Giants, figments of our predecessors, nor of violent civil war, in which tales 
there is nothing useful; but always to have respect for the gods, that is good (Athenaeus, 
Scholars at Dinner 11.462c = DK 21B1). 
 
The custom of drinking parties, or symposia, began in the 7th century. Xenophanes (in the 6th 
century), like most Greek males of a certain class, was aware of what went on in them; he would 
have provided or been some of the entertainment. As Kirk, Raven and Schofield imply, these were 
held by aristocratic households, at the least, and they followed a set procedure. At a set time, after 
the drinking, participants had the chance to prove themselves praiseworthy and so gain a 
reputation for being sophos, which they did by “expressing thoughts that are noble”. A slightly 
different translation conveys the same sentiment:    
 
Praise the man who after drinking behaves nobly in that he possesses memory and aims for 
excellence (aretē) and relates neither battles of Titans nor Giants nor Centaurs—the fictions of 
our fathers . . . (Trans: Curd and McKirahan, 2011, p.32). 
 
After the drinking came the chance to demonstrate noble behaviour, which, in this case, seems to 
have meant speeches of some sort—perhaps speeches that demonstrate learning or even wisdom, 
not the “figments of our predecessors “ or “fictions of our fathers”. The argument that Xenophanes 
seems to be making is that if a person speaks nobly then they are acting or “behaving nobly”. And, 
for acting nobly they should be praised, which, of course, will contribute to their reputation. We 
are told what not to do: repeat the old stories of gods and heroes and strife, but not what to do. 
However, the fragment B2 gives a hint.  
 
 
9.2  I should be rewarded and maintained by the polis 
 
The following fragment (B2) gives one example of what Xenophanes is referring to as “thoughts 
that are noble”: two conclusions along with his reasons or arguments, clearly aimed at persuasion. 
Similar forms of argument can be found in Homer and Hesiod, with the example from the Iliad 
earlier, so Xenophanes was not doing anything new, in one respect. However, the way he has 
consciously and deliberately devised arguments and presented them in written form provides an 
early template for justificatory reasons. The fact that it is written would have allowed others to 
read, reflect, refine and respond.  
 
But if anyone were to win a victory with fleetness of foot, or fighting in the Pentathlon, 
where the precinct of Zeus lies between the springs of Pisa at Olympia, or in wresting, or in 
virtue of the painful science of boxing, or in a dread kind of contest called Pankration: to the 
citizens he would be more glorious to look upon, and he would acquire a conspicuous seat of 
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honour at competitions, and his maintenance would be provided out of the public stores by 
the Polis, as well as a gift for him to lay aside as treasure. 
So too if he won a prize with his horses, he would obtain all these rewards, though not 
deserving of them as I am; for my craft (wisdom) is better than the strength of men or of 
horses. Yet opinion is altogether confused in this matter, and it is not right to prefer physical 
strength to noble Wisdom. For it is not the presence of a good boxer in the community, nor of 
one good at the Pentathlon or at wrestling, nor even of one who excels in fleetness of foot—
which is the highest in honour of all the feats of strength seen in men’s athletic contests—it is 
not these that will give a Polis a better constitution. Small would be the enjoyment that a Polis 
would reap over the athletic victory of a citizen beside the banks of Pisa! These things do not 
enrich the treasure chambers of the Polis (Athenaeus, Scholars at Dinner 10.413f = DK 21B2). 
 
He would probably have found an initial agreement from his audience if he began with an 
opening statement like:  
 
“Some things enrich the treasure chambers of the polis and other things don’t.” 
 
It would follow, therefore, that those things that enrich the treasure chambers deserve to be 
rewarded and those things that don’t do not deserve to be rewarded. 
 
By ‘things’ he is referring to actions carried out by people—the citizens of the polis.  
 
Recycling his own words, his argument becomes: 
 
(1)  What enriches the treasure chambers of the polis deserves to be rewarded. 
(2)  I enrich the treasure chambers of the polis with my craft (wisdom). 
(3)  Therefore, I deserve to be rewarded. 
 
And the counter argument becomes: 
 
(1)  What doesn’t enrich the treasure chambers of the polis does not deserve to be rewarded. 
(2)  The winners of sports competitions and the like do not enrich the treasure chambers of 
the polis.                                                                    
(3)  Therefore, they do not deserve to be rewarded. 
 
Xenophanes must be aware of what he was doing and after many years of performing at symposia 
and the like he would have had ample time to reflect on and refine his arguments. What is 
important about this fragment is that it is the best example to date of what most would agree is a 
consciously and deliberately constructed argument. 
 
 
9.3  The gods do not live moral and orderly lives 
 
Give us no fights with Titans, no, nor giants 
nor Centaurs—the forgeries of our fathers— 
nor civil brawls, in which no advantage is. 
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But always to be mindful of the gods is good (Athenaeus, Scholars at Dinner 11.462c = DK 
21B1). 
 
Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all deeds 
which among men are a reproach and a disgrace: 
thieving, adultery, and deceiving one another (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 
9.193 = DK 21B11). 
 
In these two fragments, Xenophanes argues that the gods do not live moral and orderly lives, and 
in doing this he refutes a widely held belief. 
 
(1) If anyone engages in thievery, adultery, and deceiving one another, they are a reproach 
and a disgrace. 
(2) The gods do engage in thievery, adultery, and deceiving one another (as Homer and 
Hesiod say).                                                                   
(3) Therefore, the gods are a reproach and a disgrace.  
 
Any of the following four statements could have been used in his argument: 
 
A. If someone does X, Y and Z, then they are moral. 
B. If someone is moral, then they do X, Y and Z. 
C. If someone is immoral, then they do A, B, and C.       
D. If someone does A, B, and C, then they are immoral. 
 
Therefore, on the basis of A. and B., (1) being moral = doing X, Y and Z. And, on the basis of C. and 
D., (2) being immoral = doing A, B, and C. 
 
If we choose to use the first equation, we can use either inference A or B above. Xenophanes’ may 
have based his counter argument on applying modus tollens to B. 
 
(1) If someone is moral, then they do X, Y, and Z. 
(2) The gods don’t do X, Y and Z. (In fact, they do the opposite of X, Y and Z.) 
(3) Therefore, the gods aren’t moral. 
 
If we choose the second equation, we can use either inference C. or D. above. Xenophanes has used 
D. 
 
(1) If someone does A, B, and C, then they are immoral. 
(2) The gods do A, B, and C. (Thievery, adultery, and deceiving one another.) 
(3) Therefore, the gods are immoral.  
 
The conclusions are the same but the reasons/arguments differ. Which is the stronger, more 
persuasive argument? It would be difficult to say as it would depend on the audience. The first 
might be safer as it doesn’t accuse the gods of doing wrong; only of not doing right. But this is not 
how the fragments read. This perhaps indicates a certain confidence in expressing unorthodox 
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ideas about the gods and suggests the social and cultural context of the time, as least with respect 
to Xenophanes’ small band of reflectors (his audience).  
 
Although it doesn’t appear in the fragment, perhaps because it was a little ‘risky’, a further 
argument could be made that we should only emulate those who are worthy of emulation. The 
gods are not worthy of emulation; therefore, the gods should not be emulated. However, while 
this is not stated explicitly, it is something Xenophanes could have thought and could have spoken 
about in a symposium at the appropriate time and place. 
 
 
9.4  Our ideas of the gods are wrong 
 
Mortals believe that the gods are born 
and have human clothing, voice and form (Clement, Miscellanies 5.109 = DK 21B14). 
 
Ethiopians say that their gods are flat-nosed and dark, 
Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired (Clement, Miscellanies 7.22 = DK 21B16). 
 
If oxen and horses and lions had hands 
and were able to draw with their hands and do the same things as men, 
horses would draw the shapes of gods to look like horses 
and oxen to look like oxen, and each would make the 
gods’ bodies have the same shapes as they themselves had. (Clement, Miscellanies 5.110 = DK 
21B15). 
 
The fragments above continue Xenophanes’ refutations of existing ideas. Not only are we wrong if 
we think the gods behave well, we are also wrong if we think they resemble us in any way: “are 
born, have human clothing, voice and form”. 
 
Greeks think their gods look and behave like Greeks. Other people think likewise for their gods. 
And, if animals could, they would describe their gods as resembling themselves. It is not possible 
for a god to simultaneously have the characteristics of all people (and animals) and it is not 
possible to decide which version, if any, is correct, and so the idea of anthropomorphic gods 
should be set aside. This argument is based on application of a principle, and as such is persuasive. 
The principle is that if we have three different descriptions, A, B and C, and if there is not sufficient 
reason for preferring one over the others, then all are questionable. 
 
If all accounts of gods are questionable, could Xenophanes propose any alternative accounts with 
better chances of being accepted? This is exactly what he did.   
 
 
9.5  There is a one god, but he (she/it) is not like us 
 
The following is an A fragment and therefore not fully reliable. It may be a Xenophanean idea but 
the reason could have been supplied later.   
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Xenophanes used to say that those who say that the gods are born are just as impious as 
those who say that they die, since in both ways it follows that there is a time when the gods 
do not exist (Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23 1399b6–9 = DK 21A12). 
 
Being born means to come into being: coming into being from a state of not-being. Dying means to 
change into a state of not-being. In both cases, it is implied that there is a time of not existing; 
before being born in one case and after dying in the other. In Xenophanes’ time it was impious to 
deny the Olympian’s immortality. This fragment is a good example of Xenophanes’ use of existing 
ideas to refute.   
 
If we look at one more A fragment and the relevant B fragments concerning Xenophanes’ One-
and-All (see below), his God, the ideas are missing explicit reasons.  
 
It is unholy for any of the gods to have a master (pseudo-Plutarch, Stromata 4 = DK 21A32). 
 
… always [he] remains in the same [state], changing not at all, 
nor is it fitting that [he] come and go to different places at different times (Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 23.10 = DK 21B26). 
 
One god, greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals in form or thought (Clement, 
Miscellanies, 5.109 = DK 21B23). 
 
… whole [he] sees, whole [he] thinks, and whole [he] hears (Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Mathematicians 9.144 = DK 21B24). 
 
… but completely without toil [he] agitates all things by the will of his mind (Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 23.19 = DK 21B25). 
 
These fragments may have had reasons accompanying them or may have served as reasons 
originally. Later writers have used them in positing possible reasons for Xenophanes’ ideas, some 
seem likely but others come across as anachronistic.  
 
 
9.6  Iris the rainbow is a cloud 
 
Xenophanes is important for his demythologising and his physical explanations based on 
observable evidence. There is persuasive power in being able to explain how something is or came 
to be, and the causal chain can be recycled as reasons. Iris the rainbow is now a physical 
phenomenon:  
 
She whom they call Iris, this too is by nature cloud: purple, and red, and greeny-yellow to 
behold (Scholium BLT on Iliad 11.27 = DK 21B32). 
 
If this incomplete physical explanation is accepted, then one question has been answered: what is a 
rainbow, but one remains: why should I accept your idea that it is a coloured cloud? 
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9.7  Xenophanes’ arché is the one god 
 
Aristotle states that Xenophanes did not have a clear conception of an arché and that “an account of 
his views belongs to a different inquiry from the study of nature”. For Xenophanes “said that this 
‘One-and-All’ is god” or “the one is god”. 
 
Theophrastus says that Xenophanes of Colophon, the teacher of Parmenides, supposed that 
there is one principle, or that what exists is one and all, and neither limited nor limitless, 
neither moving nor motionless. He agrees that an account of his views belongs to a different 
inquiry from the study of nature; for Xenophanes said that this ‘one and all’ is god 
(Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics 22.26-23.20). 
 
No reasons are recorded for Xenophanes’ ideas of the arché: that there is one principle, that it is one 
and all, and that it is god. It seems that there was not universal agreement on what his arché was. 
In this case, reasons would have helped fill out the picture.  
 
 
9.8  Xenophanes’ arché is earth and water 
 
Some writers have suggested that Xenophanes’ arché was earth and water. Again, there are no 
reasons recorded, and the reason may be that his idea was the result of some problems in 
translation: 
 
All things that come into being and grow are earth and water (John Philoponus, Commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics 1.5.125 = DK 21B29). 
 
For all things are from the earth and all return to the earth in the end (Theodoretus, Treatment 
of Greek Conditions 4.5 = DK 21B27). 
 
We all come into being out of earth and water (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 
10.314 = DK 21B33). 
 
“All things that come into being and grow” refers to all living things, not all things. Plants and 
animals come to be from earth and water. “There is a clear distinction between those perishable 
things “which take birth and grow”, the organisms, and what has no origin and is imperishable: 
the sea of air, the ocean, the earth …” (Cleve, 1965, p.15-17). 
 
On this basis, it seems that Xenophanes either did not propose a clear arché or because no 
supporting reasons are recorded it appears as only an idea with little to justify it. He did, however, 
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9.9  The arché is not Anaximenes’ aer 
 
Sea is the source of water and the source of wind. For not without the wide sea would there 
come to be in clouds the force of wind blowing out from within, nor streams of rivers nor 
rain water from the sky, but the great wide sea is the sire of clouds and winds and rivers 
(Geneva Scholium on Iliad 21.196 = DK 21B30). 
 
Xenophanes gives a causal chain; if A causes B, then B cannot in turn cause A.  
 
(1) The great ocean is the source of the things that come to be that Anaximander mentions. 
(2) Two of the things that come to be from the great ocean are water and wind.                  
(3) Therefore, since wind (aer) is from the source it cannot simultaneously be the source 
(arché). 
 
If I have interpreted this argument accurately, it is a nice use of reductio ad absurdum, and 
somewhat earlier than Zeno. 
 
 
9.10  The earth changes over time 
 
In an A fragment is presented a well-developed theory: 
 
He declared that the sea is salty because many mixtures flow together in it. . . . Xenophanes 
believes that earth is being mixed into the sea and over time it is dissolved by the moisture, 
saying that he has the following kinds of proofs: sea shells are found in the middle of earth 
and in mountains, and imprints of fish and seals have been found at Syracuse in the quarries, 
and the imprint of coral [or, “of a laurel leaf”] in the depth of the stone in Paros, and on 
Malta flat impressions of all forms of marine life. He says that these came about when all 
things were covered with mud long ago and the impressions were dried in the mud. All 
humans perish when the earth is carried down into the sea and becomes mud, and then there 
is another beginning of generation, and this change occurs in all the kosmoi [that is, in every 
such cycle] (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.14.3–6 = DK 21A33). 
 
McKirahan states, the “importance of this passage lies more in its reasoning and use of evidence 
than in the doctrine it records. Particularly impressive is Xenophanes’ marshalling of facts to 
support his thesis, which indicates a belief that the best way to prove a theory is to provide the 
greatest amount and widest variety of evidence possible” (McKirahan, 1994, p.66). Here again is 
another first for Xenophanes. This could be considered the beginning of the scientific method, a 
falsifiable hypothesis. It also indicates a more direct reference to and use of evidence than the 
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9.11  We may know but we can’t know whether what we know is true 
 
Xenophanes was “the first to reflect on the frailty of our ability to gain knowledge, Xenophanes is 
the father of epistemology. He was also hailed in antiquity as the father of scepticism …” 
(McKirahan, 1994, p. 66). 
 
No man has seen nor will anyone know 
the truth about the gods and all the things I speak of. 
For even if a person should in fact say what is absolutely the case, 
Nevertheless he himself does not know, but belief is fashioned over all things [or, in the case 
of all persons] (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7.49.110 = DK 21B34). 
 
Let these things be believed as resembling the truth (Plutarch, Table Talk 9.7.746b = DK 
21B35). 
 
By no means did the gods intimate all things to mortals from the beginning, 
but in time, inquiring, they discover better (Stobaeus, Selections 1.8.2 = DK 21B18). 
 
These three fragments may be the result of some reflection on Milesian ideas and reasons. If ideas 
about the world arise from observations about the world, and if observations about the world 
depend on perspective, then as perspectives change ideas will change. The solution could be 
better, wider perspectives or better use of what is perceived. Xenophanes’ use of the fossils as 
evidence (above) indicates a more direct, less speculative use of evidence. It also gives ideas that 
can be tested, which would have been difficult to do with earlier ideas about the arché. However, it 
leads to ‘smaller’ ideas than the all-encompassing ideas about the arché. Perhaps this was the way 
to go.   
 
 
9.13  Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.535-c.475) 
 
In moving forward, Heraclitus will be ignored. Although he has a number of ideas, he rarely gives 
reasons for them in a way that would persuade others to accept them, or in a way that adds to our 
investigation. Socrates’ comment is indicative:  
 
And they say that Euripides gave [Socrates] a small work of Heraclitus to read, and asked 
him afterwards what he thought of it, and he replied: ‘The part I understand is excellent, and 
so too is, I dare say, the part I do not understand; but it needs a Delian diver to get to the 
bottom of it’ (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 2.22).  
 
There is little benefit in speculating on his reasons if he did not give them originally. For one 
reason or other, his ideas have persisted.     
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10.  PARMENIDES OF ELEA (c.515-c.450) 
 
If reasoning, as we claim, evolved to change others’ minds, shouldn’t it look for … well-
crafted arguments? (Sperber and Mercier, 2017, p.223) 
 
Parmenides is an important figure for many reasons. In the traditional account he is considered a 
‘watershed’ as the first fully rational Greek thinker. In his argument he proceeds deductively from 
two starting premises to the conclusion that All is One. The process he worked through is then 
presented as his proof. From this arose the idea that it is possible to discover the world through 
ratiocination; or at least, this is how it is sometimes interpreted. The text is consistent with both 
CTR and ATR interpretations. The ATR version that follows, Parmenides is equally important but 
for slightly different reasons. Instead of starting with immediate premises and working towards a 
conclusion that wasn’t held in some form or other or known previously, the ATR interpretation is 
that he started with the intuitive idea that All is One and then proceeded to develop a proof in 
order to persuade others. His proof in the form of a sound deductive argument was the first that 
could be compared with Aristotle’s definition of a ‘demonstration’. Aristotle rejected Parmenides’ 
idea on the basis that it contradicted his experience, and then confabulated a not entirely successful 
refutation accordingly:  
 
. . . but, obviously, to think in this way in real life verges on insanity (Aristotle, On Generation 
and Corruption I 8. 325a13 = 28A25). 
 
For Aristotle the soundness of an argument guarantees knowledge. From the ATR perspective, as 
Mercier states in an unpublished source, “a true conclusion is more likely to be supported by good 
arguments” (and therefore, accepted).20 Are good arguments sound arguments? Aristotle would 
probably agree that the best argument is the soundest argument (the demonstration). Sperber and 
Mercier would probably argue that the best argument is the one that is most persuasive or the 
most difficult to refute (which may not necessarily be the same). And, the one that is the most 
difficult to refute is the sound argument. Reasons before Parmenides, as we have seen, are a 
mixture of explanations and arguments. After Parmenides, there is more of a focus on argument. 
Melissus re-wrote Parmenides’ argument in a clearer and more formal way, and Zeno added the 
elenchus and together these led to significant developments in reasoning in Greece. 
 
Parmenides believed that All is One, unmoving, unchanging, timeless and placeless. The CTR 
approach would argue that he arrived at this conclusion through a series of deductions, starting 
with the premise, “There is no not-being”. The ATR approach would be that the belief arose 
intuitively and that Parmenides inferenced backwardly to reasons to prove it, in this case, a 
deductive argument. While arguments can be confrabricated for Xenophanes’ ideas from his 
fragments, there is no need to do this with Parmenides. He lays out his arguments clearly and 
explicitly (despite his poetic form).  
 
 
                                                     
20 Mercier, https://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/theargumentativetheoryofreasoning, accessed 12/2/17 
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10.1  All is One 
 
Parmenides’ arguments are “good arguments” and therefore his conclusion is more likely to be 
true. He constructed the most persuasive form of argument—the deduction—and in doing so, 
raised the bar for those who followed. Moreover, he challenged them to “judge by reason (logos) 
the heavily contested refutation (elenchos) spoken by me” (Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Mathematicians 7.114 = DK 28B7). In other words, he seems to be saying, these are the strongest 
reasons I can devise to support my claims. If you want to disagree, you need to evaluate my 
reasons (my account = logos) and not just my ideas. (I have generalised a little; in the poem this 
challenge refers to just one particular argument, below, but the intention is clear.)      
 
In presenting Parmenides’ arguments, I am relying on Cleve (1965), who has done most of the 
work already, separating the arguments from the chaff. The problem for Parmenides would have 
been where to start. He was certain of where he wanted to finish, his beliefs about what-is. The two 
considerations for a good starting point, an opening premise, are whether it will be accepted by an 
audience and whether it will lead to the conclusion. If the opening premise will lead to the 
conclusion but isn’t immediately accepted, something more needs to be done. His chosen premise, 
“being is” did lead to his conclusion, through the related premise “not-being is not”, which, in the 
form ‘nothing from nothing’ was already accepted in Greece: “the common Hellenic view that 
nothing originates from nothing, and nothing turns into nothing” (Cleve 1965 p.24). But, he had 
some work to do to persuade his audience to accept it.  
 
In the Proem, a goddess tells Parmenides that  
 
. . . There is need for you to learn all things— 
both the unshaken heart of persuasive [or, well-rounded] Truth  
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance (Simplicius, Commentary on 
Aristotle’s On the Heavens, 557.25 = DK 28B1). 
 
Which have become known as the Way of Truth and the Way of Opinion. In the next fragment, 
Parmenides lays out his basic argument: 
 
Come now, I will tell you—and bring away my story safely when you have heard it— 
the only ways of inquiry there are to think: 
the one, that it is and that it is not possible for it not to be, 
is the path of Persuasion (for it attends up on Truth), 
the other, that it is not and that it is necessary for it not to be, 
this I point out to you to be a path completely unlearnable, 
for neither may you know that which is not (for it is not the be accomplished) 
nor may you declare it (Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 1.345.18 and Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 116.28 = DK 28B2 
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According to Cleve (1965, p.527-532), “Parmenides’ philosophy proper begins with an existential 




Fr. 2, 3. 
 
Then follows, in the same line, [the second underlining in the fragment above] a second 
existential sentence: 
 
There is no not-being.  
οὐκ ἔστι µὴ εἶναι 
ibid. 




10.2  Arguing by analogy and using set theory: there is no not-being 
 
On table T there is an apple, A.  
If we consider T to be all there is, it becomes the universal set, U. 
This means the universal set consists of the apple: A and everything 
else that is not the apple: ~A.  
A & ~A = U 
 
For an apple to come to be, it must come to be from what it is not: ~A, 
logically. 
 
For an apple to pass away, it must pass away to what it is not: ~A, 
logically. 
 
In the ‘real’ world, these changes can be observed, over time: an 
apple coming to be and an apple passing away, transforming one into 
the other. Or, more precisely, transforming from ~A into A, and from 
A into ~A. 
 
If in the second diagram we change the “A” to “E” to signify ‘esti’ or 
‘exist’, we now get a universal set that consists of E and all the rest, 
~E. That is, what is and what is-not. E & ~E = U 
 
But, in the third diagram, there is no not-being (from above) and so 
~E is not; there is no ‘all the rest’. 
 
In the fourth diagram, we are now left with what is (E) and this is 










E = U 
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Parmenides states this explicitly: 
 
(c) There is.  E  E  or, (E) 
(d) There is no not-being. ~E  ~E  or, ~(~E) 
 
 
(From Cleve: continues)  
 
The analogy of the two sentences shows that the grammatical subject of that first sentence is 
εἶναι (einai), or “to be”, “being”, just as the grammatical subject of the second sentence is µὴ εἶναι 
(me einai), or “not to be”, “not-being”. Consequently, the brachylogical first sentence, when 
given its complete form, means: 
 
There is being. 
ἔστιν εἶναι 
 
This alone is highly characteristic. Parmenides does not start, say, with the necessity of a belief 
in only one god or something about the origin of the world or so. He begins, instead, with 
certain propositions that could be validly stated even if there were no world at all.  
 
Parmenides, namely, is a deducing philosopher, the first “rationalist” of antiquity. “He is the 
first philosopher to argue, formally deducing conclusions from premises, instead of making 
dogmatic announcements: (Cornford, 1939, p. 29). 
 
An Ancient ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ 
 
Accordingly, the sentence, “There is being”, is then substantiated [in fragment 3]. This 
substantiation amounts to something like an ancient cogito, ergo sum: 
 
Thinking = Being 
. . . το γαρ αυτό νοείν εστίν τε και είναι 
(literally: “For thinking and being is the same.”) 
 
Just as any equation, also this one can be transformed into two sentences with copula 
construction: 
 
Any thinking is being, 
any being is thinking. 
 
The second of these proposition is rather objectionable, though. But we do not need it. The first 
proposition, however, when used as the major premise of a syllogism, leads to this result: 
 
(1) Any thinking is being. 
(2) There is thinking. 
(3) There is being. 
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The basic idea is, then: “Being is”. This is evident from the outset. It is, so to speak, an a priori 
valid proposition.” 
 
We are left with “Being is, not-being is not”. The idea that “Being is not and not-being is” is a 
“path completely unlearnable, for neither may you know that which is not (for it is not to be 
accomplished), nor may you declare it”.”  
 
(From Cleve: end of quotation) 
 
In fragment 8 Parmenides bases the bulk of his arguments on the proposition “there is no not-
being”. I have only laid out some of the relevant sections to give a feeling for what Parmenides 
did. It is obvious that the poetic form makes things difficult.  
 
. . . that what-is is ungenerated and imperishable,  
a whole of a single kind, unshaken, and complete. 
Nor was it ever, nor will it be, since it is now, all together one, holding together:  
For what birth will you seek out for it? 
How and from what did it grow?  
From what-is-not I will allow you neither to say nor to think:  
For it is not to be said or thought that it is not.  
What need would have roused it, 
later or earlier, having begun from nothing, to grow? 
In this way it is right either fully to be or not. 
Nor will the force of true conviction ever permit anything to come to be 
beside it from what-is-not.  
. . .  
But how can what-is be hereafter? How can it come to be? 
For if it came to be, it is not, not even if it is sometime going to be. 
Thus coming-to-be has been extinguished and perishing cannot be investigated. 
Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, 
. . . 
But unchanging in the limits of great bonds 
it is without starting or ceasing, since coming-to-be and perishing 
have wandered very far away; and true trust drove them away. 
Remaining the same and in the same and by itself it lies 
and so remains there fixed . . . (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1– 146.25 
[lines 1–52]; 39.1–9 [lines 50–61] = DK 28B8). 
 
Returning to Cleve, from “there is no not-being” the following arguments can be constructed:  
 
(1) There is no not-being. 
(2) Becoming is an initial not-being. 
(3) There is no becoming.      Fr. 8, 40 
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(1) Not-being is not. 
(2) Perishing is a final not-being. 
(3) Perishing is not.      Fr. 8, 40 
 
(1) Not-being is not. 
(2) Changing of place is an initial there not-being. 
(3) Changing of place is not.     Fr. 8, 41 
 
 
(1) Not-being is not. 
(2) Having been is a now not-being. 
(3) Having been is not.      Fr. 8, 5 
 
 
(1) Not-being is not. 
(2) Future being is a now not-being. 
(3) Future being is not.     Fr. 8, 5 
 
 
As there is no past and no future, it follows that being has neither a beginning nor an end in time. 
For the one would have to be in the past and the other in the future: 
 
But, unmoved within the limits of big chains, it is there, without beginning and without an 
end. (Fr. 8, 26) 
 
 
10.3  Thinking is being 
 
Parmenides repeats his claim that thinking is being three times, which suggests he thought it an 
important point. These fragments are sometimes interpreted as the idea of something being 
thought matches the actual thing. I.e., what we think is what there is. And this is often refuted by a 
counter argument along the lines of—we can think of a unicorn but it doesn’t mean they exist. This 
is a sort of dualism, contrary to Parmenides’ claim that All is One. 
 
It may be that he was arguing that the thought and the thing the thought is of are one and the 
same. That is, what is thought and spoken is what is; not that the two match but that there is only 
the one, the thought/thing. (This could be called idealism or non-dualism but as Parmenides’ 
intention does not come through clearly, it might be best not to label it.) What is important to 
remember is that in Parmenides’ time the concept of the insubstantial had not yet arisen. The 
thought of what-is and what-actually-is were both substantial, and as in accordance with 
Parmenides’ other arguments, were both of the one substance, whatever it was. The three relevant 
fragments are 
 
. . . For the same thing is [or, is there] for thinking and for being. [or, For thinking and being 
are the same.] (DK 28B3) 
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That which is there to be spoken and thought of must be. For it is possible for it to be, 
but not possible for nothing to be (DK 28B6). 
 
Thinking and the thought that it is are the same. For not without what is, in which it is 
expressed, will you find thinking; for nothing else either is or will be except that which is . . . 
(DK 28B8 & 28B34). 
 
28B3 has the equation Thinking = Being. This can be expressed as, if thinking then being and if 
being then thinking. This is repeated in 28B8. So we have the inferences (B = Being and T = 
Thinking): 
 
T  B, and B  T. 
 
If something can be thought then it is. And, if something is, then it can be thought. 
 
Applying modus tollens to the two inferences above, we get: 
 
~B  ~T, and ~T  ~B. 
 
If something is-not, then it cannot be thought. And, if something cannot be thought, then it is-not.  
 
28B6 continues the idea by stating that what can be (spoken and) thought must be because X. And, 
the X is provided by the modus tollens above. 
 
(~B  ~T)  ((B  T) & (~B  ~T))  
 
If something exists it can be thought, but if it doesn’t exist it cannot be thought because no one can 
think what is-not. It is not possible.   
 
I am not suggesting that Parmenides followed the process above; after all, it is based on symbols 
and logic. But, he did basically reach the same conclusion, which is that thinking and being are the 
same. That is, whatever I am thinking at this moment is what-is, by virtue of my thinking it. Since 
this can be experienced, even if the experience is illusory, it makes sense that in order to persuade 
others good reasons would be needed.   
 
Getting back to the series of arguments Parmenides used to support his belief that All is One, 
without change or motion, without time, uniform and necessary. This was what he called the Way 
of Truth. In fragment 28B6, as well as the Thinking = Being argument, Parmenides adds a third 
Way to the two initially introduced in fragment 28B2: 
 
That which is there to be spoken and thought must be. 
For it is possible for it to be, 
but not possible for nothing to be. I bid you consider this. 
For I bar your way from this first way of inquiry, 
but next from the way on which mortals, knowing nothing,  
two-headed, wander. For helplessness 
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in their breasts guides their wandering mind. But they are carried on 
equally deaf and blind, amazed, hordes without judgement, 
for whom both to be and not to be are judged the same and 
not the same, and the path of all is backward-turning (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 86.27–28; 117.4–13 = DK 28B6). 
 
 
10.4  The third way is not to be taken 
 
This third Way is the Way of What-is and What-is-not. Presumably, this is the way of those who 
imagine change and movement, and such like. Change being what-was-not becoming what-is. This 
fragment, in a way, adds to Xenophanes’ questions and thoughts about knowledge and what can 
be known.  
 
In the final third of his Poem, Parmenides discusses the world from the perspective of those who, 
two-headed, wander around thinking both what-is and what-is-not exist. This also adds to 




10.5  Judge by reason the refutation / elenchus spoken by me. 
 
Finally, Parmenides offers his challenge to those who would follow him:     
 
For in no way may this prevail, that things that are not, are. 
But you, bar your thought from this way of inquiry,  
and do not let habit born from much experience compel you along this way 
to direct your sightless eye and sounding ear and tongue,  
but judge by reason (logos) the heavily contested refutation (elenchos) spoken by me (Plato, 
Sophist 242a; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7.114 = DK 28B7). 
 
Parmenides has refuted the idea that things that are-not are and recommends that this path be not 
taken. Besides the sound advice, this fragment is important for several other reasons. Firstly, he 
refers to reason explicitly; in this case, logos could also be translated as ‘account’, and challenges 
others to judge what he has done on the basis of reason and nothing else. For example, not on 
observations and feelings of or about the world. Secondly, he refers to his refutation, indicating he 
is fully aware of what he had done and how he had done it. The Greek word, elenchos (or later, 
elenchus) was later to become famous as Socrates’ modus operandi. 
 
In this fragment, Parmenides is giving us the clearest expression yet of the ATR explanation of 
reasoning. He has stated his belief that All is One and supported it with his arguments. He has 
taken the commonly accepted belief of what-is and what-is-not and refuted it. And he has 
challenged others to focus on and evaluate his arguments. If they cannot, in turn, refute them, they 
will need to accept them, in theory.  
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11.0  THE ELEATICS 
 
 
11.1  Introduction 
 
Together Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus are labelled ‘the Eleatics’ (after Elea in southern Italy), 
even though Melissus may never have met the other two. Xenophanes is sometimes considered the 
founder or the instigator on the basis of certain similarities. The Eleatics influenced reasoning in 
several ways. Firstly, of course, is Parmenides’ argument, which introduced the idea of deductive 
proof. There are earlier examples, such as those mentioned above in Homer, which indicates that 
argument sits more comfortably with justification of actions. This doesn’t mean that it is not 
possible to reason to the truth, just that it is more difficult than reasoning from the ‘truth’.  
 
Parmenides was using deductive argument to support ideas about the world that had earlier been 
supported by explanations. He was not the first, Xenophanes has earlier examples. But, what 
Parmenides and the Eleatics did indicates a recognition of what it is to reason as well as of how to 
reason. They set the criteria for what was to follow: if the sound deductive argument is the 
strongest form of persuasion, then in order to persuade or be persuaded, this is what it was going 
to take. The persuader and the audience had the tools necessary for, if not guaranteeing 
persuasion, at least making it more likely. Melissus laid out the template for deductive persuasion, 
and Zeno came up with ways to counter or refute those who disagreed. One provided tools for the 
devising of arguments and the other provided tools for the evaluation of arguments. This being the 
case, there is an alignment with what was expected to arise at some stage from the ATR 
perspective. This was the stage.    
 
Constructing reasons is influenced by myside bias in that people are more interested and focused 
on producing arguments for their point of view than for others’ points of view. In doing this, they 
are lazy: anticipating the response and counter-arguments of their intended audience and only 
producing arguments that are ‘strong enough’. The direction of any subsequent deliberation will 
guide them as to which arguments persuade and which need further work. Therefore, according to 
the ATR, reasoners when producing arguments are biased and lazy and this is expected if the aim 
is persuading others in interactive contexts. 
 
On the other hand, these same reasoners, when evaluating the arguments of others are more 
objective and demanding. They demand arguments to be of good quality and will expend more 
energy in deciding whether to accept them and the ideas they are supporting. This results in an 
asymmetry between production and evaluation.  
 
In presenting his arguments, it is likely that Parmenides improved them over time in response to 
the responses of others. However, this improvement has a theoretical limit; once the most 
persuasive type of argument, the sound deductive argument, has been deployed, there are no 
other options. In reaching his final arguments, it is imaginable that Parmenides had to deal with 
opponents; after all, there is little he could point to as evidence for his ideas. This opposition could 
have been simple rejection of his ideas, or it could have been counter-arguments. A counter-
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argument to Parmenides’ All is One is really an argument for All is not-One, and Parmenides 
would have expended some energy in evaluating them, which, in turn, would have given him 
further ideas as to how to strengthen his original arguments. 
 
We are now at the point where Parmenides has produced the strongest type of argument for his 
ideas. If people still rejected them on the basis of observables, another tactic was necessary. The 
tactic that arose was to refute the ideas of the refuters. This is what Zeno did on his teacher’s 
behalf. If we have A or not-A and we have gone as far as we can go arguing for the truth of A, then 
the best next step is to argue for the falsity of not-A. If not-A can be shown to be false, then we are 
back having to accept A as true. Not only reasoning but strategy has now arisen—the arms race 
between methods of persuasion and methods of evaluation, as the following sections on Melissus 
and Zeno illustrate. 
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11.2  Melissus of Samos (fl. 5th C): The argument for All is One 
 
Little is known of Melissus. He served as a commander of the Samian fleet and won two victories 
over the Athenian fleet in 441. The success was short lived as Pericles returned and defeated them, 
forcing them to pay indemnity. Melissus seems to have known of Parmenides, and supposedly 
Zeno, even though they were from different parts of Greece. He wrote a treatise, On Being, in 
defence of Parmenides’ theory. In it, he restates the Eleatic ideas but in a more formalised, 
argumentative form. Many of his arguments are faulty, being of the form ‘If A then B, but not-A 
therefore not-B’. This is technically the fallacy of denying the antecedent. However, this form of 
reasoning, although logically faulty, is often used and accepted in real life, as mentioned above 
and expanded below. Anyway, the various faults do not detract from what Melissus did. From a 
‘philosophical’ perspective, he has been slightly discounted by, for example, Kirk, Raven and 
Schofield: 
 
Melissus was not a great original metaphysician like Parmenides nor a brilliant exponent of 
paradox like Zeno. But he was inventive in argument, and his deduction of the properties of 
reality is in general much clearer than Parmenides’. It is his version of Eleatic doctrine to 
which the atomists chiefly responded and which shaped its presentation by Plato and 
Aristotle (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983, p.401). 
 
From a ‘reasoning’ perspective, Melissus can be seen as drawing together of the various lines of 
development of those who preceded him. The clarity of his arguments, even with their faults, was 
copied by the later natural philosophers, among others. In a way, Melissus could be considered the 
exemplar of what it is to reason. 
 
I will expand Melissus’ main arguments. 
 
Whatever was, always was and always will be. For if it came to be, it is necessary that before 
it came to be it was nothing. Now if it was nothing, in no way could anything come to be out 
of nothing (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 162.23–26 = DK 
DK 30B1). 
 
Now since it did not come to be, it is and always was and always will be, and it does not 
have a beginning or an end, but it is unlimited. For if it had come to be it would have a 
beginning (for if it had come to be it would have begun at some time) and an end (for if it 
had come to be it would have ended at some time). But since it neither began nor ended, and 
always was and always will be, it does not have a beginning or end. For whatever is not 
entire [or, “all”] cannot always be (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 29.22–26, 109.20–25 = DK 30B2). 
 
If it came to be it had a beginning. It did not come to be; therefore, it did not have a beginning.  
 
(1) C  B 
(2) ~C                    
(3) Therefore, ~B 
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Often, an inference such as A  B is held in the mind more as a biconditional, as has been 
explained above. If it is wet outside, then it is raining.  Or, if it is raining, then it is wet outside. 
From a logic perspective, only the second inference would be accepted. The reason for it being wet 
outside could be for other reasons than it being raining, and therefore the first inference would not 
be accepted. Less formally, both inferences can be held, and when they are they are equivalent: 
raining ≡ wet outside. 
 
What this means is that what is often considered faulty reasoning, such as the negation of the 
antecedent, is still accepted in everyday communication. An important function of reasoning and 
reasons is to persuade, and a logically faulty argument can persuade as well as a sound one.  
 
The second point is that, with an equivalence, which actually consists of two inferences: (A ≡ B) ≡ 
((A  B) & (B  A)), if one is logically faulty the other can be brought to bear. By this I mean that 
using A  B, we can construct the denying the antecedent fallacy: 
 
(1) A  B 
(2) ~A                   
(3) Therefore ~B 
  
However, if we use the other equivalent inference, B  A: 
 
(1) B  A 
(2) ~B                    
(3) Therefore ~A 
 
(1) If it came into being then it had a beginning. 
(2) It did not come into being.                      
(3) Therefore, it did not have a beginning. 
 
(1) If it had a beginning then it came into being. 
(2) It did not come into being.                      
(3) Therefore, it did not have a beginning. 
 
The conclusions are the same. The arguments are different. It seems that in experimental situations 
both would be accepted in normal communication. In line with this, the first would probably come 
across as more persuasive. Melissus did not notice the fault, and neither would many people today 
(that only 18% of people correctly answer the Wason test supports this). (Barkow, Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1992) 
 
Looking at the broader picture, the arguments Melissus used in the two fragments above support 
his conclusion that “Whatever was, always was and always will be”. That is, whatever is, is 
eternal: 
 
(1) Whatever comes to be must come to be from what it is not. 
(2) But, what it is not is nothing or is-not. 
(3) Now, nothing can come from nothing, as Parmenides argued. 
(4) So, there can be no coming to be. 
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And 
 
(1) Whatever comes to be must also have an end. 
(2) Whatever is did not come to be.             
(3) Therefore, it will also not have an end. 
 
Combining the two conclusions: 
 
(1) Whatever is did not have a beginning nor will it have an end. 
(2) Whatever does not come to be and does not pass away is eternal. 
(3) Therefore, whatever is, is eternal. 
 
Besides being eternal, whatever is is unlimited. This is again denying the antecedent:  
 
[Just as he says that what came to be at some time is limited in its being, he also wrote clearly 
that what always is is unlimited in being, saying:] But just as it always is, so also it must 
always be unlimited in magnitude. [But by “magnitude” he does not mean what is extended 
in space.] (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 109.29–32 = DK 
30B3). 
 
(1) Whatever has a beginning and end is neither eternal nor unlimited. 
(2) Being has no beginning or end.            
(3) Therefore, it is eternal and unlimited. 
 
Despite the fault in the argument, the intention is clear. The argument can be fixed by inverting the 
starting inference: 
 
(1) Whatever is not eternal and unlimited has a beginning and end. 
(2) Being does not have a beginning and end. 
(3) Therefore, Being is eternal.  
 
He continues in the same vein with the following claims, which I am only going to list: 
 
“What-is is indivisible.”  (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 109.32-34 = DK 30B10). 
 
“What-is is bodiless.”  (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 109.34–110.2 = DK 30B9). 
 
“What-is is unlimited” (again).  (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 109.34–110.2 = DK 30B4). 
 
“What-is is one.”  (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 110.5-6 = DK 30B5). 
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“What-is is all there is.”  (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
On the Heavens 557.14–17 = DK 30B5). 
 
In fragment 30B7 Melissus provides a summary.  
 
Thus it is eternal and unlimited and one and all alike.  
And it cannot perish or become greater or be rearranged, nor does it feel pain or 
distress. For if it underwent any of these, it would no longer be one. For if it becomes 
different, it is necessary that what-is is not alike, but what previously was perishes, and 
what-is-not comes to be. Now if it were to become different by a single hair in ten thousand 
years, it would all perish in the whole of time.  
But it is not possible for it to be rearranged either. For the arrangement that previously 
was is not destroyed, and an arrangement that is not does not come to be. But when nothing 
either comes to be in addition or is destroyed or becomes different, how could there be a 
rearrangement of things-that-are? For if it became at all different, it would thereby have in 
fact been rearranged (Melissus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 
111.18–112.15 = DK 30B7).  
 
Like a shooting star, Melissus lit the sky briefly and was not heard from again. Some have decided 
that the faults in his arguments meant that his conclusions could not be true and therefore need 
not be accepted. It could also be said that the faults in his arguments blunted their persuasive 
power, which could have led to his conclusions not being accepted—if in fact they weren’t. His 
written arguments were obviously passed on. If he had reflected on and refined his arguments, 
devising strong, persuasive, sound arguments, would his conclusions then have been accepted? 
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11.3  Zeno of Elea (c.490-c.430): The arguments against All is Many 
 
As mentioned above, Zeno was a student of Parmenides and he supported his teacher by dealing 
with those who disagreed with the All is One. In dealing with them, he introduced some important 
new tools. He could have supported his teacher in a positive way, stronger arguments, but as 
mentioned above, this would have been of nugatory value. After all, his teacher already had the 
strongest arguments, even if they were in a slightly awkward format. What Zeno did was, in 
alignment with Parmenides’ challenge, to evaluate and refute counter-claims that there is change 
and movement in the world, and that time, etc. exist. In starting with the counter-claims of his 
audience rather than true premises, Zeno is also considered by Aristotle to be the founder of 
dialectic. 
 
Although there are only four B fragments for Zeno, much has been written about him by later 
writers. More importantly, for us, is that what has been written about him refers to what he did, 
his method for refuting Parmenides’ opponents.  
 
He wrote a book of Epicheiremata (Attacks) in defence of Parmenides’ theory of Being as One 
and Indivisible; his method was to take the opposite proposition that Things are Many, and 
derive two contradictory conclusions therefrom (Freeman, 1948, p.47). 
 
He followed a certain pattern, which was later to become the basis of Socrates’ elenchus. The form 
is modus tollens: 
 
(1) If all is many, then X 
(2) Not X.                                    




(1) If all is many, then ~X. 
(2) Not ~X.                                 
(3) Therefore, all is not many. 
 
Or, which became reductio ad absurdum (RAA) or reductio ad infinitum (RAI):21 
 
(1) If all is many, then X and ~X. 
(2) But X and ~X is impossible or absurd. 
(3) Therefore, all is not many.  
 
His skill lay in constructing and proving the initial inferences. For example, if all is many, then 
things must be infinitely small and infinitely great (fragment 1). What he did is well explained by 
Plato in his Parmenides (127a6ff abridged):  
 
                                                     
21 There are other ways of being impossible, or logically impossible, but they are not relevant to this point. 
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Once Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens for the Great Panathenaic festival. Parmenides 
was quite an elderly man, very gray, but fine and noble in appearance, just about sixty five 
years old. Zeno was then almost forty, of a good height and handsome to see. The story goes 
that he had been Parmenides’ young lover. . . . Socrates and many others eager to listen to 
Zeno’s treatise, for he had then brought it to Athens for the first time. Socrates was then very 
young. Zeno himself read it to them. . . . When Socrates had heard it, he asked Zeno to read 
again the first hypothesis of the first argument. When he had read it, he said, “How do you 
mean this, Zeno? If things that are are many, they must therefore be both like and unlike, but 
this is impossible. For unlike things cannot be like, nor can like things be unlike. Isn’t that 
what you are saying?” 
 
—Zeno: Yes.  
 
The Great Panathenaic festival and other festivals gave philosophers and others an audience for 
their works. The private reading was also part of the process. This became more prevalent with the 
rise of the sophists, who needed to market themselves in order to attract students, fame, and 
money. Zeno gives a public reading of his treatise, above; the sophists later expanded beyond 
straightforward readings to “public displays of their brilliance by presenting set-piece persuasive 
speeches or allowing the audience to choose from a list of topics” (McKirahan, 1994, p.180 & 
p.369). The sophists charged admission.  
 
Zeno may have benefitted, apart from reputation, by being invited to private readings or 
symposia, which seem to have been well catered (see above, Xenophanes’ elegy to drinking 
parties, and the numerous depictions of the same in Plato and Xenophon). Fragments like the one 
above give valuable information as to the circumstances of Greek group discussion and 
deliberation. 
 
Zeno’s point, which Socrates is clarifying, is that if things are many they must therefore be both 
like and unlike, and this is impossible. To which Zeno agrees.    
 
—Socrates: Now if it is impossible for unlike things to be like and for like things to be unlike, 
is it also impossible for things to be many? For if they were many they would have 
impossible attributes. Is this the point of your arguments—to contend, against all that is said, 
that things are not many? And do you think that each of your arguments proves this?  
 
—Zeno: You have well understood the purpose of the whole work.  
 
If it is impossible for things to be both A and ~A, then it is impossible for things to be many. This is 
the crux of Zeno’s approach. The other important factor is that Zeno begins with the beliefs of his 
interlocutors. For this reason, Zeno has been referred to as the father of dialectic (Diogenes 
Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 8.57). 
 
In the following fragment, Socrates points out that although what Parmenides and Zeno were 
doing could appear different, they were in fact doing the same thing but in different ways. 
Parmenides produced an argument to persuade that All is One. Zeno evaluated and refuted the 
counter claims or arguments of those who thought that All is Many.  
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Parmenides and Zeno were working with the following possible conclusions: 
 
(a) That all is one. 
(b) That all is not-one. 
(c) That all is many. 
(d) That all is not-many.  
 
Parmenides argued for (a). His opponents, on the basis of perception, argued for (c). And, Zeno 
argued for (d), reasoning that all is either one or many. If it is not many, it must be one.22 The 
excluded middle.   
 
—Socrates: I understand, Parmenides, that Zeno here wants to be identified with you by his 
treatise as well as his friendship, for he has written somewhat in the same style as you, but 
by changing it he is trying to make us think he is saying something else. For in your poem 
you declare that the all is one and you do a good job of proving this, while he declares that it 
is not many, and furnishes many impressive proofs. Now when one of you says it is one and 
the other that it is not many, and each speaks so as to seem not to have said any of the same 
things, though you are saying practically the same things, what you have said appears 
beyond the rest of us.  
 
—Zeno: Yes, Socrates, but you have not completely understood the truth of the treatise. . . . It 
is actually a defence of Parmenides’ argument against those who try to make fun of it, saying 
that if what-is is one, the argument has many ridiculous consequences which contradict it. 
Now my treatise opposes the advocates of plurality and pays them back the same and more, 
aiming to prove that their hypothesis, “if there are many things,” suffers still more ridiculous 
consequences than the hypothesis that there is one, if anyone follows it through sufficiently. I 
wrote it in this spirit of competitiveness when I was young, and then someone stole it, so I 
did not even have the chance to consider whether it should be made public (Plato, Parmenides 
127b–128d). [My underlining] 
 
Although the underlined section above are Plato’s words, they match what Zeno actually did, and 
so the intention should be taken as accurate. Zeno clearly has a specific way of going about his 
evaluations and refutations, based on the type of reasoning Parmenides demonstrated, but taking 
things further. As such, it has been serving as a template for those who followed, and still is. 
However, this type of refutation is not all Zeno did; he is known for his paradoxes and the 
antinomies mentioned above.  
 
Since our focus is on the process of reasoning in terms of reason-giving, I will unpack the 
argument in, according to Kirk, Raven and Schofield, “the only unquestionably authentic fragment 
of Zeno which [sic] has come down to us intact” (1983, p.266).  I will follow this with two of Zeno’s 
arguments against motion. 
 
As already covered above, Zeno’s method was to start with “there are many things”. 
 
                                                     
22 It could be not-one, i.e. nothing, which the atomists introduced (the void) but ‘not-one’ is not the same as ‘is-not’. 
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If there are many things, then X and ~X. 
 
Which is equivalent to ‘If there are many things, then X’; and ‘If there are many things, then ~X’. 
His task, therefore, was to argue for both inferences. In fragment 3, X = limited and ~X = unlimited 
(apeiron). 
 
. . . in proving once again that if there are many things, the same things are limited and 
unlimited, Zeno’s own very words are as follows. 
‘If there are many things, they must be just as many as they are, neither more nor less. 
But if they are as many as they are, they must be limited.’ 
If there are many things, the things that are are unlimited, since between things that are 
there are always others, and still others between those. Therefore the things that are are 
unlimited’ (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 140.29–33 = DK 29B3). 
 
For the first inference, if there are many things, then there must exactly be that many and no more 
or no less. This being the case, they must be limited. For the second inference, if there are many 
things, no matter how many there are we can always squeeze more in between them. This being 
the case, they must be unlimited. Since what-is cannot be both limited and unlimited 
simultaneously, what-is cannot be many things. It must be one. 
 
As to Zeno’s arguments against motion, these are contained in what have become known as Zeno’s 
Paradoxes. Parmenides’ arguments support the idea of no motion; Zeno’ arguments reject the idea 




First is the argument which says that there is no motion because what which is moving must 
reach the midpoint before the end (Aristotle, Physics 6.9 239b11-13 = DK 29A25). 
 
 
It is always necessary to traverse half the distance, but these are infinite, and it is impossible 




The second is called ‘Achilles’. This is to the effect that the slowest as it runs will never be 
caught by the quickest. For the pursuer must first reach the point from which the pursued 
departed, so that the slower must always be some distance in front. This is the same 
argument as The Dichotomy, but it differs in not dividing the given magnitude in half 
(Aristotle, Physics 6.9 239b14-20 = DK 29A26). 
 
The reasoning is self-evident. The arguments and conclusion are that if there were motion not only 
would no one ever reach their destination, they would not even be able to leave home. Similarly, 
someone faster chasing someone slower would get infinitely close but never overtake. These are 
absurd conclusions and therefore the idea they proceed from must be rejected. There cannot be 
motion. 
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Zeno was known for more of these sorts of arguments, and apparently had at least 50 in the book 
he is credited with writing. Not all have survived. But, for our purposes, not all needed to have 
survived. What he did is clear; he came up with a fairly rigorous way for evaluating and refuting 
claims and arguments. The general opinion is that there are holes in all of his arguments, but this is 
neither here nor there for our purposes. The building blocks are now in place for the developments 
that followed. The Greeks were discussing how to devise and evaluate arguments, they were 
coming up with various ‘sub-routines’: deductive arguments, RAA, RAI, dialectic, the application 
of principles, the use of and reference to evidence, and the circumstances whereby these could be 
practised, reflected on, refined, and developed. Combine this with Melissus’ formalised series of 
arguments and the Greeks were ready for the next innovation to arise: apply the various ways and 
methods of reasoning to the real world, specifically, the political assembly and the law courts.   
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12.0  THE LATER NATURAL PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 
The natural philosophers who followed the Eleatics (or who were around at the same time) needed 
to respond to Parmenides’ argument and his proscriptions of such things as change, motion, 
coming to be, and so on. As it was not possible to refute his arguments, work-arounds needed to 
be found. Otherwise, there would be nothing left to explain. Whatever ideas the later natural 
philosophers came up with needed to be supported by reasons. They could have tried to copy 
Parmenides’ argument, but in fact continued to put forward explanations—more complex than 
Milesian explanations, but explanations none-the-less. Considering Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and 
Leucippus/Democritus, there are some interesting innovations in their speculations. None of them 
are true. They are evidence that the Greeks were continuing to come up with new ideas and 
express them, along with reasons, for selection. There is no evidence they survived selection and 
were believed, but they were transmitted, which suggests a different sort of selection criteria. I will 
confine the discussion to their ideas of an arché. 
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12.1  Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c.500 – c.428) 
 
With the idea of change ruled out, Anaxagoras responded by describing the world as a mixture of 
primary imperishable ingredients. 
 
. . . it is right to think that there are many different things present in everything that is being 
combined, and seeds of all things, having all sorts of forms, colours, and flavours, and that 
humans and also the other animals were compounded, as many as have soul (Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 34.29–35.9, 34.21–26 = DK B4). 
 
Change is therefore the rearrangement of these primary things, caused by Nous: 
 
In everything there is a share of everything except Nous (Mind), but there are some things in 
which Nous, too, is present (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 164.22 = DK B11). 
 
Nous causes movement which causes separation off, and this results in what is observed. 
 
When Nous began to move [things], there was separation off from the multitude that was 
being moved, and whatever Nous moved, all this was dissociated; and as things were being 
moved and dissociated, the revolution made them dissociate much more (Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 300.31–301.1 = DK B13). 
 
It is the coming together of what was dissociated that results in the world we observe.  
 
The Greeks do not think correctly about coming-to-be and passing-away; for nothing comes 
to be or passes away, but is mixed together and dissociated from the things that are. And 
thus they would be correct to call coming-to-be mixing-together and passing-away 
dissociating (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 163.20–24 = DK B17). 
 
Anaxagoras does not support his theories with deductive arguments, only explanations that are 
analogical but of a greater level of clarity and complexity than the Milesian explanations. It is clear 
that he is working around Parmenides’ All is One. His idea is of a multitude of things, a sort of All 
in One. This idea in itself is fairly simple, but with the reasons accompanying it, it adds up to a 
fairly complex theory. 
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12.2  Empedocles of Acragas (c.490-c.430) 
 
Empedocles’ response to Parmenides and perhaps Anaxagoras (they were coeval) is a mixture of 
primary imperishable ingredients, but instead of many there are only six basic entities: Earth, 
Water, Air, and Fire, and Love and Strife. Each is a genuine being in the Parmenidian sense, but 
they are able to come into being and change, with the first four being moved by Love and Strife—
two competing forces.  Love causes the four elements to come together while Strife pulls them 
apart. This resembles coming to be and passing, which was proscribed by Parmenides, but not for 
Empedocles. This is a clearer and therefore more persuasive explanatory reason than that of 
Anaxagoras in that it supplies solutions to problems that arise with his vaguer idea of primary 
things and Nous, but it is still not clear enough to be more than an interesting fingerpost along the 
way.  
 
They [i.e., the four elements] dominate in turn as the cycle evolves, 
and they decrease into one another and grow in their turn, as destined. 
For there are just these things, and running through one another 
they come to be both humans and the tribes of other beasts, 
at one time coming together into a single kosmos by Love 
and at another each being borne apart again by the hatred of Strife, 
until they grow together into one, the whole, and become subordinate. 
Thus in that they have learned to grow to be one out of many 
and in that they again spring apart as many when the one grows apart, 
in that way they come to be and their life is not lasting, 
but in that these never cease interchanging continually, in this way they are always 
unchanging in a cycle (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 33.19–34.3 = 
DK B26). 
 
They exist as separate entities, but are unchanging in a cycle. This is an interesting attempt to come 
up with reasons within the bounds of the Eleatic ideas, which were presumably known by at least 
some of the audience, who could be relied on to critically evaluate anything new and/or different. 
For this reason, an argument as well as an explanation might have made the theory more 
persuasive. But, arguments were not really used by the later natural philosophers. They were by 
Xenophanes much earlier, but he was not purely a natural philosopher.  
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12.3  Leucippus of Abdera or Miletus (fl. 5th C) and Democritus of Abdera (c.460-c.370) 
 
Leucippus (if he existed, opinions vary) and Democritus are known as the atomists. There are 
some parallels between their ideas and modern atomic theory, but neither are considered accurate 
nowadays. According to the theory, an infinite number of atoms (a tomos = uncuttable) exist, with 
each being uniform, eternal, and unchangeable, which is meant to avoid the Parmenidian 
proscriptions. Individual atoms are imperceptible and differ from one another only in shape and 
size. The innovation is that they are posited to move within a void, or ‘empty’, which was a 
workaround of Parmenides’ not-being. The atomists’ void was meant to be equivalent to 
Parmenides’ nothing or not-being (but, ‘there is no not-being’). The void provided, in theory, a 
space for atoms to move, to come together and to move apart. In coming together they form the 
various physical observables. The result is that what looks like coming to be and passing away is 
really only alteration and rearrangement within the void. 
 
Leucippus’ opinion is this: All things are unlimited and they all turn around one another; 
the all [the universe] is both the empty [void] and the full. The worlds come to be when the 
atoms fall into the void and are entangled with one another (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the 
Philosophers 9.30 = DK 67A1). 
 
Leucippus and his associate Democritus declare the full and the empty [void] to be the 
elements, calling the former “what-is” and the other “what-is-not”. Of these, the one, 
“what- is”, is full and solid, the other, “what-is-not”, is empty [void] and rare. (This is why 
they say that what-is is no more than what-is-not, because the void is no less than body is.) 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.4 985b4–20 = DK 67A6) 
 
After establishing the shapes, Democritus and Leucippus base their account of alteration 
and coming-to-be on them: coming-to-be and perishing by means of separation and 
combination, alteration by means of arrangement and position (Aristotle, On Generation and 
Corruption 1.1 315b6–15 = DK 67A9). 
 
There is more to the atomic theory than I have presented above, but the main point is the positing 
of the void as a solution to Parmenides’ ‘there is no not-being’. There are two ways of responding 
to the void. The atomic theory only makes sense if the void is equivalent to not-being. Is it? 
 
(1) If it is not-being then it doesn’t exist. 
(2) The void exists.                                   
(3) Therefore the void is not not-being.  
 
The void is not nothing; it is something. And since it is something, and since what is is uniformly 
so, there is nowhere for the atoms to move. All is One. 
 
(1) What is ~E cannot be E. 
(2) The void is E. (Thinking = Being) 
(3) Therefore the void cannot be ~E. 
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The Eleatics’ non-existent is not equivalent to the atomists’ void. This being the case, the void is 
existent and Parmenides’ arguments apply equally to it.  
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13.0  THE SOPHISTS 
 
 
13.1  Introduction 
 
The English word ‘rhetoric’ is derived from Greek rhetorike, which apparently came 
into use in the circle of Socrates in the fifth century and first appears in Plato’s 
dialogue Gorgias, probably written about 385 BC. . . . Rhetorike in Greek specifically 
denotes the civic art of public speaking as it developed in deliberative assemblies, law 
courts, and other formal occasions under constitutional government in the Greek 
cities, especially the Athenian democracy. As such, it is a specific cultural subset of a 
more general concept of the power of words and their potential to affect a situation in 
which they are used or received. Ultimately, what we call ‘rhetoric’ can be traced 
back to the natural instinct to survive and to control our environment and influence 
the actions of others in what seems the best interest of ourselves, our families, our 
social and political groups, and our descendants. This can be done by direct action—
force, threats, bribes, for example—or it can be done by the use of ‘signs’, of which 
the most important are words in speech or writing. (Kennedy, 1994, p.3).   
 
In this section, I look at two important sophists of the fourth century. These were coeval with 
many of the later presocratics and there seems to have been free exchange of ideas; after all, many 
of them would have attended the same symposia or public displays. The one important difference 
was that the itinerant teachers, who became the ‘sophists’, needed to make a living. There is little 
evidence of the natural philosophers having to work to live. In fact, Plato gives the impression that 
the average Athenian looked down on work and on those who had to work—it was for the poorer 
citizens, the metics, and the slaves. The itinerant teachers may have been from the upper classes in 
their own polis, but when they travelled to other poleis they would have had to support 
themselves. They probably did not have the skills (or the desire) to compete with those who had 
trades—metics. But, they were educated and what was available to them was teaching, provided 
they had something to teach for which there was a market and a demand.  
 
With changes in the legal and political systems in Athens in the 5th century, over a comparatively 
short period of time there arose the need for the average person to be able to persuade and to 
counter-argue. This was an opportunity that suited these educated wanderers and they took steps 
to exploit it. As in any market, for the products that brought about the greatest benefits there arose 
the greatest demand.  
 
Strictly speaking, Sophists were itinerant educators who operated independently and 
charged fees. Different Sophists taught different ranges of subjects, but all taught rhetoric, 
the art of constructing and delivering public speeches, which was seen as the key to success 
in public and private life (McKirahan, 1994, p. 363). 
 
At the time there was an interesting mix of thinkers. Many were born around the same time, 500-
490 BC, and on or near Sicily. They were all aware of Parmenides and some of what they did was a 
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response to him. It was also the time of a split into two lines of development. There was a 
continuation of theories about the world, and there also arose the interest in actions—justifications 
of past actions or of proposed actions. Protagoras, for example, dabbled in both streams, but 
obviously could only earn a living in the second one; teaching or passing on theories about the 
world had no obvious utility at the time.  
 
What is crucial to the developments is that what had been developing with the natural 
philosophers, the use of reasons to persuade others to accept ideas about the world could now be 
employed to persuade others of the rightness or wrongness of actions taken (the law courts) or of 
actions proposed (the political assembly). This has been touched upon above, including in the Iliad 
and with Xenophanes’ argument for the polis supporting and maintaining him. With changes in 
Syracuse first, and then in Athens, it was this need that became a driving force. 
 
So, while the natural philosophers were expressing their ideas and their reasons across Greece, in 
Syracuse a new, unconnected line of development arose in response to citizens needing to apply to 
the courts for the return of their land and property. This line began as what was originally referred 
to as persuasion (peitho) and later came to be called rhetoric.  
 
In 467 BC, a democratic regime was established in Syracuse and land and property that had been 
‘redistributed’ earlier was being reclaimed by the original owners through the law courts. In order 
to help with this process, Corax and Tisias, or Tisias the Corax (crow),23 who was apparently a 
lawyer, put together a treatise in the form of a handbook—how to persuade in a legal setting. He 
made two main contributions: (1) dividing the judicial speech into parts: proem, narration, 
statement of arguments, refutation of opposing arguments, and summary, and (2) the argument 
from probability, which was touched on earlier with the story of Apollo and two-day-old Hermes. 
Aristotle gives an example: 
 
. . . for example, if a weak man were charged with assault, he should be acquitted as not 
being a likely suspect for the charge: for it is not probable [that a weak man would attack 
another]. And if he is a likely suspect, for example, if he is strong, [he should be acquitted]; 
for it is not likely [that he would attack another] for the very reason that it was going to seem 
probable [to the judges] (Aristole, Rhetorica: 2.24.11). 
 
While the sophists were mainly an Athenian phenomenon, the roots of what they taught arose 
elsewhere. The understanding of what it was to give reasons arose with the Eleatics and the need 
to be able to arose with the new legal and political contexts. The itinerant teachers recognised an 
opportunity to add to their syllabus and those who did it best became quite wealthy. The first two 
were Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini, and even though rhetoric went on to develop 
considerably (particularly with Isocrates in the 4th C), what these first two did is representative—




                                                     
23 The discussion has been ongoing—were Corax and Tisias one or two people? 
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13.2  Protagoras of Abdera (490-420) 
 
13.2.a  A teaching story or an argument? 
 
Socrates: . . .  So if you can clarify for us how virtue is teachable, please don’t begrudge 
us your explanation. 
Protagoras:  I wouldn’t think of begrudging you an explanation, Socrates . . . But would you 
rather that I explain by telling you a story, as an older man to a younger 
audience, or by developing an argument? 
 . . . 
Protagoras:  On this subject [on good men teaching their sons, etc.], Socrates, I will abandon 
story for argument (Plato, Protagoras 320b8 and 324d3). 
 
The earliest of the sophists was Protagoras, born in Abdera around 490 and died about 420. Hence, 
he was active during an important time for the development of reason. He seems to have spent 
some time in Athens and was connected with the circle around Pericles. He was the first to refer to 
himself as a Sophist, he charged fees for what he taught, and he became wealthy. He was known 
for a book of arguments that can be used to ‘throw’ an opponent, a book called the Antilogies or 
“Contrary Arguments”, his “man is the measure” relativism, his scepticism of knowledge of the 
gods, and his claim to teach arête (virtue or excellence), supposedly the key to success in life. In the 
following fragments he is made to speak for himself.     
 
[Protagoras on what he teaches and the value of his teachings.] My boy, if you associate with 
me, the result will be that the very day you begin you will return home a better person, and 
the same will happen the next day too. Each day you will make constant progress toward 
being better. . . . [Protagoras teaches a young man] good counsel concerning his personal 
affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also concerning the city’s affairs, 
so that as far as the city’s affairs go he may be most powerful in acting and in speaking 
(Plato, Protagoras 318a, 318e–319a = DK 80A5). 
 
This fragment above establishes Protagoras’ credentials as a teacher. Education in Greece was well 
established at the time, consisting of physical and intellectual training—mousike—which consisted 
of music, dance, lyrics and poetry. Reading and writing were learnt in the context of memorising, 
reciting and writing Homer and other ancient texts. 
 
Plato allows Anytus in Meno to accuse the sophists of exactly what he was later to accuse Socrates 
of in the Apology,  
 
By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of 
mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by 
them [sophists]; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to 
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13.2.b  Higher education and how to succeed— 
 
Protagoras is suggesting a ‘higher education’, learning how to succeed. In the following fragments 
he explains how this will be done. Again, it is in contrast with the traditional learning process.  
 
Teaching requires nature and training. . . . Learning must begin at an early age (Anecdota 
Parisiensia I 171, 31 = DK 80B3). 
 
Art (tekhnē) without practice and practice without art are nothing (Stobaeus, Selections 3.29.80 
= DK 80B10). 
 
Education is not implanted in the soul unless one reaches a greater depth (Pseudo-Plutarch, 
On Training 178.25 = DK 80B11). 
 
 
13.2.c  The ability to know the gods—the two sides of the discussion 
 
The next fragment is Protagoras’ thoughts about knowing the gods. Although not an argument, 
the fragment does introduce what was to become a feature of the methods of the sophists, the two 
sides of the equation: “that they are or that they are not”. 
 
Concerning the gods I am unable to know either that they are or that they are not or what 
their appearance is like. For many are the things that hinder knowledge: the obscurity of the 
matter and the shortness of human life (Eusebius, Preparation of the Gospel 14.3.7 = DK 80B4). 
 
Not mentioned above but below is the idea that either side could be argued for.  
 
Protagoras was the first to declare that there are two mutually opposed arguments on any 
subject (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 9.51 = DK 80A1). 
 
That is, equally strong arguments could be devised to persuade (1) that gods are, and (2) that gods 
are not, and this could be done despite the various things that hinder knowledge that he mentions. 
This strategy can also be applied to people, and this is what the sophists became known for. As an 
academic exercise, praising and blaming the same person would take some practice. In reality, 
taken into the law courts or the assembly, it could have significant real-world consequences.    
 
This is making the weaker argument stronger. And people were rightly annoyed at 
Protagoras’ promise (Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.24 1402a24–26 = DK 80A21). 
 
Protagoras made the weaker and stronger argument and taught his students to blame and 
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13.2.d  Myside bias or epistemic confidence: What I think is right is right. 
 
The question of what is right therefore arises. Is it right to praise someone who does not deserve 
praise, and vice versa? The problem becomes one of deciding which arguments to put forward 
and which arguments to accept. On this point, Protagoras’ famous comment is the first reference 
to relativism of this sort:    
 
A person is the measure of all things—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are 
not, that they are not (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7.60 = DK 80B1). 
 
No reasons are recorded, but, being a sophist, Protagoras presumably had them. Plato took “Man 
is the measure of all things" to mean there is no absolute truth, nothing beyond what each person 
believes to be the truth. Protagoras’ statement has led to endless discussion. It seems to disregard 
Homer and the like, and to be in contrast to the ‘philosophers’ who were arguing for an objective, 
universal truth. Since Protagoras’ reasons or arguments have not survived we cannot more 
rigorously evaluate the idea. Perhaps it was not referring to Truth, with a capital ‘T’ but rather 
right and wrong. What is right is what we believe is right, until we come to or are persuaded to 
change our mind. Without reasons, we are at sea. We have no way of evaluating the idea on the 
basis of someone else’s reasons and so do so on the basis of the ideas we hold at the time, which 
may not be optimal. Reasons (explanations, arguments) make all the difference.  
 
 
13.2.e  Contradiction is impossible—reasoning about reasoning 
 
Although the argument does not survive, Protagoras’ idea that contradiction is impossible was 
later taken up by Prodicus and Antisthenes (both active after Protagoras’ death); their arguments 
have likewise not survived other than a rough referral by Aristotle in Metaphysics (1024b20-
1025a1).  
 
He was the first to use in dialectic the argument of Antisthenes that attempts to prove that 
contradiction is impossible (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 9.53 = DK 80A1). 
 
The question is whether he actually believed this or whether it was an example of the sort of thing 
he did. Gorgias, in his Helen, refers to constructing arguments against what is commonly accepted 
as a sort of pastime or form of entertainment. Without reasons it can be difficult to decide, but this 
can be the case even with reasons—depending on the type and strength of the reasons. What is 
needed are the appropriate reasons, and these are determined by the outcome: reasons can be 
considered appropriate when they result in agreement and/or acceptance. And, this is what the 
sophists claimed to teach.   
 
Finally is a fragment from the Dissoi Logoi (Twofold Arguments or Contrasting Arguments). It was 
written around 420 BC either anonymously or by an author who has been long forgotten. It gives 
examples of the sorts of arguments Protagoras or other sophists might write or have their student 
practice writing. The emphasis is on providing arguments for and against certain claims. What is 
important in exercises of this nature was that it forced the consideration of the opponents’ points 
of view. The language and the way the arguments are laid out are repeated in other sophistic 
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fragments, and continue to this day in the form of university essays. This will become more 
evidence with Gorgias’ Helen below.     
 
(1) Twofold arguments are also stated concerning the false and the true, of which one 
declares that true logos [speech, statement] and false logos are different from one another, and 
others that they are the same.  
(2) And I say the following. First, that true and false logos are expressed in the same words. 
Second, when a logos is spoken, if events have occurred the way the logos is spoken, the logos 
is true, but if they have not occurred, the same logos is false.  
(3) Suppose it accuses someone of sacrilege. If the deed took place, the logos is true, but if it 
did not take place, it is false. And the logos of the defendant is the same. And the courts 
judge the same logos to be both false and true.  
. . . 
(7) As a result of the argument they say these things because if the thing occurred the logos is 
true, but if it did not then it is false. Therefore it is not their name that differs, but the fact of 
the matter. 
(8) Moreover, if anyone should ask the jurors what they are judging (since they are not 
present at the events),  
(9) these people too agree that the logos with which falsehood is mixed is false, and that with 
which truth is mixed is true. This is the entire difference (Dissoi Logoi 90.4). 
 
True and false accounts are both different from and the same as each other. For example, they are 
the same in that the same words are spoken in expressing the account. But, they are different 
depending on whether the event occurred according to the account or not. If the event matches the 
account, logos is true. If the event does not match the account, the logos is false. In this way, true 
and false accounts are both the same and different. 
 
The final points suggest the relevance of the argument to the real world. How can the jurors 
decide which accounts are true and which are false if they can be both? The answer seems to 
suggest probability. It doesn’t give a clear method. 
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13.3  Gorgias of Leontini (c.487-376) 
 
Socrates:  And what is this thing [oratory, rhetoric] you’re referring to? 
Gorgias:  I’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, 
councillors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any 
other political gathering that might take place.  
. . . 
Gorgias:  The persuasion I mean, Socrates, is the kind that takes place in law courts and in 
those other large gatherings, as I was saying a moment ago. And it’s concerned 
with those matters that are just and unjust. (Plato, Gorgias, 452e1-4 and 454b4-6) 
 
Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily was contemporary with Protagoras, both being born around 490. He 
described himself as a teacher of rhetoric (which had arisen in Sicily) and he had a good following. 
He visited Athens in 427 as part of an embassy from his polis and became recognised for his 
speeches. Due to his popularity and success at attracting students, he decided to stay. He lived 
until 100 or thereabouts.  
 
Not much survives of his writings, and perhaps the philosophers were partly to blame for this: 
“Due in large part to the influence of Plato and Aristotle, the term sophistry has come to signify the 
deliberate use of fallacious reasoning, intellectual charlatanism and moral unscrupulousness”.24 
On the other hand, since the sophists were teaching technique, nothing much needed to survive—
each generation, once they had a good grasp of the techniques could create their own writings. The 
philosophers did seem to place more value ideas and therefore maintained and transmitted them, 
as the texts of Plato and Aristotle attest. This is not to suggest that the sophists did not do the 
same, only that if they did, evidenced has not survived. The writings of such as Gorgias can be 
considered text books, exemplars and exercises. Plato gives a good depiction of Gorgias that is 
generally accepted as fairly accurate in his dialogue of the same name.  
 
 
13.3.a  The argument that nothing exists 
 
The first fragment is Sextus Empiricus’ report of Gorgias’ argument for “nothing exists”. It begins 
with a summary (1) – (3) and then arguments for each point. I will only present the argument for 
nothing exists.  
 
(1) Nothing exists. 
(2) If anything exists, it is incomprehensible. 
(3) If it is comprehensible, it is incommunicable. 
 
(1) Nothing exists. 
If anything exists, it must be either Being or Not-Being, or both Being and Not-Being. 
(a) It cannot be Not-Being, for Not-Being does not exist; if it did, it would be at the same 
time Being and Not-Being, which is impossible.  
                                                     
24 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/sophists/ 
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(b) It cannot be Being, for Being does not exist. If Being exists, it must be either 
everlasting, or created, or both. 
i. It cannot be everlasting; if it were, it would have no beginning, and therefore 
would be boundless; if it is boundless, then it has no position, for if it had 
position it would be contained in something, and so it would no longer be 
boundless; for that which contains is greater than that which is contained, and 
nothing is greater than the boundless. It cannot be contained by itself, for then 
the thing containing and the thing contained would be the same, and Being 
would become two things—both position and body—which is absurd. Hence 
if Being is everlasting, it is boundless; if boundless, it has no position (‘is 
nowhere’); if without position, it does not exist. 
(The arguments continue in this vein.) (Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Mathematicians 7.65-86 = DK 82B3) 
 
The arguments above are no off-the-cuff response to a “Why?” question. They took time and 
thought. They are a restating and restructuring of Eleatic ideas, without the faults. As a 
continuation of questions about the world, they add little but clarity.  
 
 
13.3.b  Judicial, deliberative, and epideictic rhetoric 
 
However, interest and clarity about the world was not where the sophists were focused. They were 
in the business of teaching persuasion and rhetoric, and if they were going to attract students, they 
needed examples of what they could do in the arenas that counted—arguing for or against actions 
in the law courts, as accuser or defender, and arguing for or against proposed actions in the 
assembly. They separated speeches into three general types on the basis of purpose: 
 
1. Judicial speeches—legal, forensic, with the purpose to accuse or defend 
2. Deliberative speeches—legislative, political, with the purpose to exhort or dissuade  
3. Epideictic speeches—ceremonial, with the purpose to commemorate or blame 
 
An example of the first is the trial of Socrates. An example of the second is Alcibiades persuading 
the Athenians to invade Sicily in 415 (during the Peloponnesian War, when they were already 
busy fighting off the Spartans25). An example of the third is Pericles’ Funeral Oration, given at the 
end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War 
 
The point is that the sophists needed to be able to do more than construct crisper and clearer 
natural-philosophy-type reasons and arguments. They needed to be able to do what they were 
advertising as being able to do, teach people how to persuade when and where it became not only 
necessary but also crucial. The proof of the success of process was not whether others accepted the 
ideas but whether they changed their behaviour. The outcomes of sophistic-type persuasion were 
real-world actions that had real-world consequences. An idea can be considered good if when 
acted upon it brings about good consequences; reasons can be considered good if they persuade 
                                                     
25 The reason was to strip Sicily of resources in order to continue the fight against the Spartans, which does sound 
reasonable. 
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others to take the action. Gorgias’ two surviving extended persuasive arguments, his Encomium of 
Helen and Defence of Palamedes, give ample proof of this focus. 
 
 
13.3.c  Gorgias, Encomium of Helen26 
 
[1] For a city the finest adornment is a good citizenry, for a body beauty, for a soul wisdom, 
for an action arête, and for a speech truth; and the opposites of these are indecorous. A man, 
woman, speech, deed, city or action that is worthy of praise should be honoured with 
acclaim, but the unworthy should be branded with blame. For it is equally error and 
ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and praise the blameworthy. [2] The man who speaks 
correctly what ought to be said has a duty to refute those who find fault with Helen. Among 
those who listen to the poets a single-voiced, single-minded conviction has arisen about this 
woman, the notoriety of whose name is now a reminder of disasters. My only wish is to 
bring reason to the debate, eliminate the cause of her bad reputation, demonstrate that her 
detractors are lying, reveal the truth, and put an end to ignorance. 
 
The underlined sections above illustrate pathos and ethos, two important components of rhetoric. 
Statements are made that are obviously true or that are going to be immediately accepted. The 
audience is praised and flattered in order to get them on side—this is more obvious in the section 
below: “For to tell those who know something they know carries conviction, but does not bring 
pleasure,” implying that the audience is knowledgeable and not to be spoken down to. Each 
component of the proem above has a specific function, which well illustrates what was being 
taught by the sophists. Some of this was from Tisias. What the sophists added was the logos or 
persuasive arguments, refutations and counter-arguments, which are in the following sections. 
 
[3] That the woman I speak of is by nature and birth the foremost of the foremost, men or 
women, is well known by all. . . . [5] Who it was or why or how he took Helen and fulfilled 
his love, I shall not say. For to tell those who know something they know carries conviction, 
but does not bring pleasure. Now that my speech has passed over the past, it is to the 
beginning of my future speech that I proceed and propose the likely reasons for Helen’s 
journey to Troy. 
 
The details can be skipped . . . The section above ends with a clear statement of intent. 
And the beginning of the following section is what is called in modern academic writing the thesis 
statement. It is now up to the author to persuade the reader to agree to his four arguments. That is, 
what are needed are conclusions supported by persuasive reasons—either for or against.  
 
[6] Either she did what she did because of the will of fortune and the plan of the gods and the 
decree of necessity, or she was seized by force, or persuaded by words, (or captured by love).  
 
The outline of the argument: If she left for the first reason, then any who blame her deserve blame 
themselves, for a human’s anticipation cannot restrain a god’s inclination. For by nature the 
                                                     
26 Translated from the Greek by Brian R. Donovan. 
http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/gorgias/helendonovan.htm#cite 
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stronger is not restrained by the weaker but the weaker is ruled and led by the stronger; the 
stronger leads, the weaker follows. Now, a god is stronger than a human in strength, in wisdom, 
and in other respects; and so if blame must be attached to fortune and god, then Helen must be 
detached from her ill repute.  
 
 
Argument 1: Helen was persuaded by the will of fortune and the plan of the gods because . . . 
 
(1) The weaker are ruled by the stronger. 
(2) The gods are stronger than humans.          
(3) Therefore, humans are ruled by the gods.  
 
If humans are ruled by the gods, then any actions taken by humans are at the behest of the gods. 
This being the case, the gods and not the humans (Helen) are to be blamed for any misfortune.  
 
 
Argument 2: Helen was persuaded by physical force because . . . 
 
[7] If she was forcibly abducted and unlawfully violated and unjustly assaulted . . .  
 
(1) It is a crime to forcibly abduct, unlawfully violate and unjustly assault someone. 
(2) The perpetrator and not the victim should be blamed and punished for this. 
(3) If Helen was forcibly abducted, unlawfully violated and/or unjustly assaulted, she was 
the victim.                                                                                                                             
(4) Then, Helen, as the victim, should not be blamed or punished for any misfortune. 
 
 
Argument 3: Helen was persuaded by speech (logos) because . . . 
 
[8] If speech (logos) persuaded and deluded her mind, even against this it is not hard to defend her 
or free her from blame . . .  
 
(1) Speech is a powerful persuader and compeller. 
(2) If, through speech, someone is persuaded to do something, then the persuader is the 
wrongdoer, not the persuaded.                                                                                                     
(3) Therefore, if Helen was persuaded, those who persuaded her were the wrongdoers and 
therefore they should be blamed.  
 
 
Argument 4: Helen was persuaded by love because . . .  
 
[15] The case has been made: if she was persuaded by speech, her fortune was evil, not her action. 
The fourth reason, I discuss in my fourth argument. If it was love that did all these things, she will 
easily escape blame for the error that is said to have occurred.  
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Argument 4 has two parts: either love is a god or love is a sickness: 
  
(1) Love is a god. 
(2) Gods are stronger than humans.                                                         
(3) Therefore weaker humans (Helen) can not refuse or reject them. 
 
(1) Love is a human sickness and a mental weakness. 
(2) This means any actions taken are not mistakes but misfortunes. 
(3) And, people (Helen) should not be blamed for misfortune. 
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
[20] How then can the blame of Helen be considered just? Whether she did what she did, 
invaded by love, persuaded by speck, impelled by force or compelled by divine necessity, 
she escapes all blame entirely. 
 
I have composed this discourse because . . . 
 
[21] With my speech I have removed this woman’s ill repute; I have abided by the rule laid 
down at the beginning of my speech; I have tried to dispel the injustice of blame and the 
ignorance of opinion; I wished to write this speech for Helen’s encomium and my 
amusement. 
 
Since the Helen was used as an exemplar, there is not much more that needs to be said. It provides 
a template and an example for anyone who would like to or need to argue for or against an idea of 
any kind. The method is clear. And, once having mastered the method, the text (book) is no longer 
necessary. This may be another reason for so few of the writings of the early sophists surviving. 
 
 
13.3.d  The Defence of Palamedes 
 
Palamedes was a major character in the Trojan War but not mentioned in the Iliad. Odysseus 
accused him of betraying the Greeks to the Trojans and soon after he was killed, perhaps by 
stoning, although there are other versions. In this defence, as in Helen, Gorgias takes it upon 
himself to present an epideictic speech that Palamedes might have given to a jury. The same 
strategy is followed as in Helen above, of presenting imaginary ‘legal’ arguments. In what follows, 
I have left the proem as it is, extracted the arguments, and then left the summary. The arguments 
rely to a degree on probability, which was at times frowned upon: 
 
[O]ne who intends to be an able rhetorician has no need to know the truth about the things 
that are just or good or yet about the people who are such either by nature or upbringing. No 
one in a law court, you see, cares at all about the truth of such matters. They only care about 
what is convincing. This is called “the likely” and that is what a man who intends to speak 
according to art should concentrate on. Sometimes, in fact, whether you are prosecuting or 
defending a case, you must not even say what actually happened, if it was not likely to have 
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happened—you must say something that is likely instead. Whatever you say, you should 
pursue what is likely and leave the truth aside: the whole art consists in cleaving to that 
throughout your speech (Plato, Phaedrus 272d1-36).    
 
The section above is Socrates discussing the art of rhetoric with Phaedrus; specifically, his 
disapproval of the use of arguing from probability. His response, at least in the dialogues, was to 
devise more rigorous forms of argument for his own ends. Since Socrates was engaged in what he 
did at the same time as Gorgias and the other earlier sophists (the 420s), his opinions seem valid—
even if they were put in his mouth by Plato many years later. But, back to Gorgias’ Palamedes: 
 
[1] To the Jury: This trial is concerned not with death, which comes to all, but with honour: 
whether I am to die justly or unjustly, under a load of disgrace. You have the power to 
decide the issue; you can kill me easily if you wish, whereas I am powerless. If the accuser 
Odysseus were bringing the charge because he knew or believed me to be betraying Greece 
to the barbarians, he would be the best of men, as ensuring the safety of his country, his 
parents and all Greece, as well as the punishment of the traitor. But if he has concocted this 
charge through malice, he is equally the worst of men. 
  
[2]   Where shall I begin my defence? A cause unsupported by proof engenders fear, and fear 
makes speech difficult, unless truth and necessity instruct me—teachers more productive of 
risk than of the means of help. 
 
The accuser cannot know for certain that I committed the crime, because I know for certain 
that I did not. But if he is acting on conjecture, I can prove in two ways that he is wrong. 
  
[3]   First, I cannot have committed the crime.  
 
(1) Treasonable action must begin with discussion.  
(2) But discussion implies a meeting.  
(3) A meeting was impossible since no one could come to me and I could not go to 
anyone.  
(4) It was also impossible to send a written message. 
(5) Therefore, treasonable action was impossible. 
 
 
(1) Myself, a Greek, and the enemy, a barbarian, did not understand each other's 
language. 
(2) Therefore, direct communication would have been impossible between us. 
(3) We could have used an interpreter, but this would have meant having an 
accomplice. 
(4) But, as no accomplice has been mentioned or suggested. 
(5) There was no communication. 
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[6]   What motive could I have had?  
 
(1) I could not have seized rulership over the barbarian by persuasion, nor would they have 
handed it to me voluntarily. 
(2) Therefore, rulership over the barbarian was impossible. 
(3) Therefore, it couldn’t have been my motive.  
 
(1) Wealth is needed by those who spend much; not by those who are masters of their 
natural pleasures, but by those who are enslaved by pleasures, or wish to buy honour 
with riches.  
(2) I have moderate means.  
(3) I call you to witness that my past life proves me not to be one who needs more. 
(4) Therefore, wealth was not my motive.  
 
(1) Honour accrues to virtue, not to a betrayer of Greece.  
(2) I had honour already, from you for my wisdom.   
(3) Therefore, my motive cannot have been ambition. 
 
[8]   That you have no knowledge of your accusations is clear.  
 
Hence they must be conjectural, and you are the most villainous of men, to bring a capital 
charge relying on opinion—which is a most unreliable thing—and not knowing the truth. 
Conjecture is open to all in everything, and you are no wiser than anyone else in this. One 
must believe, not conjecture, but truth. 
 
[9]   You are accusing me of two opposites, wisdom and madness: wisdom in that I am 
crafty, clever, resourceful; madness in that I wished to betray Greece. It is madness to 
attempt what is impossible, disadvantageous, disgraceful injurious to friends and helpful to 
enemies, and likely to make one's life intolerable. But how can one believe a man who in the 
same speech, to the same audience, says the exact opposite about the same things? 
 
(1) Wisdom is the opposite of madness. 
(2) You are accusing me of both. 
(3) It is not possible for me to be both wise and not-wise; I must be one or the other. 
(4) To accuse me of both must mean that you are not telling the truth. 
 
Here I stop. A summary of a long speech is worthwhile when one is speaking to a jury of 
inferiors; but before the leaders of Greece it is uncalled-for, as is the exhortation to pay 
attention or to remember what has been said. 
 
According to Freeman, “This speech has at first sight little philosophical interest; but its influence 
on forensic oratory, and therefore doubtless on education, cannot be over-estimated” (Freeman, 
1949, p.134). 
 
The Helen and the Defence of Palamedes both demonstrate that the ability to devise and evaluate 
arguments intended to persuade had become well developed by the mid-420s. The two texts seem 
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more consistent with the idea of backward inferencing from the claim or conclusion Gorgias wants 
to push than with forward inferencing from immediate premises. Considering that Gorgias first 
visited Athens in 427, he was in his 60s and the Socrates in the dialogue Gorgias was in his 40s. 
Gorgias’ fragments show a maturity both of thought and of method. The interests of the natural 
philosophers can now be left behind, and the method can be applied to other areas.  
 
Although there are examples of arguments used for persuasion in historical and medical texts, I 
don’t have the space to explore them. On the other hand, one of the most famous examples is in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds, where he portrays Socrates as a sophist. The play was submitted to the City 
Dionysia in 423 BC and was judged third of the three plays that year. It was revised between 420 
and 417 and circulated in manuscript form. The fact that a playwright could so accurately lampoon 
a ‘sophistic’ argument suggests the method was well known at the time. That Socrates was 
originally portrayed as a sophist suggests that Plato either made an effort in his dialogues to 
change the impression or that at the time, either the idea of ‘philosophers’ had not arisen or they 
were not considered to be different or engaged in different activities. 
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13.4  Aristophanes 
 
I have included some excerpts from Aristophanes’ The Clouds because I believe they may give a 
more accurate account of what Socrates was doing, or was perceived to be doing, in the agora and 
elsewhere. His lampooning of the intellectual fashions in Athens at the time, particularly the 
sophists, and his use of Socrates as the main character, the head sophist of a local Thinking Shop, 
seems a little extreme. Speeches were being made in the law courts and the assembly and they 
were more substantial than in the play. Plato is perhaps a little extreme in the other direction. 
What was going on and what Socrates and the sophists were doing was perhaps somewhere 
between these. At this time, philosophy had yet to appear and so it was reasonably assumed that 
anyone engaging in sophist-like behaviour or associating with sophists was also a sophist. Another 
interesting point is Aristophanes’ portrayal of sophists as “wretches . . . those quacks with pale 
faces, those barefoot fellows . . .” Plato later portrays philosophers as somewhat aristocratic, rarely 
needing to work, with plenty of free time on their hands. The portrayal of Socrates in The Clouds 
came back to haunt him at his trial, where Plato has him rue the ‘false impression’ of 23 years 
earlier.  
 
The play is a comedy and starts with a conversation is between Strepsiades and his son 
Phidippides. Later, Socrates enters the picture. I have focused on the setup and on one example of 
‘sophistic’ wordplay. Someone Socrates respected was the sophist Prodicus, who was known for 
his teaching of linguistics and ethics. The wordplay below may have been foisted on Socrates due 
to his association. There is nothing in the play that resembles Plato or Xenophon’s Socrates or his 
elenchus or maieusis. Had he not developed them by 423, was he not known for them at the time, or 
was what he was doing not understood or misinterpreted?      
 
In the following excerpts, what comes across clearly is the use of reasoning in two senses. The first 
is the reasoning that seems to have gone into coming up with the ideas and arguments in the first 
place—discovering the world through the use of reason. The second is the reasoning that went into 
the various strategies to persuade other characters in the play to accept strange ideas. The point is 




That is the Thoughtery (Thinkery, Thinking Shop) of wise souls (sophists). There they prove 
that we are coals enclosed on all sides under a vast snuffer, which is the sky. If well paid, 
these men also teach one how to gain law-suits, whether they be just or not. 
 




Bah! The wretches! I know them; you mean those quacks with pale faces, those barefoot 
fellows, such as that miserable Socrates and Chaerephon? 
 
Phidippides 
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And what is it I should learn [from them]? 
 
Strepsiades 
It seems they have two courses of reasoning, the true and the false, and that, thanks to the 
false, the worst law-suits can be gained. If then you learn this science, which is false, I shall 
not have to pay an obolus of all the debts I have contracted on your account. 
 
. . . 
 
Socrates 
Then what do you want to know? 
 
Strepsiades 
Not that, not that, but the art of false reasoning. 
 
Socrates 
But you must first learn other things. Come, what are the male quadrupeds? 
 
Strepsiades 
Oh! I know the males thoroughly. Do you take me for a fool then? The ram, the buck, the 
bull, the dog, the pigeon. 
 
Socrates 
Do you see what you are doing; is not the female pigeon called the same as the male? 
 
Strepsiades 
How else? Come now! 
 
Socrates 
How else? With you then it's pigeon and pigeon! 
 
Strepsiades 
That's right, by Poseidon! But what names do you want me to give them? 
 
Socrates 
Term the female pigeonnette and the male pigeon. 
 
Strepsiades 
Pigeonnette! Hah! By the air! That's splendid! For that lesson bring out your kneading-
trough and I will fill him with flour to the brim. 
 
Socrates 
There you are wrong again; you make trough masculine and it should be feminine. 
 
Strepsiades 
What? If I say, him, do I make the trough masculine? 
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Socrates 






Then trough is of the same gender as Cleonymus? 
 
Strepsiades 
My good man! Cleonymus never had a kneading-trough; he used a round mortar for the 
purpose. But come, tell me what I should say! (Aristophanes, 419 BC) 
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14.0  SOCRATES OF ATHENS (469-399) 
 
 
Finally, Socrates. Being born in Athens in 469, he must have been influenced by the natural 
philosophers and the sophists. In his own words, he turned away from the natural philosophers 
for certain reasons.  
 
As Plato portrays him, Socrates was an inquirer who came into contact with a range of thinkers 
and ideas (directly or written). The earliest portrayal is of his meeting with Parmenides, which 
may have been around 450-445, when Socrates was young—in his early twenties. He seems to 
have been one of a loose group who considered a range of topics. As he states below, he studied 
with the natural philosophers and rejected their focus on causes. There is little mention of studying 
with the sophists, but he clearly learnt and understood their methods. 
 
When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call 
investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, 
why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; . . . 
And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the 
phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally 
unfitted for this kind of investigation. . . . 
 I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and 
others also, thought I had before; . . .  
 I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even 
dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has 
become two . . . 
 Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is 
the mind that arranges and causes all things. . . . 
 My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with 
my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real 
causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many 
other absurdities (Plato, Phaedo, 95a). 
 
In other words, Socrates was looking for reasons and not physical explanations. Why things are 
and not how they are. Not finding what he was looking for, he came up with two methods of his 
own: the elenchus, or inquiry or refutation: 
 
Then let us again examine whether that is a sound statement, or do we let it pass, and if one 
of us, or someone else, merely says that something is so, do we accept that it is so? Or should 
we examine what the speaker means? (Plato, Euthyphro, 9e3). 
 
And the maieusis, or ‘midwifery:  
 
Now, my art of midwifery is just like theirs in most respects. The difference is that I attend 
men and not women, and that I watch over the labour of their souls, not of their bodies. And 
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the most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the 
offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an 
error, or a fertile truth (Plato, Theaetetus, 150a8). 
 
Both are based on an understanding of reason and argument, and both are carried out dialectically.  
 
Socrates’ methods were known and used by the sophists; however, while they used reason to 
persuade, Socrates used it to inquire. His elenchus can be found earlier with Zeno and his 
refutations, RAA and RAI, and other strategies. His maieusis can be found with Parmenides and 
Melissus, in the forward-inference interpretations of what they did in their arguments. Socrates 
used them to test (refute) knowledge and to attempt to discover truth, and he did it by the 
application of the principles of valid inference. 
 
The elenchus: 
Statement elicited—opening premise (1) A is B 
Premises added to the opening premise (2) B is C, and C is D, or C is not-A 
Conclusion drawn from the premises (3) A is D, which is absurd, or 
 (3’)  A is not-A, which is a contradiction 
 




Statement elicited—opening premise (1) A is B 
Premises added to the opening premise (2) B is C, and C is D                                  
Conclusion drawn from the premises (3) A is D, which was not known before 
 
Another important consideration is Socrates’ focus on definition. For him, correct definition leads 
to correct action. He asks Meno for generalisations or definitions, what he calls at one point, simile 
in multis, the similar in the many: 
 
Tell me, what is this very thing, Meno, in which they are all the same and do not differ from 
one another? Would you be able to tell me? (Plato, Meno, 72b9) 
 
Meno: . . . if you are seeking one definition to fit them all.  
 
Socrates: That is indeed what I am seeking (Plato, Meno, 73d1). 
 
You do not understand that I am seeking that which is the same in all these cases? (the simile 
in multis) (Plato, Meno, 75a2). 
 
. . . tell me what virtue is in the universal, and do not make a singular into a plural . . . (Plato, 
Meno, 77a4) 
 
. . . but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now but always 
(Plato, Meno, 89c8). 
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Unlike the sophists, Socrates did not accept payment for what he ‘taught’ and he didn’t devise 
arguments for both sides (in Plato; in Aristophanes, this was exactly how he was portrayed). In 
fact, what he did aligns with the ATR; he evaluated ideas and beliefs held by his fellow citizens 
about what they thought was right. He had no ideas of his own to push and hence no arguments 
supporting them. He was the artisan applying his craft. So, instead of long explanations or 
teaching stories:   
 
[Gorgias] has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which 
becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers . . . (Plato, 
Meno, 70b3) 
 
Which Socrates himself was able to do, as mentioned and demonstrated in Meno and several other 
dialogues:  
 
Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you? 
(Plato, Meno, 76c4) 
 
He engaged in the dialectic dialogue, which was a question and answer process carried out in a 
certain way that used only those ideas provided by his interlocutors. That is, as the following 
states, only those premises provided and held to be true by his audience: 
 
Socrates:  And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to 
him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the 
argument and refute me. But if we were friends . . . I should reply in a milder 
strain and more in the dialecticians’ vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the 
truth, but I should make use of premises which the person interrogated would be 
willing to admit (Plato, Meno, 75c8). 
 
Socrates:  Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in 
terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted? (Plato, Meno, 79d1). 
 
Much has been made of Socratic irony, “a pose of ignorance assumed in order to entice others into 
making statements that can then be challenged”,27 but when what Socrates was doing is fully 
understood, it becomes clear. He was not claiming to know that X, Y, and Z; he was testing others’ 
understanding, and as dialectic, this needed to start with their opinion. The fact that few of their 
ideas survived the elenchus illustrates his point that we don’t really know. However, by engaging 
in the process, we reach this conclusion for ourselves as a result of participating in the process 
(which must be dialectic). We persuade ourselves. 
 
  
                                                     
27 Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/Socratic_irony 
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Socrates:  Answer my questions—that is all. 
Alcibiades:  Nay, I should like you to be the speaker. 
Socrates:  What, do you not wish to be persuaded? 
Alcibiades:  Certainly I do. 
Socrates:  And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth? 
Alcibiades:  I think not. 
Socrates:  Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that the just is the 
expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another man again. 
Alcibiades:  I won’t; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm (Plato, 
Alcibiades 1, 113a6ff, abridged ). 
 
In this, there is a direct link to Xenophanes; we either don’t know or think we know but don’t or 
think we know and do but do not know that we are right. The reason Socrates elenchus was so 
memorable was the emotions it caused to arise, which has been called above, ‘dumbfoundment’. 
 
Meno:  I am at my wits’ end . . . you seem to be like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies 
those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me (Plato, 
Meno, 80a5). 
 
It is when this vulnerable, or annoyed, state is reached that Socrates suggests the second part of the 
process, the maieusis, the working towards the truth based on a starting premise that can be 
accepted. This process is comparable to the CTR interpretation of reasoning, forward inference to a 
conclusion. In the dialogues, it is a conclusion that is a definition of courage, or justice, or virtue 
itself, or one of the other virtues, in the working belief that if a person has a true definition of 
virtue they would naturally act in accordance with it. We only act against our best interests if we 
are not sure what they are and/or if we don’t know which action is most appropriate. 
 
Another important point is that Socrates would not provide counter-arguments. If someone did 
not agree with a particular statement, Socrates would not force the issue but move on to another 
statement. 
 
Example: taken from Alcibiades I, reference below. 




Ok. If you won’t accept statement A, will 





Right, we can continue.  
(If you learnt something, you must have 
learnt if from a teacher.) 
 
 
(If you didn’t learn it from a specific 
teacher; you must have learnt if from the 
many (hoi polloi)) 
 
Plato displays his various reasoning skills in his dialogues, such as when he has Gorgias ask what 
sort of answer Socrates would prefer (mentioned above). Another is in Meno when he refers to 
110 | P a g e  
hypothesis testing. Although this is basically what the elenchus is, Socrates did not seem to refer to 
what he was doing in these sorts of terms.  
 
Socrates:  At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question ‘Whether virtue is 
given by instruction, or in any other way’, to be argued upon hypothesis? 
. . . 
Socrates:  Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? 
Meno:  Certainly. 
Socrates:  Then now we have made a quick end of this question; if virtue is of such a nature, 
it will be taught; and if not, not? 
Meno:  Certainly 
Socrates:  The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? 
Meno:  Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. 
Socrates:  Do we not say that virtue is a good? This is a hypothesis which is not set aside. 
(Plato, Meno, 8631ff). 
 
 
14.1  Alcibiades needs to know what justice is  
 
Instruction implies that what is being passed on is known and understood beforehand. Plato’s 
dialogue Alcibiades can be used to illustrate this. The starting premise is accepted: “Those who are 
going to teach anything should first know it themselves.” But, how is Socrates going to persuade 
Alcibiades that he doesn’t know what justice is and that he needs to find a teacher—before 
attending the assembly and making his first speech? Of the many good arguments in Plato, this 
one is presented particularly clearly. I have summarised it. 
 
Socrates:  To be a leader you need to know what justice is. 
Alcibiades:  I know what justice is. 
Socrates:  How did you learn? Who was your teacher? 
Alcibiades:  I didn’t have a specific teacher; I think I learnt about justice from “the many” 
(hoi polloi). 
Socrates:  You cannot call “the many” serious teachers. 
  And if you didn’t learn from a serious teacher how can you know you know 
what justice is? 
Alcibiades:  Why can’t “the many” be competent to teach? 
Socrates:  (1) Those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves. 
(2) Those who know a subject should agree with each other and not differ over 
what the subject is. 
(3) If “the many” differ it must mean they don’t know the subject. 
(4) As you know, “the many” do differ in their ideas of what justice is. 
(5) Therefore they do not know what justice is, and therefore they are not 
competent to teach it. 
(6) You need to look for another teacher (Plato, Alcibiades 1 106c2ff, abridged). 
 
Being able to instruct is the result of a process that includes self-conscious reflection, formalisation 
and perhaps systematisation. It also means adding these to a syllabus or curriculum to ensure they 
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are replicated and transmitted and also to minimise transmission errors. Ideas arise, survive 
selection, are transmitted, and are then superseded on a regular basis. While they are no longer 
accepted as true they are still transmitted. Sometimes this is passive, remaining in the records or 
the tribal memory, but other times it is active, being taught as history of ideas and such. There 
must be some benefit in continuing to transmit formerly-true ideas, but it is not always easy to 
determine what it is. Much of the records of the presocratics exemplify this point. Culture is 




14.2  Summary 
 
What Socrates did demonstrates that ATR-type reasoning was alive and well by 399 BC, and even 
earlier. How to construct arguments intended to persuade was being taught directly by the 
sophists and perhaps, by imitation, by Socrates. There are no dialogues where he actually teaches 
how to devise reasons or arguments, but Plato fully understood; otherwise, he wouldn’t have been 
able to portray it in his dialogues. This applies equally to evaluation. 
 
That people hold ideas and then confabulate reasons is demonstrated by Socrates’ use of the 
elenchus. His interlocutors change their reasons freely through the process of backwards inference. 
If one reason is not accepted, they reach for a more persuasive one (Haidt, 2012, p.45-47). That it is 
easier to inference backwards than forwards (in the CTR sense) is also suggested by the lack of 
successful attempts at the maieusis in the dialogues. 
 
By 399, therefore, there were three lines of development. The first was the natural philosophers 
answering questions about the world. ATR suggests that this would have been done with ideas 
arising intuitively and then backward inferencing to reasons as support—the theories of the 
natural philosophers. As noted, what Parmenides did, his All is One, no change, no motion, can be 
explained in both ATR and CTR terms. For those natural philosophers who followed, his theory 
could be considered a starting point and has arguments a way to devise further theories that 
contained many, change and motion. 
 
The second line was the sophists, teaching the art of persuasion to those who were interested or 
who needed it. They had certain devices and types of arguments and counter-arguments and 
could make the weaker argument the stronger. However, this is a relativistic criticism which could 
only hold if someone actually knew the truth or the facts, and people are notoriously unreliable 
witnesses. From an ATR perspective, the same criticism could be made of the natural philosophers 
along with Plato and his ilk. There is no truth, only ideas we accept or are persuaded to accept as 
true. The sophists were in the business of justifying actions already taken or proposed, not really 
the question of what is a right action, and definitely not the question of the arché and such. 
 
The third line was Socrates’ response to the natural philosophers and the sophists. Instead of 
judging actions after the fact, wouldn’t it be better to know what a virtuous action is first and then 
take it? That is, judge an action by principle rather than outcome. To be able to do this, he said, you 
should be able to tell me what a virtuous action is. In cultural evolution terms, this is the selection 
phase—expose definitions to some selective mechanism and accept those that survive. As the 
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evaluation becomes more rigorous the arguments become stronger, until with Socrates, nothing 
but sound arguments would do, and sound counter-arguments.   
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15.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Preparing this thesis has been a real-world experience of the argumentative theory of reasoning. 
Throughout the process I have been able to express a range of ideas to my supervisor, Micheal-
John Turp, for selection. Some have survived; many have not. The process of needing to provide 
reasons for my ideas as well as reflecting on and responding to refutations and counter-arguments 
has made me realise how important myside bias, selective laziness, and consideration of the 
audience are. As to those of my ideas that did not survive, some I am willing to change my mind 
about and accept Michael-John’s more persuasive accounts, but for others I still have some 
epistemic confidence but obviously not the skills to be able to devise a persuasive enough 
argument for. In writing the thesis, I am aware of the expected audience and need to consider what 
will be needed in order to persuade. In alignment with selective laziness, I do enough to persuade 
and no more. However, since my evaluation of the expected audience may be skewed, it may be a 
worthwhile strategy to aim a little higher. Overall, this thesis is a demonstration of my ability to 
reason in the ATR sense. To devise arguments intended to persuade, in the light of numerous 
other refutations and counter-arguments that I have in turn evaluated and reached decisions on.  
 
The thesis started with the question of whether to accept Aristotle’s claim or not. Was there logic, 
or anything like it, before he came onto the scene? Initially, this seemed a simple question to 
answer. The reasoning that was being carried out in Greece consciously and deliberately was 
something like logic, without the systematisation. It became apparent that before the question 
could be answered properly a second question needed to be addressed: what sort of reasoning are 
you talking about? The mental process of reasoning is possibly the same each time we carry it out, 
but the uses to which it is put, its function or functions, do vary. The recently arisen argumentative 
theory of reasoning introduced the idea that the main function of reasoning is argumentative. This 
meant that there were two possible ways to answer the question, from the ATR perspective and 
from the CTR perspective. 
 
The question had already been answered from the CTR perspective, and it was that there was 
reasoning but not logic before Aristotle, and perhaps Aristotle had other reasons for his claim. He 
may have been marketing his school. If the main function of reasoning is argumentative, then 
much of what has been said about the Greeks becomes moot. Any account that has them becoming 
better and better reasoners in the CTR sense misses the point if in fact the developments were in 
the ATR function. That is, they were becoming better and better at coming up with reasons for 
their intuitively arising beliefs about the world, and the theories that they are known for were not 
the result of forward inference but of backward inference after the fact. At the same time, in the 
face of these various new ideas and reasons they needed to and did become more objective and 
demanding in evaluating them. 
 
It now appears that the backward/forward inference description is a little simplistic. Someone 
may state an idea plus reasons in order to persuade. If the idea had arisen intuitively, the 
inferencing would have been backward, as described above. The listener would then evaluate the 
idea on the basis of the supporting reasons or argument. However, it might occur that someone 
hears an idea about an action without reasons or argument to support it. In this case, it is 
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reasonable to assume the person would forward inference in order to consider consequences and 
then judge the proposed action on this basis. Is this the fuzzy divide between ATR and CRT? Or, 
does it give us some idea of how CTR-type reasoning arose—a development from forward 
inferencing from unsupported statements of what ought to be done to forward inferencing from 
accepted ideas about the world to new and different ideas and theories?      
 
So, the conclusion is that the over the time considered, the Greeks became better reasoners in the 
sense of coming up with and evaluating reasons. These reasons were in the form of explanations 
and justifications. Explanations of how thing are or come to be. Justifications of past, present or 
proposed actions. Parmenides’ innovation, of using an argument to justify rather than explain how 
All is One added a new alternative reasoning; one that survived selection and went on to become 
of value. Arguments were still used to justify actions, but it was the action of believing that an idea 
or explanation about the world was true.  
 
In this way, reasons in the form of arguments were introduced into natural philosophy. In working 
out what Parmenides did, reasoning was also recognised for what it was, a form of persuasion, its 
benefits noticed, and it developed in its natural domain—communication, persuasion and 
cooperation. With the sophists. And, with tools accumulating. 
 
There were certain conditions in Greece at the time that favoured the developments. The Greeks 
were free to express ideas. They were free to evaluate ideas. There was a need to support ideas 
with reasons. There were the various deliberative settings and the competitive nature of the time. 
There was exposure to different and foreign ideas, which contributed to variation. On the other 
hand, not many of the ideas about the world were true. There is no telling that they survived 
selection, but they were recorded and transmitted along with the accompanying reasons in many 
cases, for other reasons. The way or ways of reasoning developed along with the products—the 
explanations and justifications, the arguments. This being the case, the situation in Greece matches 
fairly closely Sperber and Mercier’s description of ATR-type reasoning.  
 
The idea that truth can be reasoned to arose and this became a side effect, whether it is actually 
possible or not. By the late 5th C the Greeks were applying reason consciously and deliberately 
across a range of areas. That is, they were inventing and teaching, which means an understanding 
and a formalisation. This was before Aristotle. There was no logic before Aristotle, but there was 
not nothing. Reasoning was well developed.  
 
I believe that having an alternative account of the Greek development of reasoning, based on the 
ATR, is a worthwhile return on the investment in reinterpreting the records. It is at least as likely, 
and perhaps even more likely, to be an accurate account. Whether it is accepted depends on the 
ability to put the ATR into practice, and to persuade others to accept the findings—the main 
function of reasoning. If the reasons, explanations and arguments are lacking in some way, it may 
make the findings less persuasive, but does it make them less true? It is difficult to say.  
 
Socrates:  Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was 
the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we 
said that knowledge is only the guide of right action; whereas there is also right 
opinion.  
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Meno:  True. 
Socrates:  Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? 
Meno:  The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right 
but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not. 
Socrates:  What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has 
right opinion? (Plato, Meno, 97b1) 
. . . 
Socrates:  I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs 
from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things 
which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them (Plato, Meno, 98b1). 
 
In believing that demonstration can guarantee knowledge, Aristotle was in agreement with 
Sperber and Mercier. No matter how ideas arise in the first place, the best and most powerful way 
to persuade others to accept them is demonstration, sound deductive arguments. This is not easy 
to do; it takes time and effort, cognitive resources, in order to devise these sorts of arguments. The 
benefits, however, must be worth it, and they include making the idea or theory impossible to 
refute or counter-argue, guaranteeing others will accept it, and other important considerations 
such as reputation. This is of value in such areas as marketing and advertising, and in academia, 
where the argument still reigns.  
 
True opinion and knowledge, it seems, turn out to be the same thing. The only test is subjective, 
what others can be persuaded to accept. Interestingly enough, what is needed in order to 
transform true opinion into knowledge, an account or justification, is precisely what is needed in 
order to persuade others to accept it as such. Aristotle’s demonstration either guarantees 
knowledge or guarantees that true opinion is accepted as knowledge. Either way, the sound 
deductive argument is the strongest form of persuasion, it seems. But, this is dependent on the 
truth of the immediate premise, which, as Aristotle states, just sometimes has to be taken on faith. 
So, while reason functions well in its argumentative and evaluative guises, the various problems it 
encounters in its ratiocination guise, pointed out since Aristotle, means that it should not be the 
only option in seeking the truth.  
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